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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes three essays, which address signicant issues that health-
care practitioners throughout the world face today. The fundamental research that
I rst address is a research agenda for reimbursement impacts upon healthcare oper-
ations management. The purpose of the rst essay is to oer conceptual frameworks
that portray the fundamental architecture of the U.S. healthcare system and its
connections to healthcare reimbursement systems. The research method involves
inductive theory development. I contend such frameworks are useful for healthcare
operations management research. Using the frameworks, this essay suggests promis-
ing research opportunities that should stimulate emerging research themes in the
healthcare industry and in academic healthcare operations research. These ndings
furnish a research agenda with timely insights for practitioners and academia. One
conclusion of the essay is the lack of prior research relevant to healthcare reimburse-
ment processes and their impacts on healthcare operations. The essay also concludes
that key research opportunities relate to reimbursement boundaries, reimbursement
strategy, reimbursement resources, reimbursement impacts, and reimbursement tech-
nology.
In the second essay, I examine how scheduling policies can improve healthcare
quality and doctor eciency in outpatient healthcare facilities. The purpose is to
develop an outpatient appointment scheduling approach under situations of patient
no-shows and patient heterogeneity. Based on detailed analytical and simulation
methods, the essay evaluates and compares the performance of my approach against
several outpatient scheduling policies under various scenarios, and provides advice
regarding optimal policies for outpatient clinics. The ndings show that my pro-
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posed scheduling algorithms show ecient scheduling performance relative to prior
proposed policies. In short, the ndings of the second essay provide new applica-
ble scheduling polices for outpatient scheduling. The ndings also derive qualitative
implications for clinic schedulers for improving the most eective way of scheduling
outpatient operations. The conclusion is that the proposed scheduling approach can
be potentially useful for outpatient facilities.
Finally, the third essay empirically examines how managerial operational re-
sponses of hospitals vary in response to external pressures imposed upon them by
government policies. The purpose is to examine whether hospitals respond to such
policies by improving operating processes and quality outcomes, or by gaming their
response by adjusting patient case mixes and other metrics associated with nancial
benets for the hospital, instead of operational improvement. To validate whether
hospitals respond suitably to an ongoing U.S. government quality improvement pro-
gram, called the Value Based Purchasing (VBP) program, I explore how the program
inuences subsequent behaviors of U.S. hospitals. Using observational data from the
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and several other sources, I use
regression analysis methods to provide empirical evidence of the eects of this gov-
ernment policy. The essay ndings show that nancially penalized hospitals use
tactics consistent with symbolic practices, which may be an unintended outcome
from the VBP project. The conclusion is that theoretically motivated contextual
dierences exist in the behaviors of hospitals when facing these external government
pressures.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The large and growing body of research making up extant healthcare service
research has a general consensus that current healthcare systems suer from many
ineciencies of healthcare delivery (Green, 2012). In response, governmental bodies
and healthcare institutions are trying to ameliorate the ineciencies of the healthcare
system through a mix of new processes, policies, incentives, and penalties. This
dissertation examines several healthcare operations management topics inspired by
these developments. The dissertation comprises three essays concerning conceptual
foundations for healthcare operations management research, severe healthcare service
scheduling problems, and healthcare organizational responses to incentive policies.
Specically, the dissertation develops conceptual frameworks of the healthcare system
and healthcare reimbursement processes, analytical models of outpatient scheduling
processes, and econometric models for hospital procurement behaviors in response
to government nancial incentives.
A fundamental yet untouched area of research that I rst address concerns a
research agenda for healthcare operations management motivated by the healthcare
reimbursement process. The rst essay examines reimbursement processes within the
U.S. healthcare system to motivate research opportunities for operations and sup-
ply chain management (OM/SCM) researchers. Healthcare reimbursement processes
consist of coding, billing, and payment processes related to care provided. These pro-
cesses have signicant implications for nearly three trillion dollars of annual nancial
ows, making up the largest single sector of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). To
begin to address the implications of such enormous nancial ows for healthcare op-
erations managers, this essay uses conceptual frameworks to illustrate the complexity
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of multi-stakeholder healthcare reimbursement processes, identify salient operating
challenges, and develop an agenda of research opportunities. Healthcare organiza-
tions face numerous operating challenges and decreasing reimbursement rates due to
many regulatory and market pressures. Healthcare providers must conform to regula-
tions and policies of multiple external organizations that have power to exact control
over providers through both service provision and reimbursement. The often myopic
focus in extant research represents a signicant academic gap in understanding the
broad nature of reimbursement processes, regulations, and organizations. Health-
care service providers must adopt and conform their operations processes to many
reimbursement systems. The multiplicity of healthcare providers and reimbursement
systems generates operational complexity and uncertainty, which this essay illustrates
with end-to-end conceptual frameworks of healthcare reimbursement processes.
In the second essay, I consider an outpatient appointment scheduling system
involving patient no-shows and patient heterogeneity to tackle healthcare process
scheduling issues that lead to inecient performance and nancial outcomes. In
the current outpatient scheduling systems, patients are suering from long waiting
times while physicians are complaining about their overwork and overtime hours
(Cayirli et al., 2006). Accordingly, these factors may result in healthcare delivery
system operational failures, leading to worse healthcare outcomes. For example, Vet-
erans Aairs (VA) administrators falsied VA patient scheduling data, and reported
that VA facilities had satised required performance standards (Kensling and Nis-
senbaum, 2014). The root cause of the VA facilities scandal is an unbalance between
patients' prolonged waiting times and the available healthcare capacity. This prac-
tical issue and a gap within appointment scheduling research triggers the need for
exploring this particular project.
Specically, I study block scheduling policies for single providers under conditions
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of patient heterogeneity in service times and patient no-shows. The research objective
is to nd daily appointment schedules that minimize a weighted sum of patients'
waiting time, the physician's idle time, and the physician's overtime. Compared to
extant outpatient scheduling approaches, this essay contributes by suggesting new
sequential block scheduling procedures grounded in actual outpatient clinic practices
and in the successful Toyota Production System load smoothing approach, leading
to eective appointment schedules when scheduling two heterogeneous patient types.
The proposed block scheduling policy rst assigns a sequence of dierent patient
types, given patient demand and service time information. The policy then allocates
repetitive time blocks in a planning horizon. Using the block scheduling policy, I
examine dierent scenarios that outpatient clinics face, including patient overbooking
and open-access scheduling policies. The proposed approach is found to generally
perform better than methods proposed in prior work.
Finally, the third essay examines healthcare nancial incentive and penalty pol-
icy to determine whether one such program has changed practices and processes of
healthcare providers in the intended manner. Healthcare organizations still face pro-
cess and care outcome ineciencies. With the Aordable Care Act (ACA) launch
in 2010, U.S. healthcare policy required hospitals to focus on patient safety, care
quality, and process improvement. The Value Based Purchasing (VBP) program,
one of several federal regulations directed by Medicare based on a nancial com-
ponents approach for healthcare reimbursement, encourages hospital managers to
enhance process quality, improve patient satisfaction, and improve care outcomes.
Prior to the VBP program implementation, many practitioners claimed VBP would
have little impact or would lead to the unintended consequence of harming previously
poor-performing hospitals by instead giving nancial incentives to well-o hospitals.
Despite the expanding academic study of healthcare operations management, little
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research claries the practical behaviors of care provider operations when they mod-
ify practices and processes in response to external nancial regulatory pressures. By
combining secondary data sets from several sources, I empirically examine impacts
of VBP penalties on subsequent hospital behaviors. The study nds that nancially
penalized hospitals are more likely to adopt symbolic management practices, as rep-
resented by changes in their patient case mix and two additional monetary incentive
related measures.
My dissertation has several contributions in the operations and supply chain
management area. In the rst essay, the study highlights unexplored operational
process areas that have yet to be examined by healthcare OM/SCM scholars. Based
on the agenda of research opportunities the essay presents, operations management
researchers in the healthcare domain may need to extend their managerial interest
to healthcare reimbursement processes. Scholars cannot account for all of the factors
that enable or hinder quality healthcare service design and delivery if researchers ig-
nore or improperly account for reimbursement processes. I believe that the identied
research opportunities will gain increased attention and become an important prob-
lem domain in the near future. Specically, healthcare service OM/SCM researchers
have rarely, if at all, examined healthcare reimbursement processes and related op-
erational issues. Thus, the essay provides directions for future studies into nancial
process impacts upon service operations within the healthcare industry. In addition,
the essay aims to suggest high-level guidance for practitioners. In particular, my re-
search frameworks may allow healthcare managers to identify and conceptualize the
antecedents and consequences of administrative reimbursement issues, which could
result in reduction of overhead and medical error costs. As the U.S. healthcare sys-
tem is among the most complicated in the world (Klepper, 2011), many components
of the frameworks may prove useful for understanding other countries' simpler but
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related healthcare reimbursement systems. If academic researchers provide construc-
tive research questions and corresponding suggestions, the healthcare eld might be
further improved in terms of ecient and eective operations management. I believe
that my frameworks related to sources of complexity and uncertainty, and corre-
sponding research opportunities, will contribute important research questions and
unexplored issues to the OM/SCM eld.
The second essay contributes by introducing a simple and easy-to-use block
scheduling policy that repeats block assignments throughout a day. This block
scheduling policy is based on actual practices of outpatient schedulers as well as in
the very successful manufacturing approach used in the Toyota Production System
for scheduling multiple product types. In particular, patient heterogeneity and pa-
tient no-shows are two factors that practitioners in outpatient services are interested
in (Huang and Verduzco, 2015). In the U.S., for example, there are over 900 mil-
lion outpatient ambulatory care visits annually (CDC and Prevention, 2010), at over
96,000 outpatient care centers establishments (Business Data Codes, 2015). Thus,
this essay conveys managerial insights that may prove useful to many outpatient
clinic managers and schedulers. Finally, this essay can also be widely applicable to
other professional service organizations (e.g., nancial consultations) in the context
of scheduling customers of multiple types having relatively xed service times.
Finally, the third essay contributes by providing theoretical arguments to explain
operational behaviors of hospitals when facing external government pressures such
as VBP. As traditional supply chain management studies have investigated inter-
connected supply chain activities to improve the value of a supply chain, this essay
also will contribute by exploring incentive alignment and coordination problems (i.e.,
between hospitals and third party payers) within the healthcare supply chain. By
empirically examining the evidence of symbolic practice and drivers of this prac-
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tice, this essay extends the institutional and symbolic management perspective into
healthcare service operations management research. Next, there is little empirical
research in healthcare operations management that examines responses to various
institutional pressures, thus this essay contributes to empirical evidence by quantify-
ing the impact of VBP. As Green (2012) suggests, managing patient-oriented service
processes is an essential topic for the future of the operations management eld.
Since the VBP program is a touchstone program intended to accomplish patient-
oriented service delivery and to improve healthcare outcomes, my empirical analysis
of the VBP program contributes to this aim.
In summary, my dissertation develops theoretical contributions in healthcare op-
erations supported by grounded theory from practitioners' insights and extant liter-
ature, such as organizational theory, economic theory, and scheduling theory. Using
three individual essays in the healthcare operations management domain, I create
a research portfolio that considers theoretical contributions, empirical analyses, and
analytical scheduling contributions. Based upon managerial problem-motivated re-
search, the following three chapters articulate timely and critical issues for both
practitioners and academic researchers in the healthcare industry.
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
conceptual frameworks of the healthcare system and healthcare reimbursement pro-
cesses. Section 3 develops block scheduling models for outpatient scheduling pro-
cesses. Section 4 explores econometric models for hospital procurement behaviors in
response to government nancial penalties. Section 5 briey concludes this disserta-
tion.
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2. HEALTHCARE OPERATIONS AND REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM
PROCESSES: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR OPERATIONS AND SUPPLY
CHAIN MANAGEMENT
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops conceptual frameworks of reimbursement processes within
the U.S. healthcare system to motivate a research agenda for operations and sup-
ply chain management (OM/SCM) researchers. Healthcare reimbursement processes
include coding processes, billing processes, and payment processes. Our extensive
review of literature on healthcare services reveals that few OM/SCM researchers
examine reimbursement processes. Yet, scholars and healthcare practitioners hold
a consensus that existing U.S. healthcare reimbursement systems have a complex
and awkward structure (David, 2014; Institute of Medicine, 2001; Rouse and Serban,
2014), which triggered a 10.1% rate of incorrect Medicare reimbursements account-
ing for $36 billion in incorrect payments in 2013 (Adamy, 2014). Clearly, improving
healthcare services and ensuring correct and timely provider compensation requires
understanding reimbursement processes, associated errors, and consequent care de-
livery implications.
Avoiding harmful reimbursement system consequences is societally important for
parties involved in healthcare consumption, provision, and nancial ows. Healthcare
providers face increasing process variation, which can decrease service quality and
increase healthcare costs (Schmenner, 2004; Tucker et al., 2007). U.S. healthcare
expenditures grew from $2.2 trillion in 2007 (Barton, 2010) to nearly $3 trillion in
2013, now the single largest sector of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 17.9%
(WorldBank, 2014). As many argue, continued growth of healthcare costs will harm
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various business sectors and the economy as a whole (Baker and Rosnick, 2005; Brill,
2015).
Medical errors represent one source of signicant, wasteful increases in healthcare
costs. Healthcare providers face two types of medical errors. One error type relates
to clinical errors, such as diagnostic or surgery mistakes. Clinical errors present
signicant operations problems aecting care delivery. In the 1990s, the annual cost
of U.S. clinical errors was $23 billion, and more than 7,000 patients died from the
errors (Kohn et al., 1999). Clinical errors today still cause major injuries or death in
up to 160,000 people yearly (Landro, 2013) and have motivated much OM research.
The other error type relates to administrative errors, which include incorrect cod-
ing, unsuitable billing, or inadequate payment documentation by healthcare providers.
Administrative billing and claims ling errors present signicant operations problems
that directly and indirectly aect care quality, yet few OM/SCM studies examine
these reimbursement issues. Recent evidence suggests about 30% of medical billing
claims contain errors (Silver-Greenberg, 2011). Healthcare administrators and gov-
ernment policy makers spotlight reimbursement process errors as serious causes of
poor operational performance (O'Malley et al., 2005). In light of these issues, ad-
vancing literature on healthcare reimbursement processes is of rising societal and
economic importance. Green (2012) identied the need for evidence{based health-
care research using operational research methods, which will require a new focus on
healthcare reimbursement and the operational hazards of administrative errors. A
necessary rst step for researchers involves understanding the scope and complexity
of reimbursement processes.
Compared to prior literature, this chapter contributes and provides guidance for
future research by considering various reimbursement processes and related oper-
ations through conceptual frameworks that detail the overall ow of services and
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nancial transactions within healthcare. This study also provides high{level guid-
ance for reimbursement process managers. Specically, the conceptual frameworks
may enable physicians, managers, and chief compliance ocers (CCO) to better un-
derstand operational drivers and consequences of reimbursement process problems,
which may help reduce overhead and costs.
The following sections articulate foundational literature, conceptual frameworks,
and research opportunities in healthcare reimbursement systems. For readers unfa-
miliar with the broad range of reimbursement terminology, Table A.1 in Appendix
A provides denitions for various acronyms and terms.
2.2 Background and Related Literature
This section rst reviews healthcare literature predominantly related to three
topics: a brief overview of healthcare reimbursement literature followed by more in{
depth examination of healthcare service and healthcare information technology (IT)
literature. As this section demonstrates, a void in research regarding healthcare re-
imbursement processes oers signicant opportunities for academic studies to bridge
the identied research gaps.
2.2.1 Healthcare Service Literature
Even though there are several dierent types of healthcare reimbursement sys-
tems, much of the extant literature typically assumes the use of one emblematic
system, the Diagnosis|Related Group (DRG) system (Green, 2012; Powell et al.,
2012) and often does so only tangentially in relation to non{reimbursement research
questions. The DRG system is one payment mechanism (i.e., a prospective pay-
ment system (PPS)) established by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS)|a federal agency that manages the Medicare and Medicaid programs in
cooperation with state governments. Under a PPS, third party payers (TPPs) reim-
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burse providers via a xed schedule of payment rates for individual services provided
(Roth and Van Dierdonck, 1995). The DRG system only covers a limited set of
inpatient healthcare services. CMS operates other PPSs for hospital outpatient ser-
vices, such as Ambulatory Payment Classications (APCs), Skilled Nursing Facilities
(SNFs), Home Health Agencies (HHAs), and Long|Term Care Hospitals (LTCHs)
(Abbey, 2012). Outpatient expenses have grown by 10.1% annually|double the cur-
rent growth rate of inpatient DRG expenses|emphasizing the need for researchers to
account for impacts of these multiple reimbursement systems (HCCI, 2010). Accu-
mulating evidence also suggests various adverse impacts of complex reimbursement
processes on patient care provision (AAPS, 2000; Taylor and Morrison, 2011) and on
decreasing doctor career satisfaction and retention (Dougherty, 2001). Interestingly,
operations management, supply chain, and information systems (IS) research seldom
tackles such issues. As the U.S. healthcare system is one of the most complicated
(Klepper, 2011) and the system adopts standardized worldwide treatment codes (e.g.,
ICD{10), such research may prove useful in understanding reimbursement systems
employed by other countries (Quan et al., 2008).
Conceptual OM/SCM healthcare service literature denes detailed lists of med-
ical issues at strategic, tactical, and operational levels (Hans et al., 2012) and de-
scribes healthcare operations characteristics, such as patient types, service types,
and performance measures (Cayirli et al., 2006; Gupta and Denton, 2008; May et al.,
2011). Motivated by prior literature (AMA, 2013; Hulshof et al., 2012), our review
focuses on ve classes of healthcare service processes: emergency care, inpatient care,
outpatient ambulatory care, home and residential care, and administrative services.
As systems approaches facilitate quality improvement (Chandrasekaran et al., 2012;
Flynn et al., 1994), we also carefully reviewed the three process tiers within health-
care delivery and reimbursement systems: patients, care providers, and TPPs, to
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identify extant studies of impacts of reimbursement processes on the ow of health-
care. To expand upon prior reviews focused on specic services (e.g., emergency), or
methodologies (e.g., scheduling), we reviewed conceptual, analytical, and empirical
studies, and studies on all healthcare service classes. Table 2.1 contains literature
related to within hospital/clinic (i.e., intra{rm) service processes. Table 2.2 shows
literature related to healthcare supply chain (i.e., inter{rm) processes. Each ta-
ble identies service class, dominant concepts, and whether the study considered
reimbursement processes.
Table 2.1: Related literature on intra{rm (within hospital/clinic systems) healthcare
research
Literature
Category
Authors Healthcare
Classes
Dominant Concepts Reimbur-
sement
System
Focus on
Physicians'
Treatment
Process
Eciency and
Eectiveness
Clark and
Huckman
(2012)
Inpatient Focused operations related to co-
specialization in related areas provide
positive quality performance, but no
empirical evidence due to specializa-
tion in specic practice.
None
Dobson et al.
(2009)
Inpatient Physicians are less likely to gain -
nancial benet from assigning work to
frontline sta.
None
Jiang et al.
(2012)
Ambulatory Performance-based system is superior
to FFS contracts.
U.K.
System
KC (2013) Emergency Physician multitasking inuences pro-
cessing time in a U-shaped manner.
None
KC and Terwi-
esch (2011)
Inpatient Hospital focus is associated with clini-
cal performance, such as outcomes and
quality.
None
KC and Terwi-
esch (2012)
Inpatient Patient early discharge is associated
with readmission, and when occupancy
level is high in the hospital, patients
are more likely to be discharged.
None
Nair et al.
(2013)
Inpatient Clinical quality and exibility improve
operational eciency while experien-
tial quality moderates the association.
DRG
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Table 2.1 Continued
Literature
Category
Authors Healthcare
Classes
Dominant Concepts Reimbur-
sement
System
Powell et al.
(2012)
Inpatient When doctors spend more time on pa-
per work, medical billing errors will de-
crease.
DRG
Song et al.
(2015)
Emergency Physician use of dedicated queuing can
enhance physician ownership over pa-
tients and improve operational e-
ciency.
None
Focus on
Nurses' and
Other Factors'
Eciency and
Eectiveness
Angst et al.
(2011)
Administrative The sequence of healthcare IT imple-
mentation inuences hospital perfor-
mance eects.
None
Boyer et al.
(2012)
Inpatient In small hospitals, focusing on spe-
cic outcomes related practices pro-
vides better quality, while larger hos-
pitals work better with climate focused
on specic outcome goals.
None
Chandrasekaran
et al. (2012)
Inpatient Hospital process management is nega-
tively associated with patient satisfac-
tion (experiential quality), but patient-
centered leadership can mitigate this
negative relationship.
None
Ding (2014) Administrative U.S. hospitals follow organizational
learning curves for productive e-
ciency. Operational focus in a hospital
can lead to productive eciency
DRG
Goldstein and
Iossifova (2012)
Inpatient Organizational slack consisting of
available and accessible resources in a
hospital aects process performance.
None
He et al. (2012) Inpatient Reducing hospital labor costs through
the timing of stang decisions under
uncertainty about nurses' daily work-
load.
None
Jack and Pow-
ers (2004)
Administrative Volume exibility can be a strategic
choice to tackle demand uncertainty in
healthcare.
DRG
Lahiri and Sei-
dmann (2012)
Administrative When a hospital fails to obtain neces-
sary clinical information, this causes
a signicant impact on the total
turnaround time of diagnostic reports.
None
Marley et al.
(2004)
Administrative Leadership is positively associated
with clinical and process quality, and
hence aects patient satisfaction.
None
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Table 2.1 Continued
Literature
Category
Authors Healthcare
Classes
Dominant Concepts Reimbur-
sement
System
Shortell et al.
(1995)
Inpatient Find little eect of TQM and organi-
zational culture on cardiovascular pa-
tients
None
Silverman and
Skinner (2004)
Administrative Care providers are likely to use more
upcoding to increase prots.
DRG
Spear (2005) Administrative Learning to improve process quality
while professionals actually deliver the
service can reduce medical errors.
None
Tucker (2007) Inpatient Nurses' team-based initiatives can im-
prove the work system.
None
Tucker et al.
(2007)
Inpatient Hospital teams that focus on learn-how
(activities that operationalize practice
in a given setting) may achieve more
implementation successes than teams
who focus on learn-what (activities
that identify current best practices).
None
Table 2.2: Related literature on inter-rm healthcare supply chain research
Literature
Category
Authors Healthcare
Classes
Dominant Concepts Reimbur-
sement
System
Focus on
Healthcare
Supply Chain
Management
Angst et al.
(2010)
Administrative Diusion of electric medical records
in hospitals is associated with suscep-
tibility to the inuence of prior IT
adopters.
None
Chen et al.
(2013)
Administrative Healthcare supply chain performance
is associated with supplier integration,
which consists of knowledge exchange
and IT integration.
None
McKone-Sweet
et al. (2005)
Administrative Lack of executive support and mis-
aligned incentives between chain mem-
bers can be barriers for improving
healthcare supply chain
None
Sinha and
Kohnke (2009)
Administrative Aordability, access, and awareness
framework for the healthcare supply
chain.
General
Finance
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Table 2.2 Continued
Literature
Category
Authors Healthcare
Classes
Dominant Concepts Reimbur-
sement
System
Focus on
Environmental
and Policy
Related
Literature
Bhakoo and
Choi (2013)
Administrative Hospital symbolic practice varies de-
pending on the characteristics of insti-
tutional pressures
None
Fuloria and
Zenios (2001)
Administrative The outcomes-adjusted reimbursement
system, which is based on adverse
short-term patient outcomes can max-
imize social welfare.
Fee for
service
Lee and Zenios
(2012)
Administrative The standalone operating incentive
payment system is not comprehensive
to improve healthcare delivery system.
Operating
Incentive
Payment
System
Meyer and Col-
lier (2001)
Administrative Estimates causal relationships in the
quality management program (Mal-
colm Baldrige National Quality Award
Criteria).
None
Miller and
Tucker (2009)
Administrative State privacy regulations reduce the
diusion of electronic medical records
(EMRs) in hospitals.
Fee for
service
Our review of healthcare service literature suggests various prominent character-
istics. One characteristic is the dominance of studies about particular healthcare
service classes (i.e., inpatient services), with a lack of ndings pertaining to other
healthcare service classes. Another characteristic relates to lack of literature focus-
ing on nancial ows within healthcare reimbursement systems and their impact on
patient care delivery (Roth and Van Dierdonck, 1995). Building on the limited lit-
erature base, four primary research gaps provide actionable impetus for exploring
reimbursement process issues. First, healthcare service research mostly focuses on
care delivery processes and corresponding care outcomes. Few studies (Sinha and
Kohnke, 2009; Powell et al., 2012) lay out boundaries of healthcare reimbursement
issues, revealing a lack of clear contexts for precise research and construct denition.
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Second, though the eld of medicine has beneted from the integration of theory
development and empirical research (Fisher, 2007), there appears to be a lack of
theory pertaining to the business operations portion of medicine, that is, healthcare
reimbursement processes and outcomes. Third, although some seminal studies ex-
amine salient resources within care delivery processes (Tucker, 2007; Tucker et al.,
2007), there is a broad research gap regarding resources (e.g., accountable care or-
ganizations, code professionals, RACs, IT) for reimbursement processes. Fourth,
few analytical or empirical studies investigate impacts of healthcare reimbursement
processes (Powell et al., 2012).
Next, we review related healthcare IT (HIT) research (Table 2.3), as IT often is
assumed to have resolved healthcare reimbursement issues. Most healthcare systems
and care providers have adopted internal IT applications, such as electronic health
record (EHR) software systems for collection of electronic patient health informa-
tion, to improve patient care quality (Bardhan et al., 2014). Without IT, modern
healthcare services often cannot operate smoothly (Angst and Agarwal, 2009). Many
healthcare IT researchers investigate antecedents and roles of IT (see Table 2.3).
Such studies often focus on IT adoption and diusion eects (Angst et al., 2010)
or the impact of IT usage on patient care delivery (Devaraj and Kohli, 2003). The
studies execute hospital{level (Agarwal et al., 2010; Das et al., 2011), or individual
physician{level research (Angst et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2012). The ndings often
show healthcare IT adoption is positively associated with healthcare quality and
eciency (Buntin et al., 2011).
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Table 2.3: Related literature on IT healthcare research
Literature
Category
Authors Healthcare
Classes
Dominant Concepts Reimbur-
sement
System
Focus on
Healthcare IT
Adoption
Agarwal et al.
(2010)
Administrative Identify three major areas for future
research in HIT.
None
Angst and
Agarwal (2009)
Administrative The likelihood of care providers elec-
tronic health records (EHR) adoption
is associated with individuals' concern
for their information privacy.
None
Angst et al.
(2010)
Administrative Diusion of electric medical records
in hospitals is associated with suscep-
tibility to the inuence of prior IT
adopters.
None
Angst et al.
(2011)
Administrative The sequence of healthcare IT imple-
mentation inuences hospital perfor-
mance eects.
None
Goh et al.
(2011)
Administrative To implement HIT successfully, hospi-
tals should manage co-evolution pro-
cess between work routines and HIT.
None
Kallinikos and
Tempini (2014)
Administrative The web-based patient self-reporting
data can become new models of orga-
nizing medical knowledge creation.
None
Yaraghi et al.
(2014)
Administrative Care providers' HIE adoption be-
haviors are related to topographical
factors, isomorphic eects between
providers, and labor inputs in HIE use.
None
Kohli et al.
(2012)
Administrative IT investment positively aects a hos-
pital's market value, such as nancial
and accounting performance measures.
None
Focus on the
Impact of
Healthcare IT
Bardhan and
Thouin (2013)
Administrative Clinical information systems and pa-
tient scheduling applications are posi-
tively associated with three major clin-
ical outcome metrics, such as heart at-
tacks, heart failures, and pneumonia.
None
Bardhan et al.
(2014)
Inpatient Health IT usages are associated with
reducing patient readmission risk.
None
Buntin et al.
(2011)
Administrative Many care providers (more than 90%)
have positive impacts of HIT.
None
Devaraj and
Kohli (2003)
Administrative IT usage is positively associated with
hospital performance, such as revenue
and quality.
None
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Table 2.3 Continued
Literature
Category
Authors Healthcare
Classes
Dominant Concepts Reimbur-
sement
System
Devaraj et al.
(2013)
Administrative IT is positively associated with patient
ows. In particular, swift patient ow
can aect nancial performance while
even patient ow can aect quality
performance.
None
Gao et al.
(2012)
Administrative Identied that there is no evidence
that online physician rating systems
are dominated by dissatised patients.
None
Kohli and Ket-
tinger (2004)
Administrative With IT adoption, care providers can
reduce clinic procedural costs and en-
hance transparency.
None
Mukhopadhyay
et al. (2011)
Administrative Learning rates of IT-enabled physician
referral systems dier across dierent
agents with dierent skills, and IT sys-
tem upgrade has a positive impact on
the performance of experts.
None
The review of extant IS research reveals other research gaps. Although many
studies examine adoption and impacts of healthcare IT applications (Agarwal et al.,
2010), little literature considers IT applications pertaining to reimbursement pro-
cesses. Indeed, academic studies rarely consider non{care{related IT modules, such
as physician referral systems (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2011). Specically, few IT stud-
ies focus on supply chain-level healthcare reimbursement ows and corresponding
care impacts. For instance, to date, no healthcare IT literature has examined mod-
erating or mediating eects of reimbursement systems.
Our review of the literature suggests two signicant gaps. First, certain health-
care service classes (i.e., inpatient or administrative services) dominate the OM/SCM
healthcare literature. Second, little literature focuses on nancial ows moving
through healthcare reimbursement systems. These ndings suggest a need for re-
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search pertaining to other healthcare service classes and related reimbursement is-
sues. Subsequent sections address this research need by illustrating the scope and
complexity of healthcare reimbursement processes.
2.3 Conceptual Frameworks of Healthcare Delivery and Reimbursement Processes
We start with simple models of the overall healthcare system, and move step{
by{step toward increasingly complex models of reimbursement processes. In doing
so, this section provides conceptual foundations upon which to build constructs and
research opportunities.
2.3.1 Process Model of Care Delivery and Reimbursement Processes
We begin with a simple model of the overall healthcare system in terms of ows
of care and resulting reimbursement processes. Figure 2.1 deconstructs healthcare
operations into core and tangential service ows. The rst key process is the core
ow (solid lines) between patients and care provider|the left two parties of Figure
2.1. When an individual seeks a healthcare service, the individual selects a care
provider, such as a hospital or clinic. After an individual presents to a care provider,
and subsequently checks in, the individual is dened as a patient. At this point, an
encounter begins. For purposes of this essay, an encounter refers to direct contact
between the patient and an authorized care provider (e.g., a physician) for the pur-
poses of diagnosis or treatment of the patient (Medicare Claims Processing Manual,
2008). In general, there must be face{to{face contact between the authorized care
provider and patient to bill as an encounter, though some TPPs may have dier-
ent requirements. In most cases, when a patient requires more than one follow{up
visit with a care provider, each subsequent visit is considered a separate encounter
for billing purposes. During the encounter, the care provider provides diagnostic or
treatment services to the patient. The patient checks out and leaves the provider
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Figure 2.1: Healthcare service delivery system ows
after completion of the service provision encounter. The second core ow occurs
between a care provider and TPP. When services are provided, the care provider
codes the performed care procedures into its healthcare record system, develops a
bill, translates the bill into a claim, and the claim is led to a TPP. Finally, the
service can be completed after the TPP reimburses the provider for the claim. An
individual who received treatment may pay bills directly to a provider. For self{pay
patients, the diagram may not require the TPP, as the billing process occurs between
a patient and a care provider, except in cases where the patient submits a bill di-
rectly to the TPP for reimbursement. Even in cases where a self{pay patient cannot
pay for a service, a care provider may still need to perform a required limited service
under healthcare law (e.g., EMTALA, see Table A.1 in Appendix A).
The two core ows are supported by two tangential service ows (dashed lines).
Both tangential ows are associated with a TPP. One tangential ow represents the
contract between patients and a TPP. Individuals choose and enroll with one or more
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TPPs before receiving services. Typically, an individual makes regular payments to
the TPP. When individuals become patients, the TPP pays for the covered services
as dened in the contract. The other tangential ow is a contract between a care
provider and a TPP. From the patient perspective, this tangential ow constrains
the patient's choice of a care provider because, in many cases, patients only visit a
preferred care provider that has a contract with their TPP(s).
A combination of core and tangential ows describes the healthcare system service
delivery and nancial ow mechanisms. Prior healthcare OM/SCM research explores
quality management and process improvement within the leftmost core ows (Boyer
et al., 2012; Dobrzykowski et al., 2014). However, no extant literature examines the
full set of healthcare system ows, including reimbursement. We next delve into the
reimbursement process structure.
2.3.2 Process Model of Reimbursement Processes
As dened in Section 2.1, reimbursement processes involve three steps|coding,
billing, and payment|starting with the development of clinical documentation by
physicians who participate in care provision. Figure 2.2 diagrams the care provider's
reimbursement process. In the rst step{the coding process|a physician (or an-
other licensed care provider) les a patient's medical record for the provided ser-
vices and items supplied for the patient's treatment. The physician's documentation
then becomes available for professional coding sta in the reimbursement (or billing)
department of a care provider. Coding sta then develops a set of appropriate
codes|alphanumeric string|representing services and facilitating material inputs
representing the care provided. The coding process can be quite complex due to
complicated coding guidelines. The second step is the billing process. Since one ser-
vice may require two or more codes, the professional coder develops a billing package
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Figure 2.2: Care provider reimbursement process
for the portfolio of services provided. The coder then prepares a claim to collect
payment for the billing package. Finally, in the third step, the payment process
entails ling a claim to a TPP, claim adjudication, and eventually|in theory|nal
payment.
2.3.3 Types of Healthcare Organization Entities
Table 2.4 delineates subcategories of patients, care providers, and TPPs as a
means to further characterize entities involved in reimbursement in Figures 2.1
and 2.2. For communicating and describing healthcare services, patients divide into
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Table 2.4: Types of organizational entities
Type of Patients Types of Care Providers Types of Third Party Payers
Oce Visits Inpatient Hospitals Governmental Organization
New Patient Outpatient Hospitals Medicare
Established Patient Ambulatory Surgical Centers Medicaid
Clinics Veteran Aairs
Types of Service Home Health Agencies Indian Health
Inpatient Durable Medical Equipment
Suppliers
Community Health
Outpatient
Other Facilities
Migrant Health
Resident
Private Insurance Organizations
Employment-Related Insurance
Other Private Insurance
one of two types: new patients or established patients (AMA, 2013). According to
care provider guidelines, a new patient is dened as a recipient who has not received
services from the same care provider within a certain time period. Otherwise, the
patient is an established patient. Patients are also subdivided by their length of stay
in a care provider (e.g., hospital, clinic, or associated facility). A patient who stays
more than 24 hours is classied as an inpatient whereas a patient who visits less
than 24 hours is an outpatient. A patient may receive services in the patient's home,
such as in the case of home health agencies, or a patient may become a resident at a
nursing home in order to receive care. For extended care service, physicians generally
develop and certify a plan of care (POC) to establish the boundaries, timeline, and
requirements for continued care (Medicare, 2015).
The second column of Table 2.4 outlines the breadth of healthcare providers.
Criteria of Medicare specify care provider classes|inpatient hospitals, outpatient
hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers, clinics, home health services, durable medical
equipment suppliers, and other facilities|based on care provider capabilities (eCFR,
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2015). Hospitals often provide both inpatient and outpatient services. Ambulatory
surgical centers (ASCs) are independent facilities that treat patients who need am-
bulatory surgeries taking less than 24 hours (ASCA, 2013). Clinics are care providers
similar to outpatient hospitals, but the organizational entity in terms of payment can
be physician groups (Abbey, 2009). Home health agencies (HHAs) are care providers
for patients who receive care services in their homes. Durable medical equipment
(DME) suppliers provide medical products that a doctor prescribes for patient care,
including devices such as arm braces, blood glucose monitors, or wheelchairs (Medi-
care, 2014). Though additional types of healthcare service providers exist (Abbey,
2009), the ve types in Table 2.4 provide a baseline to understand reimbursement
processes.
The third column of entities concerns TPP types. The term TPP represents an
entity involved in healthcare payment, where the entity is neither a patient nor a
care provider (Health Law Resources, 2012). For instance, a TPP is any individual,
entity, or program that is, or may be, liable to pay for any medical assistance pro-
vided to a recipient (OIG, 2014). For simplicity, Table 2.4 ignores liable individuals.
TPPs, largely comprised of various insurance rms, divide into two general cate-
gories: government organizations (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid) and private insurance
organizations (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield). As Table 2.4 shows, the range of TPPs
is quite broad.
2.4 Breadth of Healthcare Payment Systems
Though previous literature examines specic payment systems (Powell et al.,
2012) or payment policies (Lee and Zenios, 2012), no extant healthcare OM literature
presents a comprehensive framework of types of payment systems within reimburse-
ment processes. Thus, Table 2.5 identies a broad set of U.S. healthcare payment
23
systems used by TPPs to reimburse providers. Most healthcare payment systems in
the U.S. are based on fee{for{service, wherein services are reimbursed based upon the
quantity of care, and a TPP pays for the healthcare services (Abbey, 2013; Berenson
and Rich, 2010). As a baseline, fee{for{service systems can be subdivided into four
categories: cost{based payment systems, charge{based payment systems, fee sched-
ule payment systems, and prospective payment systems (PPSs). In addition, many
other systems exist, such as capitated, hybrid, managed care, and operating incen-
tive systems. Each system aims to support specic healthcare services and contains
tremendous variations depending on its care providers and patient beneciaries.
Table 2.5: Types of healthcare payment systems and specic programs
Payment Type Adopts
Coding
System
Coding System Types Applicable Care
Providers
Cost-Based Payment No N/A Pharmaceutical Items,
Critical Access Hospitals
(CAHs), Rural Health
Clinics (RHCs),Federally
Qualied Healthcare Centers
(FQHCs)
Charge-Based Payment No N/A Limited use by contract.
Charge structures also used
for PPSs
Fee Schedule Payment
Resource Based Relative
Value System (RBRVS)
Yes CPT, (or Current Procedu-
ral Terminology):Published
by the American Medical
Association HCPCS, (or
Healthcare Common Pro-
cedure Coding System):
Published by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid
Services
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Table 2.5 Continued
Payment Type Adopts
Coding
System
Coding System Types Applicable Care
Providers
Prospective Payment System
Diagnosis-Related Groups
(DRGs)
Yes DRG categories: Published
by the Medicare Program,
ICD-9-CM
Hospital inpatient services
Ambulatory Payment Classi-
cations (APCs)
Yes APCs categories: Published
by the Medicare Program,
ICD-9-CM
Hospital outpatient services
Home Health and Skilled
Nursing Facilities
Yes Resource Utilization Groups,
Published by the Medicare
Program, ICD-9-CM
Home health and skilled nurs-
ing services
Capitated Payment (Bundled
Payment System)
Yes Both Fee Schedule Payment
and PPS coding systems
Some specic services that
TPP allows. And limited
care providers
Hybrid Payment System Yes Both Fee Schedule Payment
and PPS coding systems (If
needed)
All care providers
Managed Care Payment Sys-
tem
Yes APC categories and CPT
code systems
All care providers
Operating Incentive Programs N/A
Value-Based Purchas-
ing(VBP)
No Hospitals
Meaningful Use No All care providers
2.4.1 Cost{based Payment Systems
First, with cost{based payment systems, the TPP reimburses healthcare providers
based on a provider's incurred costs at the time of service delivery to a patient. As
this payment system only considers provider costs, the payment process involves di-
rect ows between provider and TPP. For example, TPPs typically reimburse phar-
maceutical items as a cost{based payment (Abbey, 2009). However, many TPPs
no longer adopt cost{based payment systems, with the exception of some Medicare
programs (e.g., Critical Access Hospitals, Rural Health Clinics (RHC), and Feder-
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ally Qualied Health Centers). Instead, many TPPs require cost reports from care
providers, as part of other complex payment systems such as PPSs.
2.4.2 Charge{based Payment Systems
The charge{based payment system requires TPPs to pay care providers a contrac-
tually established portion of the charged service (e.g., 80 percent of a care provider's
charges). Because the TPP reimburses a percentage of whatever a care provider
charges based on incurred costs, the charge{based payment system is one step re-
moved from the cost{based payment system (Abbey, 2013). Charge{based payment
systems are more likely to be associated with the use of new equipment, drugs, or
procedures, driving service price increases.
2.4.3 Fee Schedule Payment Systems
Fee schedule payment systems use suitable codes to describe specic care services
provided to patients. Reimbursement between a TPP and a care provider derives
from a detailed service classication system of codes for physician services and items
consumed (Abbey, 2011). A TPP reimburses providers for the lesser of the charge{
based payment or the fee schedule amount. Current Procedural Terminology (CPT)
is one classication system that includes precisely delineated physician services, such
as surgical procedures, physical medicine, evaluation and management, and radiology
(AMA, 2013). Based on the CPT classication, TPPs construct fee schedule payment
systems. For example, the Resource{Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), developed
by Medicare, is the basis for the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS). Using two
common classication{coding systems|CPT and Healthcare Common Procedure
Coding System (HCPCS)|RBRVS applies to a wide range of services (Abbey, 2011).
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2.4.4 Prospective Payment Systems
Prospective payment systems (PPS) were developed by Medicare in the 1980s
(Roth and Van Dierdonck, 1995). Payments for each service are specied in advance
using several unique classication systems (i.e., code sets), each of which contains
specic categories (i.e., codes). A care provider charges TPPs based on categories
in the applicable classication system (Abbey, 2012). PPSs cover many healthcare
service types including inpatient (DRG), outpatient (APC), skilled nursing (SNF),
home health (HHA), long{term care (LTCH), and rehabilitation (Inpatient Rehabil-
itation Facilities) services (Abbey, 2012).
The four payment systems above|cost{based, charge{based, fee schedule, and
prospective payment systems|are based on the fee{for{service approach. As covered
in the following subsections, other payment systems exist, such as capitated, hybrid,
managed care, and operating incentive systems.
2.4.5 Capitated Payment Systems
In a capitated payment system, the payment is xed by period (e.g., monthly),
and care providers deliver any needed services without claiming additional payments
within the period. This system is analogous to a theme park one{month pass, in
which pass holders can ride as many rides as they want during a month. For exam-
ple, some primary care clinics now oer a membership program (e.g., $75 per month)
covering unlimited primary care services such as basic lab tests and u shots (Tess-
man, 2014; Von Drehle, 2014). In such systems, a care provider receives the greatest
nancial benet by receiving payment but minimizing service to patients during the
capitation period. This potential lack of use represents a concern for TPPs and
patients, as treatment underuse within a capitated approach is an expensive waste.
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2.4.6 Bundled Payment Systems
In a bundled payment system, a patient encounter or series of encounters related
to care provision may require bundled codes for an overall claim. Bundled payment
systems oer the potential to streamline the reimbursement and payment process
through predened groupings (i.e., bundles) of services and related codes that a care
provider or group of care providers oer. As bundled payments are still evolving,
many issues exist regarding how to structure the bundles, design appropriate con-
tracts, distribute payments both within and across care providers, and coordinate
the bundled payment between the care provider and TPP (Hussey et al., 2009).
2.4.7 Hybrid Payment Systems
Some payment systems include more than one type of payment system. Such
systems are known as hybrid payment systems. For example, for Ambulatory Surgical
Centers (ASCs), Medicare developed a hybrid payment system using features of both
the outpatient prospective payment system (i.e., ambulatory payment classications)
and the MPFS (Abbey, 2009).
2.4.8 Managed Care Payment System
Managed care payment systems have TPPs directly take part in the management
of healthcare service. For example, the Medicare Advantage program (i.e., Medicare
Part C) is an example of a managed care payment system. In Medicare Advantage,
an insurance company intervenes between Medicare and Medicare beneciaries (i.e.,
patients, care providers). Thus, instead of Medicare, contracted insurance companies
serve as intermediaries in the reimbursement process (Abbey, 2012).
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2.4.9 Operating Incentive Payment Programs
In combination with the above, TPPs such as CMS may oer healthcare providers
various operating incentives to transform the quality of medical care by realigning
healthcare provider nancial incentives (CMS, 2014b). One example is the Value{
Based Purchasing (VBP) program begun in 2012. CMS released the VBP program
to connect Medicare's payment system to quality metrics (Rau, 2012). As part of
the VBP program, Medicare can withhold a certain amount of reimbursements from
hospitals (1% in 2012, and 2% in 2013) that do not perform well along a speci-
ed list of healthcare quality outcome metrics (CMS, 2014b). Another example is
the Meaningful Use program, an Electronic Health Records (EHR) nancial incen-
tive program that provides a subsidy to care providers. With Meaningful Use, care
providers adopt certied information technologies for recording patient medical in-
formation and for sharing these records (CMS, 2014a). In return for demonstrating
compliance or noncompliance with Meaningful Use stages, CMS provides incentive
payments or penalties (CMS, 2014a).
Admittedly, the above list of payment systems is not exhaustive, as there are other
variations and hybridizations. However, the list highlights the signicant variety of
major healthcare reimbursement systems, which can ultimately lead to tremendous
complexity for decision makers (Abbey, 2012). Yet, the number of reimbursement
systems is only one antecedent of complexity. With a simple example, we next
demonstrate the interaction of a basic patient presentation|a Medicare patient's
laceration with reimbursement system structures, generating surprising complexity.
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2.5 Illustrative Example of Reimbursement System Structure: A Laceration
Presentation
At some point in life, most individuals will experience a laceration|a wound
from splitting or tearing of skin. The laceration treatment process exemplies the
complexity of the interaction between a basic healthcare delivery process and complex
reimbursement process structures. Figure 2.3 diagrams the laceration treatment
process, including care provision (upper row, left box) and reimbursement (all other
cells) involved in the patient encounter. A care provider rst evaluates the severity
of the patient's medical issue|in this case a laceration|and provides care. The
physician then creates documentation regarding the nature of care, which ows to the
billing department. The billing department evaluates and translates the physician's
notes into a billing claim (see Figure 2.2).
For this example, suppose David, a 66{year{old professor, has several lacerations
on his ngers and hand from working on his lawn mower. Because David has access
to both Medicare (one TPP) and a university healthcare insurance plan (another
TPP), he could visit a preferred provider hospital to treat his laceration (Phase
1). As the injuries are somewhat signicant, David also has to meet a specialist
physician several times to resolve the problem (Phase 2), followed by home health care
visits (Phase 3). As Figure 2.3 shows, even though laceration treatment represents
relatively simple medical care, the treatment process can generate extraordinary
reimbursement complexity.
In Figure 2.3, the reimbursement process ow is represented via seven major
steps. The hospital may need to use several billing systems with multiple coding
layers for the laceration. While David receives various treatments for his wounded
ngers and hand (Phases 1 { 3), the care providers billing system proceeds from the
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Figure 2.3: Case example of Medicare patient: Life cycle of a laceration case
31
initial presentation stage (Step 1) to care provision (Step 2) to a post discharge stage
(Step 3). Though the treatment is fairly simple, each treatment step requires dierent
billing systems under dierent code sets. Thus, a patient presenting with a simple
laceration results in signicant billing process complexity based on the decisions of
the physician care provider and other stakeholders involved during each phase. Each
stakeholder has diering roles in the treatment and reimbursement processes, which
can lead to communication issues (e.g., translation of physician notes into billing
codes) among the stakeholders. Based on the decision for inpatient or outpatient
care, as well as the possibility of post{discharge home health services care, dierent
payment systems all interact in one treatment delivery and intensify the complexity
of providing appropriate care.
The post{treatment reimbursement process variability (Steps 4 to 7) amplies the
complexity. Much like a bullwhip eect in inventory systems, this variability ampli-
cation ripples across all care providers and TPPs, potentially yielding signicant
complexity and adverse care outcomes. Care providers and TPPs need to complete
the contracted provision of payment (Step 4 and Step 5). After Step 5, CMS (or
another TPP) has the power to question and dispute care provision decisions, such
as the decision to treat David on an inpatient or outpatient basis. To prevent fraud
and abuse (Step 6), CMS contracts with Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) to
audit care providers (AAPS, 2000). One major issue RACs investigate is the choice
of site for service delivery, as CMS pays more for inpatient treatment than outpa-
tient treatment. If RACs nd that, in retrospect, the care provider used inpatient
claims (i.e., the DRG payment system) too often as a means to increase charges and
reimbursement rates, nes, denials, and recoupments of claims will occur. According
to a nationwide tracking of 2,489 hospital systems, the number of RAC audits and
the dollar amounts claimed for recovery are rising nationwide (AHA, 2013). In a
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single scal quarter of 2014, over $3 billion in recoupments and claim denials by
RAC audits were reported by the 2,489 systems. Finally, care providers may need
to respond to the RAC ndings (Step 7).
The most common form of claim reversal reported was inappropriate use of inpa-
tient care when outpatient care could have been sucient (AHA, 2014)|exactly the
type of scenario outlined in David's laceration. In eect, RAC auditors have author-
ity to \second guess" the physician's choice between inpatient and outpatient care.
Such second{guessing serves as a means to reverse and recoup previous reimburse-
ments from CMS, while the RAC auditing rms collect fees based on the amount of
claims recovered via audits (RAC, 2014). For each case that the RAC auditor asserts
to be in error, the care provider must at least reimburse the dierence between out-
patient and inpatient billings (restarting Step 4 in the billing/payment loop), which
can be millions of dollars for a small{to{mid{sized hospital system (AHA, 2013). In
the last two years, CMS developed new regulations indicating that if an inpatient
admission is not appropriate, the entire payment amount is to be recouped. If the
admission is within normal claims ling guidelines, the hospital can bill for limited
services. This situation illustrates how care providers must operate under nancial
uncertainty, not knowing whether payments from years past are nal or not. Re-
searchers might study whether physicians and hospitals might react dierently if
they knew payments were nal after a few years.
As the example in Figure 2.3 illustrates, this situation has potential to create a
serious operating incentive mismatch, as patient care quality does not appear as the
prime concern for RAC auditors. When CMS uses RAC auditors to ne a hospital
system and reverse claims, patient care quality may decline if the hospital system
responds to reduce risk rates by enforcing lower inpatient care quality. In eect,
risk of audit penalties and payment denials has the potential to override the risks
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to patient health. Thus, RAC auditors acting on behalf of TPPs can directly and
harmfully inuence patient care quality.
The reimbursement process becomes even more complex if a care provider decides
to challenge RAC audit ndings. Unless a mandatory dispute resolution period
between the RAC auditor and care provider yields an acceptable outcome for both
parties, the care provider generally pays the nes immediately or faces the risk of
additional interest and penalties for non{compliance. If a discussion period fails,
most cases lead to litigation in Medicare Appeals Council (Medicare, 2014), where
appeals for RAC audits have a tremendous backlog, with 85% of hospitals reporting
delays far in excess of 120 days (AHA, 2013). Due to persistent Medicare Appeals
Council capacity issues, this backlog continues to grow, meaning the reimbursement
process only becomes more complex and more costly in time and resources.
As David's example shows, various care and reimbursement processes interact
during and after a patient visits a care provider. Unlike in other industries that close
a reimbursement process after claim processing and payment, healthcare systems
have another layer of uncertainty through processes, such as RAC audits that may
occur years later to adjust and reverse claims. Even after a RAC audit reverses
or recoups a claim, a provider may challenge RAC ndings. In such a case, the
reimbursement process may take years to nalize and involve high legal costs. Even
for simple medical cases, complexity and uncertainty emerge at numerous levels over
extended periods.
Unfortunately, complexities are not isolated to providers and TPPs. Patients also
are aected. David may receive his own supplemental bill after an extended time,
once the care provider and TPP nally determine appropriate reimbursements. Such
events ultimately may aect the patients emotional and physical constitution. In
eect, the complexities impact not only the care provider{to{TPP dyad, but also
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the entire triadic relationship.
2.6 Sources of Complexities and Uncertainties for Stakeholders
As shown, healthcare reimbursement processes drive signicant operational com-
plexity. Thus, this section delineates and describes various sources of operational
complexity and uncertainty faced by stakeholders in the healthcare reimbursement
processes. As in many other OM contexts aected by complexity and uncertainty
(Bozarth et al., 2009; Fisher et al., 1999; Lee, 2002), healthcare operations managers
need to focus on means to improve system processes. Unfortunately, complexity and
uncertainty can work against such aims. Adapting concepts from prior OM/SCM
studies, we dene healthcare reimbursement detail complexity (we refer to this as
complexity) in terms of the quantity of inputs within a healthcare system (Bozarth
et al., 2009). This complexity increases as the discrete count of input quantities for
a reimbursement process increases. Similarly, we dene healthcare reimbursement
dynamic complexity (we refer to this as uncertainty) as a reimbursement systems
unpredictability of outcomes (Bozarth et al., 2009; Landro, 2013). To manage e-
cient and eective healthcare systems, policy makers must evaluate management of
both constructs. Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 illustrate complexities and uncertainties
that stem from reimbursement processes.
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Table 2.6: Sources of complexity in healthcare reimbursement systems and their symp-
toms
Sources Category Symptoms
Coding
Complexity
Complexity of
code set systems
Increasing overhead cost for understanding
code set systems
Inaccurate compliance between physicians
and coders
Complexity of
disease
classication
Inaccurate compliance between care
provider IT system and coding system
Increasing overhead cost for adapting new
code classication
Complexity of
care delivery team
Delays and inaccuracies of coding data
transfer between care providers
Inaccurate billing
Billing
Complexity
Complexity of
claims
development
procedures
Delays in ling claims
Inecient coding and billing feedback pro-
cesses
Care providers can be penalized by RACs
Payment
Complexity
Authority of RAC
to dispute any
claim
Increasing additional tasks for care
providers
Care providers can be penalized by RACs
Delays in nalizing reimbursement pro-
cesses
Complexity of
rules/regulations
regarding
healthcare
reimbursement
Increasing additional tasks for care
providers
Increasing payment uncertainties
Reimbursement processes may not be
timely nalized
Complexity due to
multi-level payers
Redundant payment adjudication
processes
Reimbursement processes may not be
timely nalized
Complexity of
reporting systems
Delay in claims adjudication
Risk of fraudulent transaction
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Table 2.7: Sources of uncertainties in healthcare reimbursement systems and their symp-
toms
Sources Category Symptoms
Coding
Uncertainty
Missing care
information for the
medical records
Delays and inaccuracies of coding data
transfer between stakeholders
Care providers can be penalized by RACs
Ambiguity in the
code set
denitions
Inaccurate claims
Inecient coding and billing feedback pro-
cesses
Geographical
access to care
Coding errors due to the dierent payment
system between rural providers and non-
rural providers
Redundant reimbursement processes at
dierent sites
Billing
Uncertainty
Uncertainty of
formatting of bills
Inadequate hospital claim
Inecient coding and billing feedback pro-
cesses
Care providers can be penalized by RACs
Specic
Requirements for
various TPPs
Inaccurate bills and claims
Inecient coding and billing feedback pro-
cesses
Payment
Uncertainty
Timing of
payment
Risk of fraudulent transaction
Reimbursement processes may not be
timely nalized
Subrogation
among payers
Redundant payment adjudication pro-
cesses
Inaccurate claim
2.6.1 Sources of Healthcare Reimbursement Complexity
To make analysis of the complexities manageable, we identify three sources of
healthcare reimbursement complexities: coding complexity, billing complexity, and
payment complexity.
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2.6.1.1 Coding Complexity
Coding complexity pertains to coding process related input quantities. We subdi-
vide coding complexity into complexity of code set systems for classifying procedures,
complexity of disease classications, and complexity of care delivery teams.
Complexity of Code Set System { Procedure Classication Reimbursement
code sets include Current Procedure Terminology (CPT), Healthcare Common Pro-
cedure Coding System (HCPCS), and International Classication of Diseases (ICD)
codes. Code sets exhibit increasing specicity as medical technology and procedures
evolve. Increasing specicity forces providers to address larger numbers of codes
and associated overhead from employing and educating professional coding sta.
Providers must adapt to rapidly expanding coding systems. For example, CPT 2009
included 293 new codes, 133 revisions, and 92 deletions (Majerowicz, 2009), netting
201 new codes. CPT 2012 updates have 278 new codes, 138 further revisions, and
98 deletions (O'Hara, 2012), netting 180 new codes. The ever increasing code set
detail complexity often drives decreasing provider compliance, resulting in incorrect
payments to providers. Overpayments can drive RAC audits and other penalties
against providers, while underpayments decrease protability.
Complexity of Code Set System { Disease Classication Healthcare coding
systems also increase detail complexity by including new disease classications. For
example, healthcare is moving from disease classications based on ICD{9 to ICD{10
(Quan et al., 2008). ICD{9 and ICD{10 have completely dierent disease classica-
tion formats. Such classier incompatibilities dramatically increase the number of
codes in a billing package and the risk of non{compliance. Thus, expanding disease
classication is one source of growing coding system complexity.
Complexity of Care Delivery Team Certain payment systems require only one
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payment for all services involved in a medical procedure. Multiple care providers can
take part in care provision, but billing takes place as a single, unied billing package.
This package tends to require numerous codes, increasing likelihood of errors or
omissions. For instance, a global surgical package (GSP) contains multiple providers,
including a surgeon, anesthesiologist, and an operating room facility. Surgeries take
place as inpatient or outpatient, and usually entail pre{operative and post{operative
protocols, which may be provided by other physicians or other qualied healthcare
personnel. Although the unied billing package should streamline the process, the
large number of providers increases coding detail complexity, which complicates the
billing process.
2.6.1.2 Billing Complexity
Billing complexity pertains to billing process related input quantities. Specically,
billing complexity deals with complexity of claims development procedures.
Complexity of Claims Development Procedures Given payment code set com-
plexities, care providers confront diculties when preparing accurate and timely
billing claims. Care providers generally must claim and le reimbursement requests
within a year of healthcare service provision (Tricare, 2013). The federal Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Transaction and Code Standard
(HIPAA TCS) provides billing process standards for care providers (CMS, 2013).
Providers also must meet other requirements from TPPs (i.e., CMS or insurance
companies) to le claims. In some cases, providers must le claims with TPPs about
which they have no knowledge or guidance. The expanding nature of HIPAA and
TPP adjudication standards results in detail complexity, delaying claims ling and
increasing inaccuracies.
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2.6.1.3 Payment Complexity
Payment complexity pertains to payment process related input quantities. Pay-
ment complexity is driven by processes, such as the RAC authority to dispute re-
imbursement claims, statutory payment system regulations, multi{level payers, and
reporting systems.
Complexity Due to RAC Authority to Dispute Claims The role of RACs,
which audit care providers to identify and correct improper payment processes, in-
creases payment detail complexity. A RAC has authority to reverse claims and ques-
tion or second{guess previous care provision or service encounter choices. Second{
guessing increases payment complexity because RAC reexamination may occur long
after the completion of care provision. With more ways to dispute claims, profes-
sional coding sta must prepare for alternative outcomes (e.g., denials, disputes, or
partial payments) that increase payment complexity. In eect, the RAC can create
short{term and long{term complexities for the reimbursement process, because of
the increasing number of tasks required to improve the likelihood of receiving and
retaining a payment.
Complexity of Regulations in Statutory Payment Systems To keep up with
expanding code set systems and billing procedures, statutory payment rules and
regulations also continue to increase (Field, 2008). For instance, a care provider
must follow a specic payment protocol to meet Medicare rules. As this payment
protocol expands, care providers face added bureaucratic demands and contracts
with private insurers that further increase payment complexity.
Complexity Due to Multi{Level Payers Patients and providers may contract
with multiple TPPs. The use of multiple TPPs increases payment system complex-
ity. HIPAA, which mandates that all claims for a given service must be standardized,
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was designed to enhance the processing of claims through multiple TPPs. In real-
ity, however, providers still experience signicant payment complexity due to wide
disparity of payment systems among primary, secondary, and tertiary TPPs. For
instance, the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) program requires a full standalone
CMS manual for clarication of its programs. As a result, the obvious holds|as
payment systems include more secondary and tertiary payers, payment complexity
will rise.
Complexity of Reporting Systems In keeping with secondary payment processes,
Medicare developed a complex reporting process for primary payers to clarify liabil-
ities. Intricate reporting systems, such as MMSEA Section 111 (Edelson, 2013),
were developed to address the role of primary payers in multi{payer payment sys-
tems. Additional layers of reporting add more tasks to the overall payment system,
increasing payment detail complexity.
2.6.2 Sources of Healthcare Reimbursement Uncertainties
Healthcare reimbursement systems also embed many operational uncertainties,
exposing stakeholders to coding, billing, and payment uncertainties.
2.6.2.1 Coding Uncertainty
Coding uncertainty relates to coding procedure unpredictability. Coding uncer-
tainty arises from missing care information, ambiguity in code set denitions, issues
with translation of physician notes into codes, and geographical care provider het-
erogeneity.
Uncertainty from Missing Care Information in Medical Records In general,
physicians follow a care providers protocol for documentation. Though a physician
might have some idea of the codes used within a billing system, most physicians
do not have comprehensive knowledge of the coding systems. A lack of knowledge
41
generates variation in the coding process (Powell et al., 2012). Ignoring coding
process variation can increase reimbursement uncertainties and exacerbate audit risk.
Coding process variation starts from characteristics of care procedure notes that
can be interpreted to be dierent types of services (e.g., emergency admission with
trauma department vs. without trauma department). In the end, frontline employee
(i.e., physician) uncertainty leads to coding process variation, causing conict among
physicians, professional coding sta, and TPPs, as each holds dierent incentives for
reimbursement outcomes.
Uncertainty from Ambiguity in Code Set Denitions and Use Under
HIPPA, healthcare providers and TPPs must use standard code sets in reimburse-
ment processes. However, dozens of dierent standard code sets exist, along with
multiple organizations that maintain the code sets. For instance, a care provider
should use at least two procedure codes for an ER laceration treatment, one for
evaluation and one for the procedure. However, this care treatment claim might be
delivered with only one bundled code set, leading to non{compliance. Though not
intentional, provider organizations may not adhere to proper use of standard code
sets and formats. Also, some TPPs prefer to use only subsets of available codes|
another non{compliance. Thus, variable application of code set requirements, due
to existence of many code set standards, increases coding uncertainty.
Uncertainty from Geographical Access to CareGeographical dispersion of care
providers delimits access to care and requires application of dierent code sets. To
address geographical dispersion, TPPs adopt dierent payment systems to promote
ecient care delivery in some regions, with a lesser focus on eective care delivery.
Thus, rural healthcare providers, such as Critical Access Hospitals, RHCs, and Fed-
erally Qualied Health Centers, use delimited code sets under the Medicare program
to support eciency and viability of the organizations through narrower ranges of
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covered procedures (CMS, 2015b). Overall, geographical dierences in access to care
can increase uncertainty in the appropriate coding systems.
2.6.2.2 Billing Uncertainty
Billing uncertainty pertains to dynamic complexity related to the billing process.
Billing uncertainties can be caused by bill formatting and specic TPP requirements.
Uncertainty of Formatting of Bills Based on physician documentation, profes-
sional coding sta creates bills for reimbursement (see Figure 2.2). The signicant
role of professional coding sta of a care provider is appropriate bill creation for
submission to external TPPs for payment. The coding sta relies on the already
variable documentation of physicians. Coding sta often faces ambiguous codes and
diculty translating physician notes and medical records into specic codes (Powell
et al., 2012). Due to the coding process variation, coding sta has various options
when creating the billing claim for TPPs. Variable bill formatting represents a source
of billing uncertainty.
Uncertainty from Specic Requirements of Various TPPs Billing uncertainty
also arises from specic requirements from various TPPs. For example, Medicaid and
Medicare have dierent demographic criteria for participants. Medicaid program re-
quirements assist people with low income, while Medicare requirements assist people
65 years of age or older (CMS, 2015b). In addition, private insurers contractually
limit the range of covered services. This limited range of covered services is not
always clear to patients or care providers until a claim has been processed. Ad-
ditionally, coverage may be delimited by assertions that services are not medically
necessary. Variability in specic requirements within and across TPPs for a patient
can amplify billing uncertainty.
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2.6.2.3 Payment Uncertainty
Payment uncertainty pertains to payment process related unpredictability. Pay-
ment uncertainty results from timing of payment and the potential for subrogation
among payers.
Uncertainty in Timing of Payment One source of payment uncertainty concerns
the payment nality problem. Some states have requirements that all transactions be
closed within a year, or some other specied period, after the rst claim. However, a
TPP may reverse and recoup payments on claims after many years if the TPP nds
evidence of fraudulent or faulty claims during a later audit. Such recoupments are
particularly common for CMS, which uses RAC audits. This issue relates to both
coordination among parties and the time before nality of payment|both issues
that potentially impact provision of healthcare and reimbursement processes. Thus,
variability in payment nality increases payment uncertainty.
Uncertainty Due to Subrogation Among Payers TPP subrogation raises un-
certainty in reimbursement processes. Subrogation is when one TPP takes over
payment obligations from another TPP. Although HIPAA exists to standardize all
reimbursement practices, subrogation among payers can lead to increasingly uncer-
tain payments due to variations in claim reimbursement and adjudication as billing
claims traverse a chain of secondary and tertiary TPPs.
In summary, this section outlines several sources of complexity and uncertainty in
healthcare reimbursement. The list suggests the potential for impactful OM/SCM
research to better understand and improve healthcare operations. Based on the
preceding conceptual frameworks, the next section details research opportunities
pertaining to healthcare reimbursement processes.
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Figure 2.4: Inter-relationship between research themes
2.7 Implications for Research Opportunities
Having established conceptual foundations for reimbursement processes, we turn
toward the principal focus of this essay: unexplored reimbursement research oppor-
tunities in healthcare OM/SCM. This section endeavors to reduce the seeming chaos
of reimbursement complexity and uncertainty into ve research themes. Figure 2.4
shows inter{relationships among the research themes.
2.7.1 Expanding Healthcare Operations Boundaries to Include Reimbursement
Processes
To better address healthcare management issues, scholars need to expand research
boundaries to include operations challenges generated by reimbursement processes.
Studying service operations requires the integration of multiple disciplines including
operations, human resources, marketing, and nance (Boudreau et al., 2003; Roth
and Menor, 2003). Studying contemporary healthcare will also demand integrative
multi{disciplinary, multi{methodology work. Expansion of research boundaries to in-
clude reimbursement processes will be of particular benet to service OM literature,
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which rarely considers reimbursement processes or broader nancial operations. Ex-
amining enlarged healthcare functional boundaries, by including a TPP, could shed
light on the ambiguity of current healthcare reimbursement processes and unex-
pected consequences for service delivery. In summary, expanding functional research
boundaries to include TPPs is important for considering the impacts of nancial
transactions upon healthcare services.
2.7.1.1 Expanding Conceptual Healthcare Architecture Boundaries
As with the boundary expansion of service concepts into traditional OM (Heskett,
1986; Roth and Menor, 2003; Voss, 1992), conceptualizing the full architecture of
stakeholders in healthcare delivery will expand healthcare OM boundaries. This
essay provides a critical rst step of detailing conceptual foundations. Future research
should expand healthcare architecture boundaries to consider how reimbursement
processes serve as a major driver of the overall healthcare process. Thus, we posit:
RO 1: Conceptualizing the full healthcare delivery architecture with
expanded boundaries including reimbursement processes.
2.7.1.2 Clarifying Boundaries of Reimbursement Systems
Healthcare OM researchers often make simplifying assumptions about reimburse-
ment systems applicable to a study (i.e., DRG is assumed). Researchers should
clarify which set of reimbursement systems apply to a research study and how the
systems mediate or moderate quality of care outcomes. For example, Figure 2.5
shows healthcare reimbursement resource ows processed by ve stakeholders, such
as a care administrator, patient, code professional, doctor, and third party payer.
Doing so may force researchers to explicitly diagram care and reimbursement resource
ows, as illustrated in Figure 2.5, to identify relevant system boundaries. Researchers
in healthcare OM/SCM have not yet recognized that exploring the dierential im-
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Figure 2.5: Healthcare reimbursement resource ow
pacts of diverse reimbursement processes has an equally powerful inuence to those of
the often{studied clinical treatment processes. The healthcare system under study,
which should include reimbursement processes, represents a further area of study on
how to develop eective and ecient infrastructure. Thus, we posit:
RO 2: Clarifying the overall scope of healthcare reimbursement sys-
tems to uncover how each reimbursement system inuences care provision.
2.7.2 Rening Operations Strategy for Healthcare Reimbursement
Researchers must enhance OM/SCM theory regarding reimbursement processes.
Through theory, a statement of the nature of relationships among constructs (Amund-
son, 1998; Handeld and Melnyk, 1998), healthcare scholars can deepen understand-
ing of the nature of healthcare reimbursement processes. When boundaries of an
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OM research area grow, the need for strategy research also grows. Thus, our second
theme concerns rening the eld's understanding of healthcare operations strategies.
As with prior emerging research areas in service OM that focused on new topics such
as e{retailing (Heim and Sinha, 2002) and new service development (Hill et al., 2003),
healthcare scholars now need to broaden and rene operations strategy theories to
facilitate examination of new healthcare factors that are yet to be studied. This
section presents several research opportunities pertaining to healthcare operations
strategy.
2.7.2.1 Strategic Integration Intensity of Healthcare Service Delivery
In manufacturing OM/SCM literature, the degree of integration intensity is pos-
itively associated with operational capabilities and knowledge assets (Rosenzweig
et al., 2003; Swink et al., 2007). Yet, integration intensity may not provide expected
outcomes if an organization does not have needed capabilities (Devaraj et al., 2007).
Similarly, healthcare OM/SCM literature needs to consider concepts of strategic in-
tensity. Healthcare integration resources need to support both patient care delivery
encounters and reimbursement processes. To understand healthcare integration in-
tensity, researchers should understand patient encounter intensity and care provider
reimbursement intensity. Studying various strategic dimensions of healthcare system
intensity will help researchers and practitioners better understand the full scope of
healthcare strategic management. Researchers will need to dene and examine sys-
tems integration intensity, patient encounter intensity, and reimbursement intensity
and its sub{constructs such as coding, billing, and payment intensity. Table 2.8 il-
lustrates the scope of patient encounter intensity and care provider reimbursement
intensity. Appendix B provides detailed descriptions of stages within each inten-
sity dimension, providing initial work on healthcare system intensity. More rigorous
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Table 2.8: Healthcare system intensity dimensions
Diagnosis
Patient
Encounter
Intensity
Denition: The severity level of a patient's risk of complications,
morbidity, or mortality.
Levels Examples Complexity of Care Provider Care De-
cision
Minimal intensity Self-care patients, preventive
care
Straightforward
Low intensity Short encounter duration, out-
patient, home care
Low Complexity
Moderate intensity Middle encounter duration,
outpatient
Moderate Complexity
High intensity Emergency patients, OR care High Complexity
Recording
Documenting
Care Provider
Reimbursement
Intensity
Denition: The amount of data and complexity of medical records
to be reviewed, coded, billed, processed for payment, and audited.
Levels Examples Complexity of Care Provider Care De-
cision
Minimal intensity Self-care patients, preventive
care
Straightforward
Low intensity Short encounter duration, out-
patient, home care
Low Complexity
Moderate intensity Middle encounter duration,
outpatient
Moderate Complexity
High intensity Emergency patients, OR care High Complexity
studies, such as analytical models of the value of care provider integration intensity,
should clarify specic reimbursement process issues. Therefore, we state:
RO3: Understanding and investigating healthcare strategic intensity
impacts on care delivery and nancial outcomes
2.7.2.2 Strategic Reimbursement Mist
Strategic mists occur between patient needs and care provider capabilities.
Figure 2.6 diagrams the relationship between patient encounter intensity and care
provider reimbursement intensity. When an individual presents as a patient, the
patient may independently choose a care provider based on personal utility (e.g.,
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Figure 2.6: Mist between patient intensity and care provider intensity
wealth, prior experience, preferred provider status, or proximity). A patient choice
may exhibit high or low t with provider care and reimbursement capabilities. The
patient vs. care provider structure in Figure 2.6 is similar to extant service op-
erations frameworks. Just as intensive technology enables expert service processes
(Kellogg and Nie, 1995), high intensity providers can deliver more appropriate ser-
vices for a high intensity patient requiring greater healthcare resource levels (Jencks
and Dobson, 1987).
Two types of mismatch can occur in matching patient encounter intensity to
care provider reimbursement intensity. The rst type occurs when patient encounter
intensity is high, but care provider intensity is low. Patients may consider their
symptoms as tting the low intensity level, so they present to a low intensity care
provider. However, if the patient intensity level is actually higher than assumed, a
mismatch occurs. This mismatch is typically resolved through escalation, wherein
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a care provider who encounters a mismatched case escalates the patient to a higher
intensity care provider (e.g., from clinic to hospital). Thus, a high patient inten-
sity/low care provider intensity mismatch can self{correct through escalation toward
the matched area. The second mismatch type occurs when a low intensity patient
presents to a high intensity care provider. For example, a patient with a Grade{1
nger sprain (low patient encounter intensity) may present to a hospital emergency
room (high provider intensity). This mismatch might be resolved by de{escalating
care (e.g., from hospital to clinic). However, as the high intensity care provider has
the capability to treat this patient, the mismatch generally will not be resolved, and
the patient often remains at the high intensity provider. A Wall Street Journal arti-
cle (David, 2014) highlights this mismatch type with an example of a patient with a
minor bruise (i.e., low patient encounter intensity) who chose to use a trauma center
(i.e., high care provider intensity), leading to an excessively high $20,000 charge.
Less severe mismatches are common in hospital ERs in which non{emergent care is
provided. Thus, we posit:
RO 4: Exploring the impact of reimbursement intensity levels on care
outcomes and nancial ows using mist, alignment, and complementarity
theories.
2.7.3 Illuminating Healthcare Reimbursement Resources
Researchers should investigate healthcare reimbursement resources that have not
been considered. Healthcare providers and TPPs have been implementing many new
resources, such as Electronic Medical Records (EMR), Health Information Exchanges
(HIE), and Personal Web Portals (PWP). Strategic management theories, such as
institutional theory (Bhakoo and Choi, 2013), the relational view (Chen et al., 2013),
the theory of swift and even ow (Devaraj et al., 2013), the theory of absorptive
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capacity (Boyer et al., 2012), and organizational learning theory (Ding, 2014), have
been used to highlight key care{oriented constructs of healthcare OM/SCM contexts.
Researchers should also examine reimbursement processes using the above theories,
as well as theories derived from process management and management of technology
perspectives.
2.7.3.1 Reimbursement Stakeholder Resources
Researchers may use seminal theories to explore phenomena motivating reim-
bursement processes in healthcare. Studies on resource dependence theory explore
links among organizations as a set of power relations based on resource interchange
(Goes and Park, 1997; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeer and Salancik, 2003). Health-
care organizations depend greatly on external reimbursement related resources, such
as government capital inputs (i.e., Medicare or Medicaid), regulations and legislation
(i.e., codes, RACs, or HIPAA), and labor inputs (i.e., doctors, nurses, administra-
tors, or professional coders). Each organization has dierent social capital. Thus,
an organizations provision of reimbursement resources and social capital disparity
can lead to dierent power relationships between organizations. Much extant work
in OM/SCM claried the nature of supply chain relationships (Flynn et al., 2010;
Koufteros et al., 2007), thus the healthcare domain also necessitates assessing and
clarifying the nature of stakeholders in the healthcare reimbursement system. Thus,
we propose:
RO 5: Clarifying the nature of stakeholder resources in the healthcare
reimbursement system.
2.7.3.2 Reimbursement Resource Flows
Based on the above insights, conceptual healthcare reimbursement resource ow
models need to be developed for healthcare OM/SCM research to ll in theoret-
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ical gaps between academic research and healthcare practice. Just as there exist
many coordination models in SCM with dierent optimal policies (Cachon, 2003),
healthcare reimbursement resource models should be constructed to analyze dier-
ent coordination conditions for maximizing healthcare system performance. Using
common agency theory (Rebitzer, 2014), we illustrate one example of reimbursement
resource (i.e., incentives). When a large TPP (i.e., CMS) commits to incentive con-
tracts with a care provider, other TPPs may also seek to contract with the care
provider, particularly if the other TPPs oer similar contracts to that oered by the
large TPP. Thus, we posit:
RO 6: Designing conceptual healthcare reimbursement resource ow
models to enable analysis of complex real{world systems
2.7.4 Examining Reimbursement Process Impacts on Stakeholders
Researchers should study the multidimensional impacts of reimbursement in the
healthcare sector upon stakeholders. Evidence suggests patients can be emotionally
harmed due to billing errors, and potentially physically harmed if such errors ad-
versely aect a patients treatment decision making (David, 2014). Reimbursement
process errors can lead to higher costs to patients, lower patient credit scores if
mistaken charges occur (Silver-Greenberg, 2011), and increased medical collections
(Bernard, 2012). When billing errors occur, TPPs must process and reimburse more
bills to the healthcare providers, and in response, TPPs often impose penalties upon
the providers. Addressing error{laden activities represents excess overhead costs that
are unnecessary and avoidable. To date, healthcare OM/SCM researchers appear to
have perceived that exploring processes pertaining to reimbursement may be less
substantial than other medical issues, such as clinical treatment errors. However,
reimbursement process investments are substantial, and their consequences are not
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negligible. Therefore, the varied impacts of reimbursement process should be studied.
2.7.4.1 Coordination Among Healthcare Stakeholders
Each stakeholder|patient, provider, and TPP|plays dierent roles within the
healthcare reimbursement system. Without proper coordination within and among
healthcare system members, the nancial healthcare system will not operate eec-
tively (Frandsen et al., 2015). Inecient coordination can decrease stability of health-
care reimbursement. In particular, missing or ineective information sharing among
stakeholders can contribute to inecient coordination. Brill (2015) suggests aligning
stakeholder incentives by reforming healthcare payment systems, merging providers
with TPPs, and imposing strong regulations. Contracts between stakeholders or
incentive issues also can cause inecient coordination and inecient investment of
healthcare system members. Common agency theory might be adopted to examine
care providers incentives, expenditures, and coordination through the collective ac-
tion of stakeholders contracts (Frandsen et al., 2015). To date, relationships among
healthcare stakeholders in terms of reimbursement processes have not been explored.
As such, we posit:
RO 7: Investigating each stakeholders behaviors and incentives in the
healthcare nancial system.
2.7.4.2 Identifying Policy Constraints on Stakeholders
The healthcare domain strongly depends on external constraints (Bhakoo and
Choi, 2013; Chandrasekaran et al., 2012). In organizational strategy literature, in-
stitutional theorists stress that external constraints, such as government regulation,
inuence stakeholder's behavior (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott et al., 2000).
Though some previous healthcare OM studies examine impacts of external pressures
on care delivery (Bhakoo and Choi, 2013; Chandrasekaran et al., 2012), few studies
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examine external constraints forced upon healthcare reimbursement systems, such as
Meaningful Use and Value Based Purchasing (VBP) initiatives. Therefore, we posit:
RO 8: Exploring impacts of regulatory policy, external constraints,
and pressures upon healthcare reimbursements for healthcare patients,
providers, and payers.
2.7.5 Understanding Impacts of Reimbursement Technology
The nal theme relates to impacts of reimbursement technology. A care provider
may adopt reimbursement technology in the form of various payment modules and
systems, depending on provider characteristics and capabilities. These payment sys-
tems often must integrate to internal and external healthcare delivery technology
such as EHR, HIE, PWP, and mobile devices (HealthIT, 2014). We dene reim-
bursement exibility as the degree of reimbursement options a stakeholder can use
for reimbursement processes. Examining reimbursement exibility should provide
insights for OM researchers to better understand healthcare nancial systems. Fig-
ure 2.7 expands o of Figure 2.1 to build a more comprehensive model of IT enabled
ows.
2.7.5.1 Technology Reimbursement System Flexibility
Recent evidence suggests the development of innovative technology for payment
systems has grown in the healthcare industry to enable better healthcare system
operations and improved care quality (Abbey, 2009; Rosenthal, 2008). Yet, such
claims are open to examination. For example, Medicare annually updates to im-
prove payment processes for patients, care providers, and TPPs (OIG, 2014). With
the expansion of dierent types of payment systems, a care provider has an expand-
ing list of dierent types of payment challenges depending on its health care service
types. If a care provider oers several types of services, such as inpatient, outpatient,
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Figure 2.7: IT enabled healthcare service delivery system ows
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Figure 2.8: Impacts of reimbursement exibility
and emergency care services, it may have to accommodate fee schedule payment sys-
tems, prospective payment systems, capitation payment systems, and contractual
payment systems. Thus, the care provider technology must have a high degree of
reimbursement exibility, as the care provider must accommodate dierent payment
methodologies from multiple TPPs. Figure 2.8 shows a diagram of reimbursement
exibility, which we suggest will have related technology components, care provider
capabilities, and corresponding outcomes. Research should examine the role of tech-
nology relative to reimbursement exibility:
RO 9: Investigating the role of technology in supporting reimburse-
ment exibility.
When a patient is discharged from a care provider, the provider contacts the cor-
responding TPP responsible for payment. As patient encounter intensity increases,
the necessary care provider intensity increases (Jencks and Dobson, 1987), because
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more treatment procedures will be required. As the increasing number of treatment
procedures becomes complicated, the way in which providers are reimbursed be-
comes more varied and complex. Thus, the payment systems in a high intensity care
provider must have exibility to be paid based on an individual patient's varying pay-
ment requirements. When a mismatch exists in the care delivery phase, a mismatch
often follows in the reimbursement processing phase (Figure 2.9). If the professional
coding expert responsible for a claim faces an unexpected unsuitable match between
patient and care provider under ambiguous coding conditions, the coding is likely
to be inaccurate, which can result in medical billing errors. In addition, when the
mismatch happens frequently, coding experts are more likely to use self{preferred
codes, which may not be appropriately matched with the patient's actual procedure.
In some cases, unlisted general codes can be used, which then aect reimbursement.
Thus, we propose:
RO 10: Exploring the impact of care delivery mist upon care out-
comes and nancial ows via reimbursement technology mist
2.8 Conclusion
This essay highlights healthcare operations processes that have yet to be exam-
ined by healthcare OM/SCM scholars. We rst demonstrate the roles and complex-
ities of healthcare reimbursement processes. Subsequently, we identify dimensions
of complexity and uncertainty experienced by healthcare stakeholders. We nally
suggest unexplored research opportunities. Given the complexity of healthcare re-
imbursement problems, the lack of research appears to be at least partially driven
by the lack of an appropriate research agenda. Based on our agenda of research
opportunities, researchers may make substantial contributions by extending their
managerial interest in OM/SCM topics to healthcare reimbursement processes. The
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Figure 2.9: Billing system: Care provider match vs. mismatch
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frameworks and research opportunities outlined throughout this essay are a major
rst step for the eld of OM/SCM to address the Five Rights (5Rs) of a healthcare
supply chain. Specically, as shown in Figure 2.10, the 5Rs of a healthcare supply
chain are: right care provider, right time, right physician, right care provision, and
right payment system. These 5Rs play a crucial role in managing a patient's medi-
cal needs by matching all the various elements of the healthcare supply chain from
the choice of the care provider through the eventual reimbursement via a payment
system. If research continues to fail to account for the signicant roles of reimburse-
ment processes, scholars will fail to account for all factors that enable high quality
healthcare service|a case of omission bias.
Due to the broad set of characteristics in modern healthcare, our suggested re-
search opportunities provide a rst step and are admittedly not exhaustive. Yet,
based on our review of related literature, reimbursement research opportunities
should gain increased attention and become increasingly important problem domains
for several reasons, including the sheer scope of healthcare reimbursement as a driver
of GDP. While some argue new healthcare laws have improved care access and re-
imbursement (HHS, 2015), contemporary healthcare reimbursement trends suggest
reimbursement managers will need to consider rapidly evolving technology choices,
consolidation for operational and reimbursement economies of scale, even more re-
imbursement models, and how insurance exchanges will aect stakeholders (Weldon,
2014). Healthcare service researchers hold a rare opportunity to be among the rst to
examine healthcare reimbursement processes and related operational issues. To this
end, the essay provides initial directions for future studies into healthcare operations
and outlines the need to account for the 5Rs of a healthcare supply chain.
Relatedly, this study also oers high{level guidance for practitioners. Our concep-
tual frameworks and constructs may help healthcare managers identify operational
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Figure 2.10: The Five Rights of a healthcare supply chain
61
antecedents of administrative issues, which may enable reduction of overhead and
administrative error costs. If academic researchers can provide constructive research
questions and corresponding prescriptive advice, healthcare will be further improved
in terms of ecient and eective operations management. We believe our frameworks
related to healthcare reimbursement processes and corresponding research opportu-
nities will enable appropriate questions regarding unexplored reimbursement issues
for the OM/SCM eld.
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3. OUTPATIENT APPOINTMENT SCHEDULING UNDER PATIENT
NO-SHOWS AND PATIENT HETEROGENEITY
3.1 Introduction
Healthcare providers face many challenges in improving eciency and eectiveness
of health care systems (Cayirli et al., 2006). For outpatient clinics, employing a
well-performing appointment scheduling policy is critical to balance the needs for
ecient resource utilization (by mitigating physician's idle time and overtime) and
eective care delivery (by minimizing patients' waiting time to enhance satisfaction).
Appointment scheduling research has provided many useful scheduling policies for
outpatient services (Cayirli and Veral, 2003). Nevertheless, outpatient scheduling
systems need to be studied further to account for even more realistic issues (Cayirli
et al., 2006; Chen and Robinson, 2014).
Recent events illustrate potential shortcomings of outpatient scheduling systems
used by practitioners. For example, in response to manager performance incentives
based on outpatient scheduling targets, Veterans Aairs (VA) hospitals confronted
a serious scandal due to falsied outpatient scheduling data and poor care outcomes
(Kensling and Nissenbaum, 2014). More broadly, outpatient physicians today feel
overwhelmed by the complexity of scheduling their practices due to the extent of pa-
tient forgetfulness and diverse patient types requiring dierent care and service times
(Majd, 2015). With recent developments in healthcare IT, many patients soon will
be asked to use web-based appointment scheduling systems to self-schedule outpa-
tient appointments (Williams, 2015). However, due to the high costs of implementing
advanced IT for scheduling, many outpatient clinics can be nancially constrained.
Thus, there is an urgent need to develop simple but eective scheduling approaches
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for such practitioners. Compounding such issues, U.S. outpatient expenditures re-
cently have grown by 10% annually | double the rate of inpatient services | due
to expansion in aging populations, chronic diseases, accountable care initiatives, and
pay-for-performance reimbursement pressures (HCCI, 2010). These many challenges
for outpatient healthcare services motivate a need to further examine outpatient
scheduling to identify realistic and exible scheduling policies.
3.1.1 Two Challenges
In this study, we focus on two salient challenges: patient heterogeneity and pa-
tient no-shows. Patient heterogeneity and patient no-shows can lead to inecient
and ineective scheduling outcomes (Gupta and Denton, 2008), yet little academic
research considers these two factors together.
Appointment schedule performance can be sensitive to patient heterogeneity, due
to patient gender, age, physiology (Cayirli et al., 2006; Majd, 2015), and new or
follow-up patient types (AMA, 2013, p.11, Chapter 1). Literature suggests the main
dierence between two types concerns required service times (Cayirli et al., 2012).
Since patient heterogeneity exists, scheduling algorithms should take this informa-
tion into account when developing patient schedules (Chen and Robinson, 2014).
However, no one specic appointment policy can outperform all other policies due
to each clinic's dierent environment (Cayirli et al., 2012). Further, most outpatient
scheduling rules are analytically intractable, making it dicult to demonstrate an
algorithm's optimality (Gupta and Wang, 2011). Thus, instead of pursuing a univer-
sally optimal approach, we propose an adaptable sequential block scheduling policy
that reects the way many outpatient care providers prefer to incorporate patient
heterogeneity, that is, via heterogeneity in service times.
Patient no-shows, where a patient does not show up for an appointment, also can
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harm operational eciency, through under-utilization of outpatient service system
capacity (Zacharias and Pinedo, 2014). Typical outpatient appointment scheduling
approaches allow patients to make appointments weeks or months in advance, lead-
ing to patient no-shows due to forgetting about appointments or scheduling conicts
(Chen and Robinson, 2014). Previous studies examine impacts of no-shows on -
nancial performance (Moore et al., 2001; Pesata et al., 1999) and provider-patient
relationships (Pesata et al., 1999). Literature also nds patient no-show rates vary
across clinics (Robinson and Chen, 2010) and patient heterogeneity and no-show
rates are interrelated (Liu and Ziya, 2014).
While prior literature explores patient heterogeneity and patient no-shows sep-
arately, not much literature considers both together (Zacharias and Pinedo, 2014).
The objective of this study is to provide new scheduling approaches for outpatient fa-
cility managers who face patient heterogeneity in service times and patient no-shows.
In line with extant literature, we consider three concerns aecting the design of an
appointment system. First, clinics must consider patients' waiting time. Second,
clinics may try to avoid overtime of physicians. Third, clinics may try to minimize
physician idle time. This study tries to balance the three concerns.
3.1.2 Our Approach
We develop sequential block scheduling procedures inspired by the load smooth-
ing methods used in the Toyota production system. Our appointment scheduling
approach incorporates several assumptions. First, following extant literature (Robin-
son and Chen, 2010), we assume that a single physician represents one care delivery
system, which accounts for the one-to-one doctor-patient relationship. In reality,
patients prefer to seek services from the physician of their choice. Thus, a patient
scheduled to visit one particular physician cannot be transfered to other physicians
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who are underutilized.
Second, we assume a care provider knows each patient's information in advance,
making it possible to assign a type to each patient well ahead of time. In health-
care practice and academic literature (Chen and Robinson, 2014; Gupta and Denton,
2008), the assumption that demand for service by patients is large enough to con-
sistently ll appointment slots within each day is well-accepted. In doing so, we can
assign a xed number of patients from dierent types into the future time slots. In
addition, one main reason for patient no-shows may be a patient's forgetfulness due
to a clinic scheduling appointments well ahead of time. Thus, the second assumption
motivates the need to investigate patient no-shows.
Third, we assume that the scheduled patient arrivals are xed. The xed time
slot appointment is well accepted in modern outpatient clinics (Huang and Hanauer,
2014), and the academic literature (Cayirli and Veral, 2003; Mondschein and Wein-
traub, 2003; Schutz and Kolisch, 2013) also provides evidence that the xed time
slot assumption is not uncommon in outpatient appointment scheduling practice.
Based on the above assumptions, the study develops block scheduling policies for
several scenarios: zero no-show, positive no-show, overbooking, and open access.
3.1.2.1 Block Scheduling Policy
Each block scheduling policy is inspired by the load smoothing methods used in
the Toyota Production System (i.e., \Heijunka") (Ono, 1988), which tries to balance
dierent demand types and production volumes. We adapt the Toyota concepts to
assist outpatient scheduling managers who face patient heterogeneity and patient
no-shows. In particular, our policy tries to convert dierent patient service times
and numbers of patients for multiple patient types into an evenly balanced and
predictable process to stabilize physician idle time and overtime. In essence, each
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patient type becomes an input (comparable to a product type in Heijunka) that a
facility (i.e., physician) has to serve within a planning horizon. Our block scheduling
policy requires the following steps: (1) patient types are identied, (2) information
on relative demand frequency of patient types is used to dene time blocks within a
day (i.e., \session"), (3) a block's time capacity is subdivided into time slots based
on the patient type information, and (4) time slots within blocks are allocated to
specic patient types. We acknowledge that practitioners in fact are prototyping and
publishing experiments with similar scheduling policies in actual clinics (Huang and
Verduzco, 2015). For example, in Huang and Verduzco (2015), the authors studied
an actual women's health clinic and identied patient types and demand ratios, yet
their research approaches are not very rigorous. In that work, the clinic distributes
dierent patient types consistently over time. This example further supports that
our block scheduling policy can be widely applicable for practitioners.
3.1.3 Contributions
Our essay contributes by introducing a simple and easy-to-use block scheduling
policy which repeats block assignments throughout a day. This policy is grounded
in practitioner developments as well as in the very successful and broadly applica-
ble Toyota approach for manufacturing of multiple product types. The two features
of our study | patient heterogeneity and patient no-shows | clearly are ones that
practitioners in outpatient services are interested in, as demonstrated by recent prac-
titioner experiments with similar block scheduling systems (Huang and Verduzco,
2015). In the U.S.A., there are over 900 million outpatient ambulatory case visits
annually (CDC and Prevention, 2010), at over 96,000 outpatient care centers estab-
lishments (Business Data Codes, 2015). Thus, this essay might provide actionable
managerial insights to a large number of outpatient clinic managers and schedulers.
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Finally, our study can be widely applicable to other professional service organiza-
tions (e.g., nancial consultations) in the context of scheduling customers of multiple
types having relatively xed service times.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is among the rst few sequential schedul-
ing studies to provide guidance for outpatient clinics. We rst provide an algorithm
that can lead to an optimal block schedule when considering two patient types where
no-show rates are zero. Although the problem with more than three patient types
is proved to be NP-Hard, meaningful insights for both practitioners and academic
scholars are provided. We then consider patient no-shows along with patient hetero-
geneity to examine conditions under which our block scheduling policy is eective.
We also adapt the block scheduling approach to implement overbooking tactics, a
widely adopted policy to mitigate patient no-shows. Finally, since some healthcare
providers have switched from traditional appointment scheduling policies to open-
access approaches, we also consider our block scheduling policy within an open-
access environment allowing same-day appointment scheduling. Due to demand
uncertainty in the open-access scenario, we employ computational experiments to
compare our sequential block scheduling policy against alternative open-access poli-
cies. We demonstrate how two variants of our block scheduling approach improve
upon extant literature.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related lit-
erature. Section 3.3 provides model notation and formulations for traditional schedul-
ing situations. Section 3.4 examines overbooking with our block scheduling approach.
Section 3.5 compares open-access policies adopting our block scheduling algorithms.
Section 3.6 concludes and provides potential directions for future research.
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3.2 Literature Review
Our research relates to the large body of appointment scheduling research in the
healthcare area. A great number of operations management scholars are interested in
healthcare appointment scheduling, and the topic has been explored over the last 50
years (Cayirli et al., 2012; Gupta and Denton, 2008; LaGanga and Lawrence, 2012).
A critical literature survey on traditional appointment scheduling is developed by
Cayirli and Veral (2003) and Gupta and Denton (2008) providing an extensive tax-
onomy of methodologies as well as directions for future research. In the literature,
the design of appointment systems has been mainly focused on identifying appoint-
ment rule, for "within the day" scheduling that typically considers the combination
of timing of patient arrivals and sequencing patients, with the objective of balancing
between patient waiting time and the idle time of surgeons (Cayirli and Veral, 2003;
Cayirli et al., 2012).
3.2.1 Appointment System Design
Appointment system design comprises three decisions: (i) which appointment rule
to use, (ii) how to classify patients, and (iii) how to adjust scheduling for no-shows,
walk-ins, and other patient events (Cayirli and Veral, 2003). An appointment rule
identies a size of scheduling time block, a length of time interval for appointment
slots within a block, and initial variables such as the number of patients that will be
scheduled. Pioneering stuides on appointment system design, studied extensively in
the operations management eld (Bailey, 1952; Ho and Lau, 1992; Soriano, 1966),
explored appointment rules derived from many combinations of block size, appoint-
ment interval, and initial variables.
The second decision in appointment scheduling design considers whether to rec-
ognize patients as heterogeneous. Patient populations can be categorized using many
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dierent characteristics (e.g., new/return patient, service time dierences, and arrival
patterns). A decision maker can design a policy to assign patient categories to time
blocks and appointment slots. This research stream suggests that adopting patient
grouping approaches for new/return patients (Cox et al., 1985), inpatient/outpatient
(Walter, 1973), patient care procedure types (Bosch and Dietz, 2000), and dierent
service times (Wang, 1997) can substantially improve a clinic's schedule performance.
The third decision for designing an appointment system concerns adjustment of
schedules for patient behaviors such as no-shows and walk-ins. Extant literature ex-
plores patient no-show behaviors via equal service time scheduling policies (LaGanga
and Lawrence, 2012; Robinson and Chen, 2010). Empirical studies indicate patient
no-shows are widespread and drive negative nancial eects (Moore et al., 2001; Pe-
sata et al., 1999). Conversely, several studies propose that refusing walk-in patients
also may cause negative eects for a clinic (Cayirli and Veral, 2003; Taylor, 1984;
Virji, 1990). To address issues related to patient behaviors, scheduling literature
examines two types of appointment scheduling policies: traditional and open-access
scheduling policies (Robinson and Chen, 2010).
3.2.2 Traditional Policies vs. Open-Access Policies
With traditional scheduling policy, a clinic sets a routine appointment schedule in ad-
vance of the day of treatment. Traditional scheduling policies do not allow same-day
patient call-ins or walk-ins. Using traditional policies, a clinic can easily develop a
no-idle-time schedule. However, these appointment schedules often cannot appropri-
ately support clinic administrators due to variability in patient arrival and treatment
processes (Robinson and Chen, 2010). One source of variability aecting a schedul-
ing policy relates to patient no-shows, which are common in practice (Cayirli et al.,
2006; Ho and Lau, 1992; Rust et al., 1995). If a scheduled patient does not show
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up, a clinic may not utilize available resources. No-shows can lead to negative -
nancial and care quality eects (Hixon et al., 1999; Moore et al., 2001; Pesata et al.,
1999). One approach to remediate no-show eects is to use an overbooking appoint-
ment policy that allows a clinic to book multiple patients in a particular time slot
(Muthuraman and Lawley, 2008; White and Pike, 1964). Prior studies examine im-
pacts of overbooking policies on patient no-shows (Feldman et al., 2014; LaGanga
and Lawrence, 2012; Liu and Ziya, 2014). An overbooking policy can improve the
physician's workload eciency, but also may increase patients' waiting time.
To mitigate this trade-o, an alternative scheduling policy, called open-access
scheduling, was proposed in the 1990s (Qu et al., 2007). Under an open-access
scheduling environment, a clinic allows patients to call into the clinic in the morning
to make a same-day appointment (Herriott, 1999; Erdogan et al., 2015; Murray and
Tantau, 1999, 2000). The proportion of the schedule devoted for the daily call-
in appointments is one key parameter to provision appropriate capacity to meet
patient demand (Herriott, 1999; Qu et al., 2007). While some literature argues that
the eectiveness of open-access scheduling is questionable (Kodjababian, 2003), these
arguments are mainly based on qualitative experience.
Recent studies of open-access scheduling tend to use rigorous quantitative ap-
proaches, including stochastic optimization, queuing models, and simulation. Dob-
son et al. (2011) study the eect of reserved capacity for urgent patients in primary
healthcare settings using a stochastic model. Their study demonstrates that when
a clinic is not overloaded, the optimal scheduling policy depends on the ratio of
the cost of treating an urgent patient to the cost of delaying a regular patient. Qu
et al. (2007) demonstrate a quantitative method to determine the proportion of call-
in/same-day time slots to derive optimized clinic appointment schedules. Green et al.
(2007) investigate the impact of panel size, or the number of patients that a doctor
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needs to see in a day, in an open-access system. Using the overow frequency level,
which is the percentage of demand that exceeds capacity, the study provides an ap-
proach to select the optimal call-in panel size. Similarly, Green and Savin (2008)
use a queuing model to estimate the impact of panel size when all patients want to
make an appointment as soon as possible. Robinson and Chen (2010) analytically
compare cost between traditional and open-access scheduling policies for homoge-
neous patients, and demonstrate that an open-access system outperforms traditional
schedules unless patient waiting time is little or the probability of no-shows is minor.
Overall, our review of literature on healthcare clinic outpatient appointment sys-
tems implies that not many studies explore heterogeneous patient characteristics and
patient no-shows together. Zacharias and Pinedo (2014) and Schutz and Kolisch
(2013) are among the few studies that consider both patient heterogeneity and pa-
tient no-shows. Assuming equal service time for patients, Zacharias and Pinedo
(2014) consider patient heterogeneity in the sense of no-show probabilities. Our
work is general and is dierent from Zacharias and Pinedo (2014) in the sense that
we allow variable service times and patient-type-dependent no-show probabilities.
Schutz and Kolisch (2013) consider dierent patient types requiring integer multi-
ples of time slots to explore patient heterogeneity and patient no-show issues. Our
work is dierent from Schutz and Kolisch (2013) in the sense that we do not impose
any restriction on the service time being an integer multiple of predened time slots.
Rather, the xed time slot is dened in our essay as a function of the input param-
eters of the problem. In other words, the length of a time slot is a weighted average
of service time requirements of dierent classes of customers served in a block.
In short, to the best of our knowledge, no literature provides sequential block
scheduling policy for traditional, overbooking, and open-access cases, where schedules
are aected by new/follow-up patients, no-shows, and call-ins. Our essay contributes
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by considering such factors, which often occur in the clinical environment, leading
to more realistic scenarios for considering optimal scheduling policy.
3.3 Problem GP : Traditional Scheduling Policy without Overbooking
In this section, we consider Problem GP , a patient scheduling problem under
the traditional scheduling environment without overbooking. Note that under the
traditional system, each patient makes an appointment well in advance of the sched-
uled date. The clinic is able to ll up all available time slots on a given day. In
Problem GP , no overbooking is allowed. Thus, only one patient is assigned to each
time slot. We describe the problem setting and provide notation in Section 3.3.1.
In Section 3.3.3, we consider the problem when all patients are guaranteed to show
up at the appointed time. Then, in Section 3.3.4, we discuss the problem when pa-
tients' no-show probabilities are positive. Finally, in Section 3.3.5, we discuss how
practitioners may want to adjust our approach into their preferred time slot set up.
3.3.1 Problem Formulation
Our research is motivated by our discussions with practitioners, practitioner-
oriented literature, such as Huang and Verduzco (2015), and a pediatric orthopedic
clinic case (Klassen et al., 2010). Based on the motivating literature, we design the
framework for our research. We generalize the framework so the ndings apply to
many clinic scheduling contexts.
3.3.1.1 Motivating Clinic Case
The clinic opens daily from 8:00 AM to 12:10 PM. On average, a physician at
the clinic can examine 25 patients during each one-day session. The 4 hours and
10 minutes (i.e., 250 minutes) available during a session are divided into 25 time
slots with each patient taking one 10-minute time slot. The rst patient is scheduled
73
at 8:00 AM, while the last one at 12:00 PM. Overtime cost occurs if the physician
continues treating patients after 12:10 PM.
Based on historical data, the clinic categorizes patients into two dierent types:
new patients and follow-up patients. In general, a new patient has to go through
more diagnostic examinations than a follow-up patient. The clinic observes that the
average service time required by a new patient is 13 minutes, while the average service
time required by a follow-up patient is 8 minutes. The clinic also observes that the
variation in service times within each patient type is insignicant. The clinic is able
to conclude that the ratio between the number of patients of the two types is very
stable. In the clinic, 40 percent of patients are new patients, while the remaining 60
percent are follow-up patients. The clinic also observes that patients do not show up
for scheduled appointments all the time. Also, a signicant dierence exists between
the no-show probabilities of the two patient types.
3.3.1.2 Problem Setting
Motivated by the above clinic features, we describe a general traditional schedul-
ing problem. A clinic provides services to two types of patients, Type A (e.g., new
patients in the case clinic) and Type B (e.g., follow-up patients in the case clinic).
The average service times of these two types of patients, a and b, are dierent.
Without loss of generality, we assume that a > b. In addition, the average no-show
rates of Type A patients, pa, and Type B patients, pb, may dier. The arrival rates
of these two types of patients may also be dierent. The clinic is able to derive the
ratio ra : rb as the smallest positive integer ratio between the arrival rates of Type
A and Type B patients.
The clinic adopts a block scheduling policy. The length of each time slot, L, is
xed and satises L = raa+rbb
ra+rb
. Then every r = ra + rb time slots are considered
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as a block. The clinic needs to assign ra Type A patients and rb Type B patients
in each block. Once the scheduling sequence in a block is determined, the clinic
then repeats the same block sequence k times to ll up the one-day session. This
scheduling approach is referred to as \sequential block scheduling policy" throughout
the essay. Thus, on a given day, during the regular hours, there are T = kr time
slots scheduled.
We have several assumptions for the basic model: (i) The length of service time
for each patient type is constant. Extant literature shows that service time variance
is low in many outpatient clinics (LaGanga and Lawrence, 2012). LaGanga and
Lawrence (2007) demonstrate that a scheduling policy with xed service time is
eective even in a high service time variance environment. (ii) The patients are
scheduled well ahead of time. Since the demand from the patients is always higher
than the capacity of a clinic, the clinic is able to ll up the time slots based on its
preference. (iii) The clinic does not serve unscheduled walk-in patients (Liu and Ziya,
2014). (iv) The patients and physicians punctually arrive in a scheduled time slot,
following extant literature (Klassen and Rohleder, 1996; LaGanga and Lawrence,
2012; Soriano, 1966). The following Table 3.1 introduces the notation used in our
models.
Table 3.1: Notation
Parameter Note
a The average service time of Type A patient. In our example above,
a = 13 minutes.
b The average service time of Type B patient. In our example, b = 8
minutes.
ra The number of Type A patients scheduled within a block. In our
example, ra = 2.
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Table 3.1 Continued
Parameter Note
rb The number of Type B patients scheduled within a block. In our
example, rb = 3.
r Total number of patients scheduled within a block, r = ra + rb. In
our example, r = 5.
L The length of each period (time slot). In our example, L = 10
minutes.
k The number of blocks to be scheduled in the planning horizon (e.g.,
a day). In our example, k = 5.
T The number of periods (time slots) in the planning horizon, T = kr.
In our example, T = 25.
na The number of Type A patients scheduled in the planning horizon.
nb The number of Type B patients scheduled in the planning horizon.
n Total number of patients scheduled in the planning horizon, n =
na + nb.
pa The probability that a Type A patient does not show up for the
scheduled appointment.
pb The probability that a Type B patient does not show up for the
scheduled appointment.
t The type of patient assigned to time slot t, t = 1; 2; : : : ; T . For
example, 1 = A, 2 = B.
 The sequence of a block,  = (1; 2; : : : ; r). For example,  =
(A;B;A;B;B).
s The schedule of the planning horizon. In our example, s is dened
as a concatenation of blocks: s = (; ; ; ; ).
w Unit cost for patients' waiting time.
d Unit cost for physician's idle time.
o Unit cost for physician and facility overtime.
zt A dummy variable to indicate whether the t
th patient shows up,
1  t  T : zt = 1, if the patient shows up; 0, otherwise.
~z One realized instance of schedule s: ~z = (z1; z2; : : : ; zn).
t The service time of the patient who arrives at the beginning of
period t. t = a, if the assigned patient is Type A; t = b,
otherwise.
bt The backlog at the beginning of Period t after the t
th patient either
shows up or not, i.e., the additional amount of time to serve the
rst t patients at the beginning of Period t.
wt The waiting time of the t
th patient.
dt The physician's idle time in the t
th period.
W (s; ~z) The patients' total waiting time of ~z, a realization of schedule s.
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Table 3.1 Continued
Parameter Note
D(s; ~z) The physician's idle time of ~z, a realization of schedule s.
O(s; ~z) The physician's overtime of ~z, a realization of schedule s.
Cw(s) The expected total patient waiting time cost for schedule s.
Cd(s) The expected total physician idle time cost for schedule s.
Co(s) The expected total physician and facility overtime cost for schedule
s.
C(s) The expected total cost for schedule s, i.e., C(s) = Cw(s)+Cd(s)+
Co(s).
3.3.2 Cost Calculation
When overbooking is not considered, the clinic assigns exactly T patients to T
available time slots, i.e., n = T . There are two possible scenarios for each patient: she
either arrives punctually or does not show up. A vector of show/no-show dummies
~z = (z1; z2; : : : ; zn) can be used to describe a realized instance of schedule s. Also,
given schedule s, we know the type of patient assigned to Period t, and consequently
t, the service time of the t
th patient, 1  t  n. Given the vector (zt; t), 1  t  n,
we rst describe the calculation of bt which is used to calculate the costs.
Calculation of Backlog bt: The backlog, bt, is dened as the additional amount
of time to serve the rst t patients at the beginning of Period t. Thus, when t = 1,
we have b1 = z11: For t  2, there are two possible scenarios: (1) If bt 1  L, then
the physician can nish serving the rst (t  1) patients before the start of Period t.
Thus, bt = ztt; (2) If bt 1 > L, then the physician cannot nish serving the rst
(t  1) patients before the start of Period t. The extra time needed is (bt 1   L). In
this scenario, bt has the value bt 1 L+ ztt. Thus, to combine these two scenarios,
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we have:
bt =
8><>: 0; if t = 0,(bt 1   L)+ + ztt; if t  1.
Calculation of Expected Total Cost C(s): Three types of costs are considered as
follows:
 Expected total patient waiting time cost (Cw(s))
Given ~z, a realized instance of schedule s, to calculate the waiting time cost,
we rst derive the waiting time of the tth patient, wt. There are three possible
scenarios: (i) If a scheduled patient does not show up, then her waiting time
is considered as 0. (ii) The waiting time of the patient who is scheduled for
the rst period is 0, since there are no patients scheduled before her. (iii) For
any patient who shows up at the beginning of Period t (t  2), her waiting
time depends on bt 1. If bt 1  L, then the tth patient does not need to wait.
Otherwise, the patient needs to wait an additional (bt 1   L) minutes to get
her service. Thus, we have:
wt =
8><>: 0; if t = 1 or zt = 0(bt 1   L)+; if t  2 and zt = 1:
Accordingly, the patients' total waiting time for ~z, a realized instance of sched-
ule s, is W (s; ~z) =
Pn
t=1wt: Thus, the patient waiting time cost is:
wW (s; ~z) = w
nX
t=1
wt:
The above calculation is for ~z = (z1; z2; : : : ; zn), one realized instance of sched-
ule s. Since each of the n patients can either show up or not, there are in
total 2n scenarios. The probability associated with each scenario is p(~z) =
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(1   pa)xapra xaa (1   pb)xbprb xbb , where xa (resp. xb) represents the number of
Type A (resp. Type B) patients who show up in instance ~z. Thus, the expected
total waiting time cost is:
Cw(s) =
X
~z
p(~z)wW (s; ~z):
 Expected total physician idle time cost (Cd(s))
At the beginning of Period t, after the tth patient either shows up or not, we
obtain bt. If bt < L, then a physician will be idle after spending bt minutes
with the patient in Period t. Thus, the physician's idle time in Period t is
dt = L   bt. If bt  L, then the physician will be treating the patient during
Period t. Thus, dt = 0. Therefore, we have dt = (L   bt)+. The physician's
total idle time of one instance ~z of schedule s is D(s; ~z) =
Pn
t=1 dt. Thus, the
physician idle time cost for ~z, a realization of schedule s, is:
dD(s; ~z) = d
nX
t=1
dt:
Thus, the expected total waiting time cost of schedule s is:
Cw(s) =
X
~z
p(~z)dD(s; ~z):
 Expected total physician overtime cost (Co(s))
A physician's overtime depends on bn. When bn > L, the physician needs extra
time to care for the remaining patients. Thus, we have O(s; ~z) = (bn   L)+.
Thus, the physician overtime cost for ~z, a realization of schedule s, is:
oO(s; ~z) = o(bn   L)+:
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Thus, the corresponding expected total overtime cost of schedule s is:
Cw(s) =
X
~z
p(~z)oO(s; ~z):
Combining together, the above cost components, the expected total cost for sched-
ule s is:
C(s) = Cw(s) + Cd(s) + Co(s):
Thus, the objective is to nd an optimal schedule s such that C(s) = minsC(s).
3.3.3 When Patients' No-Show Probabilities Are Zero
The results developed in this section are used later to develop scheduling ap-
proaches for traditional scheduling environments without overbooking (Section 3.3)
and with overbooking (Section 3.4). The results also are used in developing open-
access scheduling policies later in Section 5, as having zero no-show probabilities is
a reasonable assumption in this environment.
In Problem GP , the objective is to minimize the expected total cost (C(s)) of
schedule s. However, previous studies suggest that physician-related per-unit time
cost is much higher than patient per-unit waiting time cost (Cayirli et al., 2012;
Zacharias and Pinedo, 2014). Due to this reason, a clinic may prefer a class of
schedules that minimizes the physician's idle time and overtime. Thus, we introduce
Problem SP , a variant focusing on schedules that minimize a physician's expected
idle time and overtime. In this section, we study Problem SP0, a variant of Prob-
lem SP in which the no-show probabilities of both types of patients are 0, i.e.,
pa = pb = 0. Thus, for each schedule s, there is only one possible instance, i.e.,
zt = 1, t = 1; 2; : : : ; n. In Problem SP0, we only consider the schedules with zero
physician idle time and overtime. Among the schedules with zero physician idle time
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and overtime, we try to select one which minimizes the patients' waiting time.
Problem SP0: min
s
Cw(s)
s.t. Cd(s) = 0; Co(s) = 0:
In Section 3.3.3.1, we rst describe Set , which represents the feasible set of
Problem SP0, i.e., the class of block schedules having zero physician idle time and
overtime. We also provide an upper bound for Problem SP0. Section 3.3.3.2 in-
troduces an algorithm to derive an optimal solution of Problem SP0. Finally, Sec-
tion 3.3.3.3 discusses computational complexity of the problem with m  3 patient
types.
3.3.3.1 Set : Feasible Set of Problem SP0
Let Set  represent the set of schedules that satisfy the following properties:
(i) The schedule is a block schedule, (ii) Each patient's no-show rate is zero, (iii)
The schedule has zero physician idle time, and (iv) The schedule has zero physician
overtime. Note that in each block, ra Type A patients and rb Type B patients are
assigned to r = ra+rb periods. The length of the block equals the sum of the service
times of these r patients, i.e., rL =
Pr
i=1 i. In the following lemma, we describe the
conditions for a block schedule to have zero physician idle time and overtime. The
reader may refer to the online supplement for all proofs of Lemmas and Theorems.
Lemma 1 A block schedule  has zero physician idle time and overtime if and only
if
Pt
i=1 i  tL, 81  t  r.
In the online supplement, we analyze the upper bound of patients' waiting time for
any schedule in Set .
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3.3.3.2 Algorithm OptBlock(o) to Derive an Optimal Solution of Problem SP0
We now study the schedule in Set  which minimizes patients' waiting time. We
propose Algorithm OptBlock(o), an algorithm to derive o. Thus, so = (o1; o2; : : : ;
oi; : : : ; ok) is an optimal solution for SP0.
Algorithm OptBlock(o)
Begin
Set Ja = ra, Jb = rb.
Assign Type A patient to Period 1 of . Set F1 = a, Ja = Ja   1, and t = 2.
While (Ja + Jb > 0) do
Step 0: If Ft 1 + b  tL and Jb > 0, then perform Step 1;
otherwise, perform Step 2.
Step 1: Assign Type B patient to Period t of .
Set Fj = Fj 1 + b, Jb = Jb   1, t = t+ 1.
Step 2: Assign Type A patient to Period t of .
Set Fj = Fj 1 + a, Ja = Ja   1, t = t+ 1.
End(while)
Output: o
End
We briey explain the idea behind Algorithm OptBlock(o). Note that a > L > b.
To guarantee there is no physician idle time in the rst time slot, we must assign it
to the type of patient with a longer service time (Type A patient in our example).
Next, whenever possible, the scheduling policy tries to assign the patient with shorter
service time (Type B patient in our example), as long as doing so will not incur any
idle time. We dene the sequence obtained by this algorithm as \OptBlock Sequence."
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Example of OptBlock Sequence Schedule: For the example parameter settings
specied in Section 3.3.1.2, Algorithm OptBlock(o) produces \ABABB" as the Opt-
Block Sequence, and accordingly, the schedule for a whole session of 25 time slots
would be jABABBjjABABBjjABABBjjABABBjjABABBj.
Since the while loop performs ra+rb iterations, we know that our scheduling policy
can be performed within polynomial time. Thus, the computational complexity of
Algorithm OptBlock(o) is O(ra + rb). Lemma 2 states this complexity. We show
optimality of OptBlock Sequence based policies in Lemma 3.
Lemma 2 The complexity of Algorithm OptBlock(o) is O(ra + rb).
Lemma 3 Algorithm OptBlock(o) provides an optimal schedule for Problem SP0.
In summary, our policy oers an optimal schedule within set . In total, this policy
maximizes labor resource utilization and minimizes patients' waiting time.
3.3.3.3 Generalization to m Patient Types with Zero No-Show Probability
Although most outpatient clinics categorize patients into two types, some clinics
may want to consider more general cases of patient heterogeneity. This section
extends patient heterogeneity to m  3 general types. We rst dene Problem SPm0
as follows.
Problem SPm0 : Given there are m (m  3) types of patients with dierent service
time, nd a block schedule so with zero physician idle time and zero overtime such
that the total patients' waiting time Wso is minimized.
We rst describe AlgorithmOptBlockm(), a variant of our AlgorithmOptBlock(o)
that is adapted for m types of patients. Algorithm OptBlockm() nds schedule
so = (; ; : : : ; ), where  is a block sequence consisting of (r = r1 + r2 + : : :+ rm)
patients. We name the m types of patients as Type i, i = 1; 2; : : : ;m. Without loss
of generality, we assume 1 < 2 < : : : < m.
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Algorithm OptBlockm()
Begin
Set Jl = rl, l = 1; 2; : : : ;m. Set F0 = 0 and t = 1.
While (
Pm
l=1 Jl > 0) do
Step 1: Find the smallest index i (1  i  m)
such that Ft 1 + i  tL and Ji > 0.
Step 2: Assign Type i patient to Period t of .
Set Ft = Ft 1 + i, Ji = Ji   1, and t = t+ 1.
End(while)
Output: 
End
In the following observation, we demonstrate that Algorithm OptBlockm() may
not derive an optimal solution to scheduling problem SPm0 for xed m  3.
Observation 1: Algorithm OptBlockm() may not provide an optimal solution for
xed m  3.
Although Algorithm OptBlockm() may not provide an optimal solution, it may
provide a good heuristic solution. We summarize the two feasibility conditions for
any solution : (i) The physician's idle time is 0 in each period. (ii) There are exactly
ri Type i patients assigned in 
, i = 1; 2; : : : ;m.
Next, we describe DPm, a dynamic programming (DP) algorithm which can be
used to derive , a block sequence to form an optimal solution of Problem SPm0 . We
dene ~t = f1; 2; : : : ; tg as the vector that includes the types of patients assigned
from Period 1 to Period t, and dene Ji(~t) as the number of Type i patients that
have been assigned in ~t. At the beginning of Period t, 1  t  r, for each feasible
~t 1, we rst obtain the set which includes all possible indexes i (1  i  m) such
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that
Pt 1
l=1 l +i  tL and Ji(~t 1) < ri. Then we create ~t by including one index
from the feasible set at a time. In the next lemma, we describe the computational
complexity of DPm.
Lemma 4 The complexity of DPm is O(m
r).
Note that for xed r and m, mr is polynomial in m. Thus we have the following
result.
Lemma 5 DPm solves Problem SP
m
0 polynomially for xed r and m.
If r and m are variables (which means they are parts of the input), then problem
SPm0 is a strongly NP-hard problem.
Theorem 1 Problem SPm0 is strongly NP-hard when r and m are variables.
Although many clinics classify patients into two types, some clinics categorize
their patients into more than three types. Theorem 1 provides an important message
for outpatient clinic managers: categorizing patients into three or more types will
increase the diculty to obtain an optimal schedule.
3.3.4 When Patients' No-Show Probabilities Are Positive
We next study Problem GP when patients may not show up. Note that if patients
do not show up, a clinic experiences physician idle time. In Section 3.3.4.1, we show
in Theorems 2 and 3 that schedules in Set  outperform other schedules regarding
the physician's expected idle time and overtime. Then in Section 3.3.4.2, we use
numerical experiments to compare the performances of schedules in Set  and other
schedules when patients' expected waiting time cost is also considered.
3.3.4.1 Two Properties of Schedules in Set 
In this section, we analyze the performance of schedules in Set  in Problem GP .
In Theorem 2, we rst compare among schedules in Set .
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Theorem 2 For any schedule in Set , the expected physician idle time has the
same value.
Next, in Theorem 3, we compare any schedule in Set  with any schedule that is not
in Set .
Theorem 3 For any schedule that is not in Set , the physician's expected idle time
and overtime is larger than that of any schedule in Set .
Recall that Problem SP is a variant of Problem GP focusing on schedules min-
imizing the physician's expected idle time and overtime. Thus, Theorem 3 shows
that any schedule in Set  is an optimal solution of Problem SP . In other words,
regardless of the patient no-show rate, the clinic should always consider the schedules
in Set  if its focus is to minimize the physician's expected idle time and overtime.
3.3.4.2 Numerical Experiment to Examine the Optimality of OptBlock Sequence
As extant literature shows (Zacharias and Pinedo, 2014), an optimal schedule can
vary depending upon patient no-show probabilities. Although we mathematically
prove that OptBlock Sequence leads to an optimal scheduling solution under zero
no-show probability, this sequence may not always be optimal under positive no-
show probabilities. Thus, we now explore the impact of no-show probabilities pa
and pb on OptBlock Sequence. We standardize the coecient of physician's idle
time as 1. Following extant literature (Cayirli et al., 2012), we assume the ratio
between physician costs is o = 1:5 d. We then examine dierent values of patient
waiting time (w) from 0:1 to 0:8 as in Zacharias and Pinedo (2014). We expect that
physician overtime or physician idle time is more costly than patient waiting time.
Thus, schedules with positive overtime may perform worse than our schedule.
We use the following experiment to verify the performance of our scheduling
policy in positive no-show cases. Table 3.2 provides numerical parameters for the
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Table 3.2: Parameters for the experiment
Case a b ra rb OptBlock Sequence Range of pa and pb k L w
1 22 14 1 7 ABBBBBBB
0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.8 4 15
0.1, 0.3,
0.5, 0.8
2 24 12 2 6 ABBBABBB
3 30 6 3 5 ABABBABB
4 22 8 4 4 ABABABAB
5 18 10 5 3 AABAABAB
6 17 9 6 2 AAABAAAB
7 16 8 7 1 AAAAAAAB
experiment. As described in the Problem Formulation (Section 3.3.1), we keep a
block size r xed at 8 time slots, which accounts for eight patients within a block.
Then, we vary the number of Type A patients (ra) and Type B patients (rb) from
1 to 7. Thus, the combination of ra and rb can generate 7 dierent cases. We can
obtain the OptBlock Sequence in each scenario. The experiment covered a range
of patient no-show probabilities from 10% to 80%. Thus, one scenario can obtain
64 dierent cases (8 possible values of pa, and 8 possible values of pb). We x the
length of each time slot L as 15 minutes and x the length of the session as 480
minutes, which is 8 regular hours per session. Thus, the experiment includes 32 time
slots within a session. The corresponding number of blocks k is a determined value
based on other parameters, such as , r, and L. Using dierent w, we calculate
the total expected cost (C) to compare OptBlock Sequence schedules against other
schedules. With the above parameter settings, we have 1; 792 dierent cases (i.e.,
7 clinic scenarios x 64 no-show cases x 4 weights of patient waiting time). We also
examined schedules that are not in set  and the results show that schedules in set
 provide better performance than other schedules in most cases.
To examine the eect of our scheduling policy relative to other schedules, we rst
compared schedules within Set , since in Theorem 3, we show that the schedules
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in Set  minimizes the physician's idle time and overtime for any range of no-show
rate. For example, there exist seven feasible schedules in  when ra = 3 and rb = 5.
In Table 3.2, the \OptBlock Sequence" column represents sequences developed by
Algorithm OptBlock. For each pa value, we change each patient no-show probability
pb to investigate the impact of no-shows on OptBlock Sequence.
3.3.4.3 Managerial Insights
Following accepted simulation approach (Law, 2013) programmed an experiment
in the C++ language, we randomly generate the number of Type A and Type B
patients to schedule for a session, and then use a binomial distribution for each
patient type to generate no-shows. With a xed session length (i.e., 480 minutes), it
is possible to randomly generate too many patients for a session, thus excess patients
are scheduled on the following day. Thus, we need to consider the warm-up period
for consistent estimation. After generating 1,100 session replications, we dropped
the rst 100 results, to obtain a total of 1,000 session replications for each scenario,
representing approximately three years of daily sessions. We used analysis of variance
(ANOVA) to examine whether the schedules of the OptBlock Sequence and other
schedules in the set  (i.e., in Figure 3.2, OptB vs. OTHER) were signicantly
dierent. In each case, patient waiting time cost is statistically dierent between the
two categories (i.e., OptB vs. OTHER).
Figure 3.1 illustrates four instances (i.e., Case No. 2, 3, 5, and 6) of experi-
ment results, which show the total expected cost (C), as we vary patient no-show
probability. The \OptB" (i.e., grey) region indicates an optimal area using the Opt-
Block Sequence and the \OTHER" (i.e., white) region indicates an optimal area
using schedules other than OptBlock Sequence. This numerical experiment high-
lights implications of OptBlock Sequence. First, the result remains consistent across
88
Figure 3.1: OptBlock sequence cost eciency
(a) ra = 2, rb = 6, ABBBABBB (b) ra = 3, rb = 5, ABABBABB
(c) ra = 5, rb = 3, AABAABAB (d) ra = 6, rb = 2, AAABAAAB
all w patient waiting time cost cases. This observation suggests that Algorithm
OptBlock(o) can be widely applicable in many dierent clinic settings. Second, as
shown in Figure 3.1, we observe that OptBlock Sequence performance is associated
with Type A patients, who require more service time than Type B patients. If the
no-show rate in Type A patients is not high (e.g, less than 50% in our cases), Opt-
Block Sequence clearly outperforms (i.e., minimum C) regardless of the no-show rate
in Type B patients. This observation provides an important insight for clinic sched-
ulers. If a clinic can reduce the no-show rate of patients with longer service time,
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the clinic can obtain the best schedule with OptBlock Sequence. Although our nu-
merical experiments are not exhaustive, the experimental results demonstrate that
our scheduling policy is eective in dierent ra, rb, a, and b environments. This
insight further illuminates that level scheduling policy can be widely applicable in
outpatient clinics.
3.3.5 Alternative Scheduling Policy Based on OptBlock Sequence
Our numerical experiment ndings so far provide evidence that our policy gen-
erates eective schedules for two patient types. We now discuss how our approach
might be relaxed by practitioners to adapt it to specic time scheduling preferences.
In practice, schedulers may prefer to use time slot lengths close to an integer number,
often a multiple of 5 or 10 minutes. That is, the preferred scheduled appointment
times may be 8:00 am, 8:05 am, 8:15 am, 8:20 am, 8:30 am, 8:40 am, 8:45 am, 9:00
am, and so on. Figure 3.2 illustrates this alternative scheduling adaptation that will
generate schedules closer to the desired scheduling environment.
Suppose in a clinic, we have the following parameter values: ra = 2, rb = 3,
a = 14, b = 4. The corresponding length of block, raa + rbb, is 40 minutes, and
the length of each time slot, L, is 8 minutes. Theoretically, a clinic can assign the
ith patient scheduled at time (i   1)L with our block scheduling policy. That is for
i = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6, the ideal scheduled appointment time should be 0, L = 8, 2L = 16,
3L = 24, 4L = 32, 5L = 40, 6L = 48, 7L = 56, 8L = 64. However, the scheduler
instead can assign patients to arrive at an earlier preferred time based on 5 minute
increments (Figure 3.2).
3.3.5.1 Main Dierence
To calculate cost for each session, we need to consider a variable-interval Li. We
dene Li as the actual length of the time slot for the ith patient. Thus, functions of
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Figure 3.2: Practical scheduling based upon algorithm OptBlock(o)
bt, wt, dt, and O must be revised. In other words,
bt =
8><>: 0; if t = 0,(bt 1   Lt 1)+ + ztt; if t  1.
wt =
8><>: 0; if t = 1 or zt = 0(bt 1   Lt 1)+; if t  2 and zt = 1:
dt = (Lt   bt)+:
O = (bn   Ln)+:
The practical implication of this approach is that solutions based on OptBlock Se-
quence should have the same physician idle time and overtime, whereas the patient
waiting time will be extended slightly.
In summary, we have identied that OptBlock Sequence can perform well for pos-
itive patient no-show rates. Overall, the OptBlock Sequence based schedule provides
a lower expected total cost C than other schedules when the no-show rate of the pa-
tients with longer service time is not too high. In situations where patient no-show
rates are high, extant works (Chen and Robinson, 2014; Robinson and Chen, 2010)
have suggested the use of overbooking policy to mediate patient no-show behaviors.
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Thus, we next study the impact of OptBlock Sequence when applied to overbooking
scenarios.
3.4 Problem OP : Traditional Scheduling Policy with Overbooking
In the previous section, we study the scenario when patients may not show up
for appointments. The physicians experience idle time if no overbooking is allowed.
In practice, to improve the utilization rate of physicians and facilities, clinics may
consider overbooking, i.e., assign more than one patient for each time slot. In this
section, we study a traditional scheduling policy combining OptBlock Sequence with
overbooking. For the overbooking model, we assume that (i) If a time slot is over-
booked, then patients assigned to this time slot are of the same type (i.e., all are
either Type A or Type B), (ii) There is no priority between the overbooked patients.
If all patients scheduled for the same time slot arrive, the clinic will randomly select
one of these patients to serve rst. After serving this patient, the clinic will continue
randomly selecting one patient among those arrived at the same time slot to serve.
The clinic nishes serving all these patients before serving the patients scheduled
after this time slot. (iii) The clinic must serve all scheduled patients even when a
regular session is over. Thus, the clinic may remain open after TL minutes have
elapsed.
3.4.1 The Design of Overbooking Policies
An overbooking policy handling multiple patient types should include the follow-
ing three elements: (a) the type of patient assigned to each time slot of the schedule,
(b) the number of overbooked patients for each type, and (c) the allocation of these
overbooked patients. In this section, we propose two overbooking policies: (i) Front
Load Overbooking (Policy FLO) and (ii) Level Load Overbooking (Policy LLO).
We rst describe the three elements of each policy, then briey explain the rationale
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behind our choices. Some illustrative examples are presented to derive insightful
observations.
 Type of patient assigned to each time slot of the schedule
In both Policy FLO and Policy LLO, we use OptBlock Sequence as the base
schedule, i.e., to determine the type of patient to be assigned to each time slot.
In our example, the base schedule is
jABABBjjABABBjjABABBjjABABBjjABABBj.
Our Rationale: In the previous section, we have shown that the schedule based
on OptBlock Sequence is the optimal policy when patient no-show rates are
zero. Thus, when no-show rates are positive and overbooking is allowed, if only
those overbooked patients do not show up, then this schedule minimizes the
patients' waiting time while achieving zero physician idle time and overtime.
We have also shown that this policy minimizes the expected physician idle time
and overtime, when patients have positive no-show rates and overbooking is
not allowed. Thus, if the no-show patients spread out across the schedule, we
still believe our proposed overbooking schedules below will perform well.
 Number of overbooked patients for each type
We use Type A patients as an example. Recall that kra represents the number
of time slots reserved for Type A patients in the base schedule. We dene
Ea as the number of overbooked Type A patients in the schedule. Thus, the
expected number of arrived Type A patients is (kra + Ea)(1   pa). Since the
no-show rate pa is positive, to minimize the physician's idle time, we would
prefer the expected number of arrived Type A patients is close to kra. Thus,
we obtain Ea =
l
kra
1 pa
m
  kra. We can use a similar method to calculate the
number of overbooked Type B patients. As an example, let us suppose we have
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ra = 2; rb = 3; k = 5. Let pa = 0:15 and pb = 0:25. Thus, Ea = 2; Eb = 5. We
need to overbook 2 Type A patients and 5 Type B patients.
 Allocation of these overbooked patients
The idea of front loading has been used for single-type patient overbooking
(LaGanga and Lawrence, 2012; Zacharias and Pinedo, 2014). By assigning all
overbooked patients in the rst time slot, the clinic is able to minimize the
expected physician's idle time. Since we are dealing with two types of patients
in our schedule, we rst describe the allocation plan for our Policy FLO:
Policy FLO
Step 1: Identify the rst time slot assigned for a Type A (resp. Type B)
patient.
Step 2: Allocate Ea (resp. Eb) Type A (resp. Type B) patients in this time
slot.
FLO Schedule SF : jA(2)B(5)ABBjjABABBjjABABBjjABABBjjABABBj
A(2) means two Type A patients are overbooked to the rst time slot. B(5)
means ve Type B patients are overbooked to the second time slot.
Next, we describe the allocation plan for Type A patients in our Policy LLO
(The allocation plan for Type B patients follows a similar method):
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Policy LLO
Algorithm for Policy LLO
Begin
Set Ja = Ea. Set i = 1.
While (Ja > 0) do
Step 1: Find the rst period k in Block i such that the patient
assigned to period k is Type A and period k
has not been overbooked yet.
Step 2: Overbook one Type A patient to period k of Block i.
Step 3: Set Ja = Ja   1. If i = r, then i = 1; otherwise i = i+ 1.
End(while)
Output: s
End
LLO Schedule SL:
jA(1)B(1)ABBjjA(1)B(1)ABBjjAB(1)ABBjjAB(1)ABBjjAB(1)ABBj.
Next, to compare the performances of our two overbooking policies, we study several
scenarios under which Ea Type A and Eb Type B scheduled patients did not show
up.
 Scenario OB1: The last Ea Type A and the last Eb Type B scheduled patients
did not show up.
 Scenario OB2: The rst Ea Type A and the rst Eb Type B scheduled patients
did not show up.
 Scenario OB3: The Ea Type A and Eb Type B patients who did not show up
are evenly distributed.
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We have the following observations:
Observation 2: Under Scenario OB1, schedule SL (LLO) outperforms schedule SF
(FLO).
Under both SL and SF , we overbook Ea Type A patients and Eb Type B patients.
If the last Ea Type A and the last Eb Type B scheduled patients did not show up,
then the system utilization rate remains 100% in both schedules. However, in SF ,
patient waiting time is much higher than that in SL due to the high number of
patients assigned on the front.
Observation 3: Under Scenario 0B2, schedule SF (FLO) is the optimal schedule. The
physician's idle time and overtime are zero. The patient waiting time is minimized.
When the rst Ea Type A and the rst Eb Type B scheduled patients did not show
up in a session, the resulting schedule becomes a traditional appointment schedule
without overbooking: jABABBjjABABBj jABABBjjABABBjjABABBj. We have
proved the optimality of this policy in the previous section.
As a consequence of the above observations, we have the following result.
Observation 4: Under all three scenarios, schedule SF (FLO) has zero idle time.
Remark: Scenario 3 is the likely occurrence in practice. Under Scenario OB3, it
is dicult to conclude which one of the two schedules (SL, SF ) dominates. We
expect that SL (FLO) dominates SF (LLO) for the most practically relevant problem
instances dened in our computational study. We explore this in our computational
study in the next section.
3.4.2 Numerical Experiment for Overbooking
We adopt the experiment setting used for the numerical experiments in Sec-
tion 3.3.4.2 for our simulation, xing number of patients per block, r = 8, and overall
session hours, TL, which are equivalent to 480 minutes. In addition, we include three
96
Table 3.3: Parameters for overbooking experiment
Case a b ra rb Sequence Range of pa and pb k L w
8 40 8 3 5 ABABBABB
0.1,0.2,...,0.7,0.8 3 20
0.1, 0.3,
0.5, 0.8
9 30 10 4 4 ABABABAB
10 26 10 5 3 AABAABAB
more cases to examine the impact of L on scheduling performance. Table 3.3 shows
the additional cases on top of the previous cases in Table 3.2. Finally, we estimate
the eect of no-show probabilities on the optimal overbooking policy when we con-
trol for other parameters. We then compare scheduling without overbooking (NO)
and with overbooking policies (LLO and FLO). We rst examined the analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to ensure all three policies (i.e., LLO vs. FLO vs. NO) are
signicantly dierent.
3.4.2.1 Managerial Insights
In general, we observe that the LLO policy always provides better performance
(i.e., lowest C) than the FLO policy in terms of marginal total cost that includes
patient waiting time cost, physician idle time cost, and physician overtime cost. This
result further supports the idea that Toyota's production leveling philosophy can
lead to ecient service system utilization and eective care delivery in overbooking
settings. Since LLO provides a better overbooking policy, we now examine the
impact of overbooking policy using LLO scheduling.
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 illustrate one instance (i.e., Case No. 3 in Table 3.2) of
simulation results that compare overbooking with leveling scheduling (LLO) against
the no-overbooking policy (NO). When the total cost (C) per patient for LLO is
lower than NO, we label the cell \LLO", otherwise we label it \NO". The X axis
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Figure 3.3: LLO vs.NO overbooking (w = 0:1)
and Y axis indicate the no-show rate of Type A and Type B patients, respectively.
Figure 3.3 provides the result when the coecient of patient waiting time is 0:1.
Figure 3.4 shows results when the patient waiting time coecient is 0:5. Overall,
LLO performs well under the high patient no-show rates. Another observation is
the following: as w increases, the region of LLO shrinks. Other scenarios, which
have dierent ra, rb, a, and b parameters, follow similar patterns. One implication
from the simulation is as follows: a clinic, which has physician idle time that is 10
times more expensive (i.e., w = 0:1) than patient waiting time, will be better o to
overbook patients if no-show rate is moderate. If a clinic considers patient waiting
time to be at least half the value of physician idle time, then it is better o not to
overbook patients unless the patient no-show rates are extremely high.
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Figure 3.4: LLO vs.NO overbooking (w = 0:5)
3.4.2.2 Regression Analysis
Since our numerical results cannot estimate distinct clinic characteristics that can
aect the benets of overbooking, we now consider a regression analysis to examine
eects of patient characteristics on a clinic's decision to overbook. Specically, we
use a logistic regression model to predict whether characteristics of patient demand,
no-show, and service length can encourage clinics to use LLO overbooking. Using
DOverbook as a dependent dummy variable, we estimate the logistic regression model:
Logit(DOverbook) = 0+1Service+2Demand+3pa+4pb+5L+ e, where 0
is constant and e is a random error term. The dependent variable (DOverbook) takes
the value 1 when an \LLO" policy is better to use than \NO", and 0 otherwise.
We use service time ratio (Service)(i.e., a
b
) and demand ratio (Demand)(i.e., ra
rb
) as
determinants of benets of overbooking. We also include control variables (pa, pb,
and L).
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Table 3.4: Determinants of over-
booking decision
Variable w = 0:1 w = 0:5 w = 0:8
Service -0.243 -0.427*** -0.357***
(0.18) (0.127) (0.13)
Demand -0.027 0.001 0.047
(0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
pa 17.879*** 11.116*** 10.148***
(2.10) (0.92) (0.89)
pb 15.286
*** 10.242*** 8.566***
(1.80) (0.87) (0.79)
L -0.076 0.026 0.041
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
cons -6.21*** -11.03*** -10.915***
(1.33) (1.09) (1.10)
N 768 768 768
R2 0.682 0.554 0.504
* p < 0:1 ** p < 0:5 *** p < 0:01
Table 3.4 provides estimated coecients. The regression results demonstrate that
the probability of benets from overbooking a schedule decreases as the service time
ratio between Type A and Type B increases (Service). However, if w = 0:1, the
service time ratio is not signicant. In other words, the impact of the service time
ratio matters most when a clinic places a high value on a patient's time, relative to
the value placed on the clinic's idle time (i.e., w > 0:5). Next, there is no evidence
that the probability of benets from overbooking a schedule change as the demand
ratio between Type A and Type B patients changes (Demand). Also, the probability
of benets from overbooking a schedule increases as the patient no-show rate (pa, pb)
increases. Finally, we observe no empirical evidence of eects of the length of time
slot (L) on the overbooking benet.
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In summary, the simulation results with OptBlock Sequence overbooking demon-
strate that overbooking, when using a level scheduling approach, can mitigate eects
of patient no-shows. The results show the eectiveness of level scheduling for over-
booking policy. As previously described, the use of open-access scheduling policy
is the other way to mediate impacts of patient behaviors. Thus, we next study the
impact of OptBlock Sequence on the open-access policy.
3.5 Open-Access Scheduling Policy
To mitigate the impact of patient no-shows, some clinics implement an open-
access scheduling policy, where patients are allowed to make same day appointments,
rather than an overbooking policy. Robinson and Chen (2010) have demonstrated
the relative dominance of open-access schedules for homogeneous patients under zero
patient no-show rates, as compared against traditional and overbooking schedules ex-
periencing typical no-show rates. Motivated by this implication, we consider whether
scheduling policies based on OptBlock Sequence perform well within the constraints
of an open-access scheduling environment. We explore whether open-access schedules
generated by policies based on OptBlock Sequence show better performance than an
extant open-access scheduling policy. A key idea built into an open-access schedul-
ing policy is the allowance for same-day appointments, in order to benet from their
observed low or zero no-show rates. In this section, we introduce two scheduling
policies based upon OptBlock Sequence to adapt into the open-access scenario. We
then implement simulation experiments to evaluate their performance. We take the
base case scheduling scenario for this simulation from previous literature (Robinson
and Chen, 2010), which adopts the First-Come, First-Appoint (FCFA) rule. Since
environmental assumptions in an open-access schedule dier from the assumptions
in Section 3.3, we start by introducing our problem statement.
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3.5.1 Problem Statement
In academic open-access literature, clinics generally require patients to call early
in the morning on the same day before starting their operations (Chen and Robinson,
2014; Robinson and Chen, 2010). Since literature demonstrates that the observed
no-show rate in open-access scheduling environments can be signicantly lower than
that in traditional scheduling (Cayirli et al., 2012; Chen and Robinson, 2014), we
also assume that the no-show rate in the open-access policy is negligible. Therefore,
following this literature, we assume there is zero no-show probability for both patient
types.
For justication of an open-access clinic's regular hours and maximum extended
working hours, we adopt an empirical report, which surveyed American physicians
(Hawkins, 2012). The survey results support the parameter settings used in our
simulation models. We assume that a clinic's regular working hours are 8 hours
(Cayirli et al., 2006).
We also assume that an open-access clinic does not allow walk-in patients or call-
in patients during regular operating hours. In other words, a clinic will only consider
patients who actually call in the morning, in line with the assumptions of Robinson
and Chen (2010). The arrivals of the two types of patients are independent and
follow separate Poisson distributions, a reasonable assumption based upon scheduling
literature (Cayirli et al., 2012). The additional parameters are the following.
Additional Parameters:
a The daily demand rate of Type A patients.
b The daily demand rate of Type B patients.
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3.5.1.1 Challenge of Implementing Open Access Policy for Multiple Patient Types
With traditional scheduling, a clinic knows the exact number of patients of each type
to schedule in a given session. In contrast, under an open-access policy, the clinic
needs to assign the patient to a time slot when she calls in the morning. At this
point, the clinic scheduler can only observe the patients who have already called in,
but has no idea how many more patients will call in later that morning. This feature
is less of an obstacle when all patients are assumed to be of the same type. The clinic
can just assign the patients consecutively into the slots available. However, when
there are multiple types of patients, the situation becomes more complicated. As we
have shown in Section 3.3.4, to balance waiting cost against idle time and overtime
costs, it is optimal to assign dierent types of patients to dierent time slots by using
the sequential block schedule. However, in an open-access situation, the uncertainty
of the actual demand makes an optimal schedule unlikely. Thus, we apply our block
scheduling approach in two dierent ways. Below we describe the three approaches
we compare:
 First Come First Appoint (FCFA) Policy { (Benchmark Policy)
The clinic scheduler assigns patients to the next available slot regardless of their
types. The shortcoming of this policy is that the schedule in each block may
not be optimal, given that the patients call in randomly. For example, we may
have patients call in the following order: BBBBA. By using the FCFA policy,
we schedule these ve patients in this same order. However, if the optimal
block schedule is ABABB, the physician likely will have a positive idle time
under this policy.
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 Strict OptBlock Policy
Our rst open-access approach is based on the OptBlock Sequence in Sec-
tion 3.3.4. Thus, a patient will only be assigned to a slot reserved for the
same type. The shortcoming of this policy is we may have too many partially
lled blocks at the end of a day. For example, on a day with a large excess
of Type A patients and no excess of Type B patients, any additional blocks
opened to satisfy excess demand would exhibit physician idle time. Thus, the
physician idle time may make this schedule inecient in an open-access setting.
 Flexible OptBlock Policy
We also propose a Flexible OptBlock policy, which resolves the possible short-
comings of the above two policies to some extent. In this approach, we rst
use the OptBlock policy to assign the rst ra Type A patients (resp. rb Type B
patients) to the slots based on their type. But, if we receive a call from the
(ra + 1)
th Type A patient before lling the current block, instead of opening
a new block, we temporarily switch to the FCFA policy to schedule. Then,
this Type A patient is assigned to the rst reserved slot for a Type B pa-
tient in this unlled block. For example, if patients call in the following order:
BBBAB, then using the Strict OptBlock policy for the rst four patients, we
have AB?BB with the third slot unlled. Since the fth patient is still of
Type B, we then use FCFA to assign this patient to the 3rd slot to obtain the
schedule: ABBBB. In this instance, the schedule obtained will be better than
the schedule obtained by using either of the rst two policies.
Among the above three policies, we expect none will always be better than the
other two. By conducting a thorough experiment, we show that either the Strict
OptBlock policy or the Flexible OptBlock policy is the most robust one. Next, we
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provide an algorithm which describes the Flexible OptBlock policy used to obtain a
schedule for the open-access environment.
Algorithm Flexible(s)
Begin
Step 0: Set J = 1, na = 0, nb = 0.
While (A new patient calls in) do
Begin
Step 1: If the new patient is of Type A, then na = na + 1, go to Step 2;
otherwise, nb = nb + 1,go to Step 3.
Step 2: If na  ra, assign this Type A patient
to the rst available slot in Block J which is reserved for Type A;
otherwise, assign this Type A patient to the rst available slot in
Block J which is reserved for Type B. Go to Step 4.
Step 3: If nb  rb, assign this Type B patient to the rst available slot
in Block J which is reserved for Type B; otherwise, assign
this Type B patient to the rst available slot in Block J
which is reserved for Type A. Go to Step 4.
Step 4: If na + nb = ra + rb, set K = K + 1, na = 0, nb = 0.
End
Output: s
End
3.5.1.2 Modied Overtime Cost Calculation for Open-Access Scheduling
To calculate cost for each open-access session in open-access scheduling, we introduce
additional parameters. Now tk is dened as the actual time slot for the kth patient.
Next, tf is the time slot that the last patient is assigned. Since we assume that a
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clinic can obtain specic demand information about Type A and Type B patients, the
clinic scheduler knows the approximate number of needed blocks. In this open-access
scenario, the calculations of expected physician idle time cost (Cd) and expected
patient waiting cost (Cw) are the same as in the basic model cost calculation. Thus,
we only describe the new formulation of expected physician overtime cost (CO). Since
we dene T as the number of periods (time slots) in the planning horizon (a day)
without overtime, we can derive the physician overtime as: O = (btf + L(tf   1)  
LT )+.
3.5.2 Performance Evaluation of Open-Access Scheduling Policies
We perform simulation experiments to compare three scheduling policies (i.e.,
FCFA Policy, Strict OptBlock Policy, and Flexible OptBlock Policy). Again, the base
scheduling policy is the FCFA policy that prior work (Robinson and Chen, 2010)
adopted for open-access.
As we mentioned, the daily number of patient early morning call-ins follows a
Poisson distribution. A clinic will experience a volume of calls from Type A patients
with call-in ratio a (= kra), and from Type B patients with b (= krb) call-in ratio.
Recent open-access scheduling literature (Chen and Robinson, 2014; Robinson and
Chen, 2010) justies the credibility of this assumption.
We rst examine the impact of patient numbers within a block (i.e., ra and rb) on
the performance of scheduling policies based on OptBlock Sequence. We adopt xed
service time parameters for Type A patients as 20 minutes, and Type B patients as
10 minutes. These expected service times are acceptable in actual practice (Hawkins,
2012). Then, we vary the number of Type A patients (ra) and Type B patients (rb)
from 1 to 10. Thus, the combination of ra and rb generate 100 dierent cases. Since
we x ra, rb, and demand ratios as integer numbers, we cannot make the exact same
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Figure 3.5: Open-access total cost
amount of the length of session (TL) in each case. Instead, we try to make each case
such that the length of session is close to 240 minutes (i.e., one session as a half day).
To calculate the total cost (C), we use the same parameters for cost coecients that
we adopt in Section 3.4 (i.e., d= 1, o= 1:5, and w = 0:1, 0:3, 0:5, and 0:8).
Figure 3.5 illustrates the results. In the gure, F indicates the Flexible OptBlock
policy, S indicates the Strict OptBlock policy, and B indicates the Benchmark FCFA
policy. Overall, schedules based on OptBlock Sequence perform well for the open-
access scheduling environments. The results support that scheduling policies based
on OptBlock Sequence can improve system eciency when ra
rb
< 2:5. One implication
identied through the result is the following: a patient category, which requires more
service time, may play a signicant role in open-access scheduling.
The nding also supports the eectiveness of scheduling policies based on Opt-
Block Sequence by minimizing patient waiting time. Specically, Figure 3.6 shows
that the Strict OptBlock Policy often provides better schedules that have lower ex-
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Figure 3.6: Open-access patient waiting time
pected patient waiting time than the base policy. Also, the Strict OptBlock Policy
performs better than the Flexible OptBlock Policy for most of the environments.
Therefore, the combined results for the impact of patient numbers within a block
supports the eciency and eectiveness of OptBlock Sequence in open-access situa-
tions.
We next examine the impact of service time ratio (i.e., a
b
) on the performance
of scheduling policies based on OptBlock Sequence. While the previous experiment
examines the relationship between patient numbers and performance of OptBlock
Sequence, the patient service time ratio (a
b
) is xed. We next vary the service time
ratio, while keeping the length of a regular session constant. We also vary the length
of time slot (L = 10, 15, 20, and 30) and the number of patients within a block
((ra, rb) = (2,3) and (3, 2)). We also use the same parameters for cost coecients
to calculate the total cost (C).
Figure 3.7 illustrates results of open-access scheduling policies in service time
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Figure 3.7: Open{access results in service time (ab )
(a) Total Cost vs. Service Time Ratio (b) Relative Cost Performance vs. Ser-
vice Time Ratio
(c) Patient Waiting Time vs. Service
Time Ratio
(d) Relative Cost Performance Between
Truncated vs. Base Scenarios
b
ratio (a ). Specically, Figure 3.7(a) shows the total cost (C), as we vary the service
time ratio, for the vector (ra, rb) = (2,3) and L=10. A dominant policy shown in the 
gure is the Strict OptBlock Policy. The result indicates that the total cost increases 
as the service time ratio increases, and as the service time ratio increases, \F" and 
\S" are better than \B". Figure 3.7(b) presents relative cost performance of \F" 
and \S" against the benchmark scheduling policy (i.e., FCFA). If the service time 
ratio is higher than 1:3, then OptBlock Sequence based scheduling policies perform
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dominantly in terms of the total cost C. When we vary parameters for the sensitivity 
analysis, \F" and \S" perform better than the \B" policy. Further, the experiment 
still supports the eectiveness of OptBlock Sequence in various service time ratios. 
Figure 3.7(c) shows the expected patient waiting time against service time ratio, 
where again \F" and \S" perform better than the \B" policy.
Above, we assumed that a clinic accepts all patients who call in during the early 
morning. However, in practice, many clinics may limit the size of the patient panel 
during a session, depending upon the clinic capacity. Thus, we modify the simulation 
design so that a clinic will turn down patients who call-in after the ( + 1)th patient. 
In other words, the scheduling system allows patients up to a for Type A and b for 
Type B patients. Figure 3.7(d) demonstrates that OptBlock Sequence based schedul-
ing policies are even more ecient in the truncated open-access environment. Thus, 
the experimental results suggest scheduling policies based on OptBlock Sequence can 
be adopted eciently in actual clinics.
We have identied that OptBlock Sequence can perform well in situations where
a clinic will use an open-access scheduling policy. Either the Strict or Flexible sched-
ule developed by OptBlock Sequence provides a lower total cost C than the base
scheduling policy (FCFA). Thus, we argue that the benets of scheduling policies
based on OptBlock Sequence still hold when applied to open-access environments.
3.6 Conclusion
We examine an outpatient appointment scheduling system under patient het-
erogeneity and patient no-shows. Our research extends prior healthcare operations
research on scheduling to policies for patient heterogeneity. Our sequential block
scheduling approach is generated from the idea of production leveling used in the
Toyota Production System. Specically, we adapt an approach for leveling of pro-
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duction requirements so that product mix and volume are relatively even over time.
The objective of production planning aims to balance the workload in each work
station. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the rst research to apply this
idea to healthcare scheduling systems.
This article has several implications. First, when considering two heterogeneous
patient types, we develop a sequential block scheduling policy that leads to ecient
and eective appointment schedules. Since this policy is easily implementable, out-
patient clinics, which distinctly face patient heterogeneity, should benet from adopt-
ing our scheduling policy to schedule patients. Second, if the clinic faces more than
three patient types, clinic schedulers are encouraged to use the proposed dynamic
programming procedure to nd the base block schedule. Third, although our pol-
icy may not provide optimal schedules incorporated with positive patient no-shows,
our policy nevertheless performs well when the no-show rate for patients who re-
quire longer service time is not signicantly high. Fourth, using a logistic regression,
we identify causal factors for outpatient clinic managers to consider when examin-
ing whether to use an overbooking policy. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of
our scheduling policies on open-access environments, which allow same-day appoint-
ments. Since extant literature (Robinson and Chen, 2010) shows that an open-access
approach can perform better than traditional and overbooking scheduling policies,
and we showed our block scheduling approach performed better than FCFA in the
open-access environment, we argue that our scheduling policy should provide better
schedules in many outpatient scheduling settings. The ndings contribute to the
outpatient scheduling literature by bridging the research gap and providing stepping
stones for future scheduling research.
We observe many fruitful opportunities for future research. Prior research com-
pares open-access scheduling having zero no-show rates against traditional overbook-
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ing scheduling with positive no-show rates. Future studies of multiple patient types
may relax this assumption and explore the impact of our block scheduling policy.
Researchers also can further investigate impacts of constraining schedules having ap-
pointment times to multiples of 5 or 10 minute increments. Finally, we foresee many
research opportunities for detailed overbooking analysis. Thus, future research can
enhance our block scheduling approach within even more varied overbooking envi-
ronments.
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HOSPITAL BEHAVIORS RESULTING FROM
HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL INCENTIVE POLICY
4.1 Introduction
A long-standing concern facing the U.S. healthcare system pertains to low care
delivery quality and the existence of medical errors associated with a lack of eective
service delivery by healthcare providers (Naveh et al., 2005; Green, 2012). Given
the complexity of healthcare service delivery, parties including policy makers, medi-
cal professionals, and academic researchers argue that minimizing process variation
is one of the key drivers to reduce medical errors (Schmenner, 2004; Tucker, 2004;
Tucker et al., 2007). In past years, U.S. medical errors have led to the deaths of
about 100,000 patients annually with more than $3 billion of unnecessary additional
costs (Adamy, 2014; Kohn et al., 1999). To address these issues and improve ob-
jective service quality and the perceived quality of healthcare service delivery, the
U.S. Medicare program has implemented several incentive and penalty systems that
require hospitals to consider and demonstrate their service delivery eectiveness.
Among them, Medicare in 2011 revamped its reimbursement system to develop the
Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) program, which forces care providers (i.e., hospitals)
and care professionals (i.e., doctors) to become responsible for improving healthcare
service quality (Werner and Dudley, 2012).
As part of the VBP program, Medicare can withhold a certain amount of reim-
bursements (1% in 2013, 1.25% in 2014, and later up to 2%) from hospitals that do
not perform well along a specied list of healthcare quality outcome metrics (CMS,
2014b). In contrast, hospitals that perform exceptionally well can receive incentive
bonuses. Through the measurement of hospital care processes, patient satisfaction,
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and care outcomes, hospitals that participate in the VBP program are assigned ei-
ther penalties or incentives. Among the nearly 3,000 hospitals that were required to
participate in VBP, the program penalized about 1500 hospitals in 2013 and 2014,
based on hospital operating data from the previous year and two years before the
performance period, calculated as weighted scores pertaining to poor patient satis-
faction and low process quality. Hospitals incurred total nancial penalties of about
$1.1 billion (CMS, 2014b).
Since the VBP penalty eventually will not be negligible for most hospitals, given
the annual growth of the penalty and uncertain hospital prot margins, there is
an expectation for hospital healthcare managers to comply with this government
regulation. Nevertheless, instead of triggering a hospital to make signicant process
and care outcome quality improvements, some hospitals may make opportunistic
adjustments to avoid penalties. Although potentially illegal to do so, in response
to VBP, hospitals may not be willing to admit high-risk patients (i.e., risky health
conditions, low-income patients, or certain races of patients) who are likely to be
conducive to poor quality healthcare performance (Jha et al., 2010). Hospitals also
may respond to VBP penalties by tactically focusing on new patient sectors that
provide stronger remuneration. Healthcare professional skepticism about the eects
of the VBP program on process quality improvement (Rau, 2013) supports the need
for careful, detailed scrutiny of the VBP program and related initiatives.
We investigate the VBP program to examine its quantitative impacts on health-
care quality improvements when hospital managers face this institutional pressure.
Prior studies demonstrate healthcare organizations are concerned with unavoidable
external pressures (Scott et al., 2000; Lee and Zenios, 2012; Ata et al., 2013). To
respond to this VBP institutional pressure, some hospitals may adopt symbolic man-
agement practices to comply with social standards in appearance (Westphal and
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Zajac, 1994), leading to symbolic practices that may not align with VBP program
expectations. Organizational theory scholars have explored the symbolic practice
phenomenon, which often occurs when an organization needs to demonstrate exter-
nal legitimacy, but cannot aord to acquire substantial resources to modify practices
(Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Westphal and Graebner, 2010). Healthcare policy makers
and hospital administrators, as well as U.S. citizens, need to know how much of a
real eect the VBP program actually has on healthcare providers and the overall
healthcare system. Thus, we raise the following unexplored research question: Are
nancially penalized hospitals likely to adopt tactics relevant to symbolic management
practices in response to penalties from VBP?
To address our research question, we employ several dierent data sets from the
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which provides detailed hospital
data including process quality, patient experience, and other related information. We
also obtain specic VBP measures and hospital environment data from the Hospital
Compare data from Medicare. Using information from HIMSS Analytics, we obtain
hospital information technology adoption data. Finally, we obtain information from
the Dartmouth Atlas, which provides information on geographical distribution of
hospitals.
Our research endeavors to contribute both to academic research and practition-
ers in the healthcare sector. First, compared to emerging OM studies that hypoth-
esize the VBP program will uniformly improve hospital operational performance,
this study theorizes contextual dierences in the behaviors of hospitals when facing
these external government pressures. By empirically examining evidence of drivers
of symbolic practice, our research introduces the symbolic perspective into health-
care service OM research. Next, little empirical research in healthcare OM estimates
responses to the variety of exogenous institutional pressures intended to improve
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healthcare processes and outcomes, thus this essay contributes empirical evidence
by quantifying impacts of the VBP program, while controlling for other relevant
regulatory programs. As Green (2012) suggests, managing patient-oriented service
processes is an essential topic for the future of the OM eld. Finally, since the
VBP program is a touchstone nancial program, among several programs intended
to motivate the objectives of patient-centered care, our empirical analysis of the VBP
program contributes to key principles that the OM eld should endeavor to move
toward: disentangling actual operating improvements from symbolic improvements
motivated by nancial incentives.
For government policy makers and hospital administrators, we estimate the con-
temporary eects of the current VBP program. We investigate whether the program
pushes hospitals to opt to use symbolic practice instead of process improvement prac-
tices. Our ndings suggest that when hospitals are nancially penalized by the VBP
program, then the hospitals are more likely to respond in appearance. Specically,
previously penalized hospitals may avoid more complicated patients while accommo-
dating patients who can bring extra revenues. Through considering these ndings,
government policy makers might be motivated to consider additional metrics that
may generate more eective incentives for improving the overall healthcare system.
Otherwise, the VBP program may lead to unexpected negative associations with the
intended healthcare quality improvements. In addition, there are nearly 3,000 VBP
participating hospitals in the U.S.A. that annually discharge about 10,000 patients
per hospital on average (CMS, 2015a). Thus, the ndings might provide actionable
managerial insights directly related to the care quality and outcomes for 30,000,000
patients per year aected by the VBP program. Given our ndings, if government
policy makers can empirically identify that a hospital exhibits symbolic practice out-
comes, then hospital administrators will need to carefully control the stakeholder
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behaviors to counteract unintended, or potentially illegal, operational processes. If
a hospital is exhibiting symbolic practices in the short-run, administrators might
need to initiate organizational changes for the long-run to ensure compliance with
the VBP intentions.
In Section 4.2, we provide an overview of the VBP program, review literature on
institutional theory and symbolic management perspectives, and generate hypothe-
ses. In Section 4.3, we describe data and methods. We present results in Section
4.4. Finally, we discuss implications for both practitioners and researchers about the
empirical ndings.
4.2 Background and Hypotheses
We rst review aspects of government regulations in the healthcare industry.
We then explore theoretical perspectives underlying organizational actions based
on institutional symbolism. We pose hypotheses based on symbolic management
literature pertinent to healthcare provider reactions.
4.2.1 The Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program
Government-initiated programs in healthcare have made eorts to motivate im-
proved quality of medical service. These programs require healthcare providers to
meet certain rules, standards, and expectations. U.S. healthcare-related government
policy, regulatory bodies, and reimbursement bodies, such as Medicare and the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS), have developed sets of best practice
protocols, which provide a general approach for process management practices for
care process measures (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Chandrasekaran et al., 2012).
These process management practices, inspired by Total Quality and Lean Practice
adoption, support healthcare providers in the quest to deliver consistent services and
procedures (Westphal et al., 1997). Corresponding to recommendations of the In-
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stitute of Medicine (IOM) to tackle the quality of healthcare service, the Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), for instance, in 2003 developed quality mea-
surement programs for reducing process variation and promoting quality improve-
ments (Boyer et al., 2012; Kohn et al., 1999). CMS provided best-practice process
measures for hospitals to assess general and severe health issues, spanning from best
practices for the timing of antibiotic treatment for general surgery patients to best
practices for the quick response to heart attack patients. Healthcare providers who
participate in Medicare or Medicaid programs must provide related data to CMS to
verify they are conforming to such practices.
In 2010, CMS released a new regulation called the Value-Based Purchasing (VBP)
program, which connects the Medicare payment system to care delivery quality met-
rics. The program's purpose is to reduce cost and to improve healthcare quality
(Rau, 2012). To do so, Medicare can charge reimbursement penalties or provide
reimbursement bonuses based on a hospital's annual quality measures and actual
healthcare outcomes during prior years (CMS, 2014b). Table 4.1 provides the set of
metrics for the VBP payment program. Regarding quality measures, the underlying
rationale for the VBP program is the consideration of two sets of performance quali-
ties and one set of care outcomes. The rst quality measure concerns process of care
adherence to internal clinical procedures in which a healthcare provider follows the
CMS recommended guidelines when they treat patients. For instance, for each of the
four conditions measured (e.g., heart failure), one of the VBP clinical measures is
the percentage of hospital patients whose antibiotic selection was appropriate. The
second measure relates to perceived patient experience, which is an external quality
measure that considers how care providers deliver services to patients. For example,
the degree of nurse or doctor communications with patients is one external quality
measurement dimension. While the two sets of measures estimate process quality of
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Table 4.1: Key metrics for the VBP payment program
Description of Measures Note 2013 2014 2015
Process of Care
Measures
 Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI)
CMS measures each
metric's performance and
improvement rates
X X X Heart Failure (HF) Pneumonia (PN)
 Surgical Care Improvement Project (SCIP)
Patient Experiences
 Communication Hospital Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare
Providers and Systems
Survey (HCAHPS)
measures patient
satisfaction using patient
survey data
X X X
 Responsiveness
 Pain Management
 Hospital Environment Conditions
 After Discharge Satisfaction
Outcome of
Care Measures
 Heart Failure Mortality rate of patients
who died within 30 days
after being treated for
these conditions
X X Heart Attack (AMI)
 Pneumonia
the care providers' internal care delivery protocols and patient satisfaction, the VBP
program also evaluates the care providers based on a third set of objective outcome
of care measures, such as mortality of three health conditions (Heart Failure, Acute
Myocardial Infarction (AMI), and Pneumonia), each of which is viewed as a crucial
disease that results in high rates of death and hospitalization, and accordingly, ex-
cessive costs for all stakeholders (i.e., patients, care providers, third party payers,
and U.S. taxpayers).
Previous management literature already suggests government regulations and
policies are associated with healthcare executive actions (Elsbach et al., 1998; Oliver,
1991; Pfeer, 1981; Ruef and Scott, 1998). Goodrick and Salancik (1996) and Oliver
(1991) argue that depending on the characteristics of care providers, the degree of
compliance with a regulation will dier, and the constraints under which top man-
agement's strategic choice is made should be investigated. Some studies examine the
impact of healthcare management on quality (Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Short-
ell et al., 1995). However, very little empirical research tackles specic behavior of
healthcare providers when they address institutional pressures such as government-
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initiated VBP quality improvement programs intended for healthcare providers. Re-
cent working papers simply analyze the VBP-to-care quality linkage. We contribute
by demonstrating how hospitals can respond to VBP either through actual process
improvement or instead via symbolic practice.
4.2.2 Institutional Pressures and Symbolic Management
Institutional theorists argue that external pressures, such as government regula-
tions, will inuence the motivation of organizational behaviors, making rms behave
dierently than would be expected under strictly logical and rational actions (DiMag-
gio and Powell, 1983; Scott et al., 2000). Institutionalization refers to societal pro-
cedures by which external policies obtain legitimacy in an organization (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977; Westphal et al., 1997). Indeed, organizational literature proposes le-
gitimacy as \a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and denitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). To acquire legitimacy,
organizations are more likely to operate using similar strategies or decision-making
systems, a situation called an isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Heugens
and Lander, 2009).
Based on the institutional perspective, there exist three types of isomorphic pro-
cesses: coercive, mimetic, and normative processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
Coercive isomorphism comes from formal or informal pressures exerted on organi-
zations by governments or other dominant agencies upon which they depend. Prior
literature relates to coercive isomorphism exerted by government regulators (Bar-
ratt and Choi, 2007), customers (Choi and Eboch, 1998), and headquarters (Kos-
tova and Roth, 2002). Mimetic isomorphism refers to the cognitive isomorphic pro-
cess in which organizations recognize institutionalization as taken-for-granted beliefs
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(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott et al., 2000). Organizations are likely to face
unexpected environments that entail risks. Through a mimetic isomorphism pro-
cess, the organizations follow best practices within an industry to tackle economic
peril and acquire legitimacy (Heugens and Lander, 2009). Finally, the normative
isomorphic process refers to institutionalization as a pursued value among peers of
a professional network, such as professional organizations, trade associations, and
public opinion (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott et al., 2000). These groups may
impose pressures on organizations to conform to specic standards (Peng, 2003). In
response to the three isomorphic processes, organizations may enact dierent strate-
gic responses including symbolic practice (Markoczy et al., 2013; Oliver, 1991).
Symbolic management literature suggests organizations under institutional pres-
sures instead are likely to adopt symbolic practices conforming to social expecta-
tion (i.e., legitimacy) in appearance, without conforming actual operating practices
(Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 1998, 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). We dene sym-
bolic practice as the adoption of organizational legitimacy in name only, where in-
ternal organizational structures move in an opportunistic direction. Organizational
theorists empirically demonstrate that the organizational symbolic management per-
spective is positively associated with instances of high implementation cost, or high
symbolic gain (Elsbach et al., 1998; Martinez-Moyano et al., 2013; Rogers et al.,
2007; Westphal and Graebner, 2010). For example, hospitals are likely to exert sym-
bolic practices when they want to diminish patient attention, such as with highly
charged issues of hospital billing practices (Elsbach et al., 1998). In healthcare OM
literature, symbolic practice has been explored using case-based research (Bhakoo
and Choi, 2013). Using the information technology adoption context, the study ex-
plores whether hospital symbolic practices vary depending on institutional pressure
characteristics.
121
In summary, the institutional and symbolic management literatures suggest ex-
planations for the ways institutionalization occurs and for drivers of institutional
pressures and symbolic practices. Yet most prior studies use a qualitative approach
to examine such issues in healthcare. Little research empirically studies drivers of
symbolic management or the impact of institutional pressures in the healthcare in-
dustry. We contribute by investigating the symbolic practice phenomenon in the
context of VBP within the healthcare industry via an econometric approach.
4.2.3 Research Hypotheses
4.2.3.1 Prior Performance and Government-Regulations
Government mandates and corresponding symbolic management literature sug-
gest that prior performance in terms of poor hospital performance threatens the
reliability of hospitals as an appropriate service provider for patients (Scott et al.,
2000; Westphal and Zajac, 1994). To assuage this quandary, hospital administrators
should at least provide some signal to patients (including potential patients) that
the hospital conforms to the particular government mandate performance criteria,
at least in appearance (Oliver, 1991; Pfeer, 1981; Scott et al., 2000). The follow-
ing year's hospital performance represents the hospital managers' eorts to improve
service quality in a way that satises patients (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). While
hospitals can use many forms of tactics for symbolic practices (Fiss and Zajac, 2006),
the operational performance of the following year is the most direct and externally
visible outcome. The VBP program's disclosure of performance metrics for a hos-
pital is observable to patients and provides hospitals with a signaling mechanism
demonstrating apparent service quality capability. This VBP evaluation should be
based on a hospital's actual performance. However, the observed performance result
may not accurately reect on the actual hospital care delivery quality improvement
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eorts.
To conform to legitimacy in appearance, without substantive quality improve-
ment, some hospitals may opportunistically manipulate patient inputs or process
outputs. Assuming little or no change in exogenous patient needs in the local popu-
lation (i.e., city), one way to make opportunistic adjustments relates to the change in
a hospital's patient distribution. Changing the patient case mix index (CMI) is one
tactic hospital managers might use to improve the hospital's quality score without
making real process improvements. The case mix index refers to a hospital's level
of clinical complexity for inpatient services (CMS, 2015a). Thus, a change in this
index may represent a signal to indicate a change of the patient distribution. For
example, if CMI increases, a hospital is treating a patient population consisting of
proportionally more complicated patients.
Also, hospitals might choose to serve more patients who can bring in extra -
nancial revenues to the hospitals. If a hospital admits more than a certain portion
of a specic patient group, the hospital can achieve extra nancial incentives. In
doing so, rather than improving processes, they may simply attempt to counteract
the impact of the VBP penalty. The disproportionate share hospital (DSH) percent-
age indicates the proportion of these patient groups. Further, the outlier payments
percentage, measuring the proportion of patients who require extra costs to treat,
represents another index based upon which a hospital receives additional nancial
incentives from the government. In response to the VBP nancial penalty, hospitals
may accept more patients who are eligible for this outlier payment category.
Motivated by symbolic institutional theory, we conjecture that when hospitals are
penalized in the previous period, they are more likely to avoid patients who require
more complex treatments and to report more patient proportions that can bring in
incentive based nancial bonuses. In short, through adjusting patient groups, specif-
123
ically those groups that are negatively associated with the VBP quality measures
(e.g., more complicated patients), hospitals may obtain a lower CMI compared to
the previous year. Also, hospitals can also accept more patients who are directly
associated with the nancial incentives by increasing the proportion of DSH patients
and Outlier Payment patients. Thus, symbolic managerial behavior can be reected
by a decreasing CMI, increasing DSH, or increasing Outlier Payment level. Through
tactical handling of these patient groups, hospitals may avoid nancial penalties
from CMS, which represents conformity to VBP objectives in appearance but not in
action, that is, symbolic practice. Taken together, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The lower a hospitals previous performance, the higher the
likelihood that the hospital exhibits symbolic management practices.
4.2.3.2 Impact of Dense Referent Group on Symbolic Behavior
Since institutionalization concerns adaptive responses that are logically connected
by organizational regulative, mimetic, and cognitive characteristics (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983), the diusion of the VBP program into hospitals can be convention-
ally explained by such institutionalization. In the context of a hospital's referent
group, which represents a source of organizations having similar organizational char-
acteristics, dierent yet socially similar hospitals may take part in VBP and develop
similar normative beliefs (Festinger, 1954; Reichers, 1985). These common beliefs
may precede similar practice adoption among the hospitals. Researchers in man-
agement argue that organizations positioned in dierent referent groups engage in
distinguishable strategies (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Lounsbury, 2007). Organizational
behavior within a geography base is one way to classify hospitals into dierent social
normative systems. Studies in the institutional literature have empirically identied
that organizations may take various responses to institutional pressures depending
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on location (Doshi et al., 2013; Lounsbury, 2001, 2007; Marquis, 2003; Marquis et al.,
2007). Marquis (2003) illustrates that the density of intra-organizational networks
diers across U.S. cities, and these geographical dierences can lead to the adoption
of dierent behaviors.
We conjecture that referent group density of institutional constituents enables
hospitals to induce symbolic practices. When hospitals are located within a city
(or county) referent group, the particular hospital referent group is more likely to
share common (i.e., mimetic) practices, leading each hospital to react similarly to
peers within the group when responding to external pressures. However, having a
high level of hospital geographical density within the referent group also may lead to
more aggressive tactics to capture patient attention, than in a region with a low level
of geographical density. For example, a hospital within a highly dense referent group
area may face keen competition for the same types of patients. In this situation of
high density, some hospitals within a referent group may be more likely to respond
in appearance to external pressures (Marquis, 2003). Hospitals that are not capable
of following the actual practices of the same geographic group are likely to adopt
symbolic practice when responding to external pressures. In short, when hospitals
have high referent group density, previously penalized hospitals are more likely to
adopt symbolic practice. We posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Compared to low-density hospital referent groups, symbolic
management practice is more likely when penalized hospitals reside within a high-
density referent group.
4.2.3.3 Impact of Legitimacy Eorts on Symbolic Behavior
New hospital IT investments conforming to government mandates reect an at-
tempt to achieve institutionalization rather than symbolic practice, which we refer
125
to using the term legitimacy eorts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Prior studies in
information systems (IS) research explore IT adoption and corresponding impacts on
hospital operational performance (Agarwal et al., 2010). Modern hospitals incorpo-
rate IT to handle service processes smoothly (Angst and Agarwal, 2009). IT usage
can enable process improvements and thus improve objective hospital performance,
such as nancial performance and quality performance (Devaraj et al., 2013), and
enhanced process transparency (Kohli and Kettinger, 2004). Thus, we expect mod-
erating eects of legitimacy eorts pertaining to IT adoption on hospital symbolic
management practices. Even for hospitals previously having low VBP performance,
in achieving the successful adoption of new government mandated IT systems, we
expect those hospitals are more likely to improve actual process performance. In
turn, these hospitals are less likely to exhibit characteristics consistent with sym-
bolic practice. We posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Legitimacy eort negatively moderates a previously penalized
hospital's symbolic management practices.
We also conjecture that IT adoption can moderate referent group social proximity
eects upon symbolic management. Previous studies show diusion eects of IT on
hospitals (Angst et al., 2010), thus social proximity is positively associated with the
likelihood of IT adoption, a form of mimetic isomorphism. When hospitals adopt
new IT and implement it appropriately, such hospitals can deliver more eective
healthcare services (Bardhan and Thouin, 2013). Thus, such outcomes are consistent
with institutionalization rather than symbolic practices. We expect hospitals that
adopt new IT in high-density areas are less likely to exhibit characteristic indicators
of symbolic practice when responding to external government requirements. We posit
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). For hospitals within a dense referent group, when a hospital
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exhibits legitimacy eort, the impact diminishes on symbolic management practices.
In summary, emerging healthcare literature on impacts of VBP pays little at-
tention to the symbolic management perspective. From organizational literature,
we observe many institutional pressures and corresponding responses. These studies
seldom focus on strategic service design in the healthcare industry. We view the
impact of institutional pressures on the healthcare industry as imperative research
questions that have not been explored yet. Thus, we examine the actual eects of the
government-initiated program (VBP) for both healthcare policy makers and hospital
administrators.
4.3 Research Methodology
We next describe available data sources. We then describe how we construct
variables pertaining to our analyses and econometric models.
4.3.1 Data Sources
The data for this study include hospital-level information related to hospital VBP
performance and hospital operations. In particular, the data come from various
sources, such as Medicare Hospital Compare, CMS Cost Report, CMS Impact Files,
CMS Case-Mix Index, Dartmouth Atlas, and Healthcare Information and Manage-
ment Systems Society (HIMSS). From the CMS Impact Files data, we obtain informa-
tion regarding the hospital level annual performance of the VBP program from 2013
to 2014. There are 2,984 VBP participating acute care hospitals in 2013 and 2,728
hospitals in 2014. We use the CMS Case-Mix Index data to provide a signal about
whether hospitals may not admit patients requiring complicated procedures. From
CMS Cost Report, we obtain DSH information related to the proportion of patients
eligible for extra nancial bonuses to be paid to hospitals. From the CMS Impact
Files, we obtain Outlier Payments information relevant to the percentage of patients
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that require extra costs to treat. Data from Dartmouth Atlas provides information
pertaining to U.S. regional categorization (i.e., Hospital Referral Region (HRR)).
This data set provides the number of care providers in a region, the level of hospital
density, and other data, within each HRR. Using data from HIMSS Analytics, we
observe the level of mandate-compliant IT adoption in each hospital. Specically,
this data set contains information on the adoption of Computerized Physician Order
Entry (CPOE) technology. We collect information from Medicare Hospital Compare
to use as treatment control variables. Specically, we obtain patient satisfaction re-
lated data from HCHAPS, a part of the Medicare Hospital Compare data set. We
also collect hospital-level control variables from Medicare Hospital Compare, includ-
ing size of hospital (i.e., number of beds), teaching intensity, and hospital types.
Table 4.2 illustrates denitions for our variables.
4.3.1.1 Dependent Variables
We use lagged dependent variables to assess the following year's hospital be-
haviors pertaining to symbolic practices. In response to the nancial penalty, we
estimate three dependent variables. From annual CMS Case-Mix Index (CMI) data,
we observe the rst symbolic behavior signal, whether a hospital decreases the CMI
in the following year. Specically, CMI is measured by summing the weighted treat-
ment cases related to inpatient services and dividing by the number of cases (CMS,
2015a). Thus, a decreasing hospital case-mix indicates that a hospital treats less
complicated patients compared to the previous year. To estimate the symbolic sig-
nal in each hospital i, we use the following formula:
%CMIi =
CMIit+1   CMIit
CMIit
Our second dependent variable is the change in the Disproportionate Share Hos-
128
Table 4.2: Variable denitions
Variable Name Variable Measure Source
Dependent
Variables
CMI Percentage change of Case Mix
Index from 2013 to 2014
CMS Acute Inpatient PPS:
Case-Mix Index
DSH Dierence between DSH per-
centage in 2013 and 2014
CMS Cost Report
Outlier Dierence between operating
and capital outlier payments as
a percentage of the provider's
Federal operating PPS pay-
ments in 2013 and 2014
CMS Acute Inpatient PPS:
Impact File
Key Inde-
pendent
Variables
Penalty Indicator variable: 1= hospital
is penalized in 2013; 0 = oth-
erwise
CMS Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing
Density Indicator variable: 1= hospital
is in the high-density area clas-
sied by HRRs; 0 = otherwise
Dartmouth Atlas
CPOE Indicator variable: 1= hospital
mandated physicians to utilize
CPOE; 0 = otherwise
HIMSS Analytics
Control
Variables
ReadminFactor Payment adjustment factor for
the CMS readmissions penalty
program
CMS Acute Inpatient PPS:
Impact File
Beds Number of beds CMS Impact File
Revenue Revenue from inpatient service
(in $ 1,000,000)
CMS Cost Report
Resident Bed Ratio Resident to bed ratio in a hos-
pital
CMS Acute Inpatient PPS:
Impact File
Region Ten hospital regions dened by
CMS
CMS Acute Inpatient PPS:
Impact File
Ownership Ten hospital ownership types
dened by CMS
Medicare Hospital Compare:
Hospital General Information
Selection
Models
Clean VBP score of cleanliness and
quietness (out of 10)
Medicare Hospital Compare:
HVBP-HCHAPS
Communication
Doctor
VBP score of communication
with doctors (out of 10)
Medicare Hospital Compare:
HVBP-HCHAPS
DischargeInfo VBP score of providing dis-
charge information (out of 10)
Medicare Hospital Compare:
HVBP-HCHAPS
Recommend VBP score of patient recom-
mended the hospital (out of
100)
Medicare Hospital Compare:
HVBP-HCHAPS
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pital (DSH) patient percentage, which measures the proportion of low-income and
older patients (i.e., Medicare with Supplemental Security Income (SSI) patients or
Medicaid patients) treated by the hospitals. Depending upon the DSH percentage,
hospitals can achieve extra nancial incentives, which can counteract the impact of
the VBP penalty. A proportional change in DSH can further indicate another signal
of symbolic practice by estimating whether a hospital tries to earn an extra nancial
revenue to compensate for a previous penalty. We use the percentage change in DSH
as the second dependent variable.
%DSHi = %DSHit+1  %DSHit
The third dependent variable that we examine also pertains to hospital nancial
incentives. The Outlier Payments proportion indicates the percentage of patients
who need unusually expensive treatments. Similar to DSH, if a hospital's percentage
of Outlier Payments increases between years, the hospital can earn an additional
nancial revenue. Again, this revenue can compensate for a penalty. Thus, we use
the percentage change in Outlier Payments as another signal of possible symbolic
behavior by a hospital.
%Outlieri = %OutlierPaymentit+1  %OutlierPaymentit
4.3.1.2 Independent Variables
Independent variables pertaining to our research hypotheses reect impacts of
nancial penalty, regional density, and the extent of IT adoption. The variable
Penalty provides an indicator about whether a hospital was penalized due to prior
VBP performance. Penalty is equal to 1 if a hospital was penalized and 0 other-
130
wise. For region, we construct indicator variables for the hospital referral regions
(HRRs), which are classied by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, to account for
the diusion eects of the VBP program. HRRs delineate a regional hospital classi-
cation system for tertiary care (www.DartmouthAtlas.org). Using this information,
we can capture the number of hospitals within the same HRR region as a specic
hospital. We develop a binary variable Density, which is equal to 1 if a hospital is
in an high-density area and 0 otherwise. We dene high-density area based on the
number of hospitals in a region being above the median number of hospitals across
the HRRs. Thus, we capture the diusion eects with a binary interaction term,
Penalty*Density, which is equal to 1 for a penalized hospital in a dense HRR region
and 0 otherwise.
To account for the moderating eects of government mandated information tech-
nology, we use the variable CPOE as an indicator to describe whether a hospital
requires that physicians within a hospital utilize Computerized Physicians Order
Entry (CPOE), which is the key measure for the Meaningful Use stage 1 (HealthIT,
2015). If a hospital adopts an IT system compliant with government mandates per-
taining to information technology adoption (i.e., Meaningful Use), we capture the
hospital as 1 and 0 otherwise.
4.3.1.3 Control Variables
We also measure several control variables that may inuence our dependent vari-
ables. We control for hospital-level factors that include Hospital Readmission Factor,
Bed Size, Revenue, Cost, and ResidentBedRatio. We also add regional demographic
factors and hospital ownership.
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4.3.1.4 Treatment Control Variables
The eect of the binary Penalty variable on the hospital behaviors can cause
sample selection concerns, which occur due to dierent characteristics between the
treated group (i.e., penalized) and the non-treated group. Thus, we consider several
instrumental variables to account for the potential sample selection issues. Clean
measures the patient satisfaction level for the hospital cleanliness and quietness. We
expect a highly scored (out of 10) hospital is less likely to get penalized. Communica-
tionDoctor examines the quality of communication between patients and physicians
in a hospital. If a hospital has a high quality of communication between patients
and physicians, the hospital is less likely to be penalized. DischargeInfo represents
whether a hospital provides appropriate discharge information to patients. If a hos-
pital provides patients' discharge information clearly, the hospital may treat their
patients sincerely, making the hospital less likely to be penalized. Finally, Rec-
ommend measures word of mouth in terms of patients who would recommend the
hospital to their friends and relatives. Thus, the more the hospital is recommended
by patients, the less the hospital is likely to be penalized.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for our
data. We also checked for potential multicollinearity in the data using variance
ination factor (VIF). Since each VIF score does not exceed 5, and the average VIF
is 2:51, we do not nd evidence suggestive of multicollinearity.
4.3.1.5 Sample Sizes for Models
Out of 2,984 VBP participating hospitals, there are 1,774 hospitals for which we
can obtain the percentage change in CMI information. After combining dierent
data sets from various sources, we obtain 571 hospital observations that include all
key independent variables for 2013 and 2014, such as Penalty, Density, and CPOE.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
%CMI 0.016 0.071 -0.376 2.015
%DSH 0.006 0.035 -0.448 0.230
%Outlier 0.003 0.107 -1.739 3.437
Penalty 0.478 0.5 0 1
Density 0.535 0.499 0 1
CPOE 0.55 0.498 0 1
ReadminFactor 0.997 0.004 0.9 1
Beds 186.30 179.78 1 1928
Revenue 243.59 514.02 0.0002 8440
Resident Bed Ratio 0.058 0.152 0 1.20
Clean 2.374 2.397 0 10
Communication
Doctor
2.45 2.484 0 10
DischargeInfo 4.275 3.041 0 10
Recommend 61.2 26.117 0 100
Similarly, there are 802 hospitals for which we can obtain the change in DSH percent-
age information. Among them, only 275 hospitals provide full information relevant
to our key measures, including Penalty, Density, and CPOE. Finally, 1,769 hospitals
out of 2,984 VBP participating hospitals provide all relevant information pertaining
to the change in outlier payment percentage. Among the 1,769 hospitals, 570 hos-
pitals possess full information for Penalty, Density, and CPOE. Thus, the sample
sizes of each model varies depending on the dependent variables, such that we have
data on 571 hospitals for CMI, 275 hospitals for DSH, and 570 hospitals for Outlier
payments.
4.3.2 Econometric Models
To examine whether symbolic practice may occur in hospitals in response to the
VBP program, we consider how a penalty aects hospital behaviors. The treatment
eect model can account for this causal eect. To describe our empirical strategy,
let Yi denote the dependent variable, such as hospital i's annual CMI percentage
change in hospital i (%CMI), change in DSH percentage (%DSH), or the change
in outlier payment percentage (%Outlier). The general regression model is the
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following:
Yi = 0 + 1Penaltyi + 2Densityi + 3Penalty Densityi
+ 4CPOEi + 5Penalty  CPOEi + 6Density  CPOEi
+ 1ReadminFactori + 2log(Bedi) + 3log(Revenuei) + 5ResidentBedRatioi
+ Regioni + Ownershipi + i;
(4.1)
where Penalty is the indicator of the treatment group (i.e., a hospital is previously
penalized by the VBP program). Thus, this variable is the key estimator to measure
H1. Penalty Density represents the diusion eect of penalty used to assess H2.
To assess H3 and H4, Penalty  CPOE and Density  CPOE are key variables to
measure the impact of IT adoption in the hospital. ReadminFactor, Bed, Revenue,
and Cost are control variables that may directly aect CMI change. Finally, we use
ten Region dummy variables and ten Ownership dummy variables to control for
hospital environments.
Following extant literature (Angrist, 2001; Greene, 2008), we develop instru-
mental variables to account for sample selection. Due to partial sample selection,
Penaltyi is likely to be correlated with i. Since we cannot observe the dierence
in the expected value of penalty, versus the expected value of avoiding penalty for
hospital i, we dene another variable Penalty as a latent variable.
Penaltyi = 0 + 1Cleani + 2CommunicationDoctori
+ 3DischargeInfoi + 4Recommendi + i
Penaltyi = 1 if Penalty

i > 0; P enaltyi = 0 otherwise
(4.2)
where we assume error terms i and i have bivariate normal distributions with mean
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0 and E(i,i) 6= 0 for i. Using this instrumental variable approach, we account for
selection issues and can perform consistent estimation. We use robust standard error
estimates for the purpose of ecient estimation. In doing so, one can lessen worries
about whether parameter estimates may be aected if our data set is not necessarily
identically distributed (i.e., heteroskedasticity). We use SAS to prepare the data and
estimate models using Stata version 12.
4.4 Empirical Findings
For each dependent variable, we estimate four models. Model 1 presents base
models including estimates of main eects only. Model 2 focuses on H2 by including
Penalty*Density. Model 3 is relevant to H3 by including Penalty*CPOE. Finally,
Model 4 includes all relevant variables.
Since the sample selection model assumes a non-zero correlation () between
a regression equation and a selection equation, we rst checked  for our models.
Using the Wald test of independence and inverse Mill's ratio (), we observed that
all three main models (Model 4 in each table) have non-zero and signicant  (p
< 0.05). Thus, our sample selection assumption is appropriate. We also check the
Wald 2 test of the regression model to estimate the goodness of t and all models
were statistically signicant (p < 0.01). As a robustness check, we later present a
propensity score matching analysis to demonstrate consistency of our results.
4.4.1 Econometric Results
Table 4.5 provides estimation results for the impact of nancial penalty on hos-
pital CMI behavioral changes. The coecient of Penalty ( = 0:039, p < 0.001)
is negative and signicant, providing support for Hypothesis 1. We also observe a
marginally signicant interaction eect of CPOE IT adoption ( =0:012, p < 0.1)
indicating that symbolic practice is less when a hospital adopts government man-
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dated IT (Hypothesis 3). However, we do not observe a signiant moderating eect
of penalty and density ( = 0:0011, p > 0.1, H2) or density and IT adoption (
=0:003, p > 0.1, H4) on CMI change.
Table 4.6 provides estimation results for the impact of nancial penalty on hos-
pital DSH changes. The coecient of Penalty ( =0:017, p < 0.05) is positive and
signicant, providing support for Hypothesis 1. We also observe empirical evidence
for the IT adoption variable (i.e., CPOE) indicating that adopting new IT is associ-
ated with increasing DSH percentage ( =0:009, p < 0.05). However, although we
observe empirical evidence of the impact of nancial penalty, we do not observe any
signiant moderating eects of density or IT adoption (H2 ( =0:004, p > 0.1), H3
( = 0:007, p > 0.1), and H4 ( =0:004, p > 0.1)) with penalty on DSH change.
Table 4.7 provides estimation results for the impact of nancial penalty on hos-
pital Outlier payment changes. The coecient of Penalty ( =0:044, p < 0.05) is
positive and signicant, providing support for Hypothesis 1. However, we do not
observe any signiant moderating eects of density or IT adoption (H2 ( =0:0001,
p > 0.1), H3 ( =0:0024, p > 0.1), and H4 ( =0:001, p > 0.1)) with penalty on
Outlier Payment change.
4.4.2 Discussion of Econometric Results
The estimated treatment eect (i.e., Penalty) indicates that other things being
equal, penalized hospitals have a mean CMI percentage change that is 3.9% less
than non-penalized hospitals. In other words, the penalized hospitals are less likely
to admit the complicated patients than non-penalized hospitals. The dierence is
statistically signicant at a 0.001 level. Similarly, other things being held equal,
the penalized hospitals have a mean change in DSH percentage that is 1.2% greater
than non-penalized hospitals. Also, the penalized hospitals have a mean change
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Table 4.5: Estimation of the %CMI Model
Regression
Model
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Base Model-
Penalty Only
Penalty and
Density
Penalty and
IT
Penalty, Den-
sity, and IT
Penalty -0.018* -0.02** -0.036** -0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.001)
Density 0.00002 0.0026
(0.003) (0.006)
Penalty*Density 0.002 -0.0011
(0.004) (0.008)
CPOE -0.008y -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Penalty*CPOE 0.013y 0.012y
(0.007) (0.007)
Density*CPOE 0.003
(0.006)
ReadminFactor -0.470y -0.713** -0.19 -0.53**
(0.245) (0.230) (0.27) (0.21)
log(Beds) -0.003 -0.003 -0.0001 0.0003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.0047)
log(Revenue) -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0028)
ResidentBedRatio 0.016 0.023 0.30*** 0.366***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.083) (0.081)
Region Included Included Included Included
Ownership Included Included Included Included
Selection Model
Clean -0.05** -0.05** -0.04 -0.04
(0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026)
CommunicationDoctor -0.033* -0.036* -0.076** -0.079**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.025)
DischargeInfo -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.051** -0.049**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.020) (0.019)
Recommend -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.01 -0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
N 1774 1742 576 571
X 2(df) 53.17(18) 58.38(20) 43.97(20) 68.73(23)
 0.226 0.260 0.326 0.349
 0.01 0.01 0.014 0.015
y p < 0:1 * p < 0:05 ** p < 0:01 *** p < 0:001
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Table 4.6: Estimation of the %DSH Model
Regression
Model
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Base Model-
Penalty Only
Penalty and
Density
Penalty and
IT
Penalty, Den-
sity, and IT
Penalty 0.015** 0.015** 0.016* 0.017*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Density -0.0002 -0.0046
(0.003) (0.0039)
Penalty*Density 0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
CPOE 0.007* 0.009*
(0.003) (0.004)
Penalty*CPOE -0.006 -0.007
(0.005) (0.006)
Density*CPOE 0.004
(0.005)
ReadminFactor 0.002 -0.05 -0.58 -0.13
(0.216) (0.30) (0.58) (0.16)
log(Beds) -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
log(Revenue) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ResidentBedRatio 0.083 0.09 -1.38 Omitted
(0.30) (0.317) (1.40)
Region Included Included Included Included
Ownership Included Included Included Included
Selection Model
Clean -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09* -0.08**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.03) (0.03)
CommunicationDoctor -0.025 -0.032 -0.067* -0.069**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.034) (0.034)
DischargeInfo -0.033* -0.030* -0.03 -0.033
(0.016) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028)
Recommend -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.017 -0.016
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
N 802 784 279 275
X 2(df) 127.63(18) 89.34(20) 90.93(20) 4424.04(22)
 -0.27 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28
 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
y p < 0:1 * p < 0:05 ** p < 0:01 *** p < 0:001
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Table 4.7: Estimation of the %Outlier Payment Model
Regression
Model
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
Base Model-
Penalty Only
Penalty and
Density
Penalty and
IT
Penalty, Den-
sity, and IT
Penalty -0.003 -0.003 0.0019 0.044*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.0058) (0.019)
Density -0.0019 -0.0027
(0.0019) (0.029)
Penalty*Density 0.001 0.0001
(0.0029) (0.0036)
CPOE -0.0037 -0.0039
(0.0027) (0.003)
Penalty*CPOE 0.0019 0.0024
(0.005) (0.005)
Density*CPOE 0.001
(0.004)
ReadminFactor -0.017 -0.075 0.060 0.140
(0.088) (0.107) (0.125) (0.156)
log(Beds) -0.0006 -0.0008 0.002 0.025
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.004) (0.004)
log(Revenue) -0.0003 . -0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0013
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.002) (0.002)
ResidentBedRatio 0.070*** 0.073*** 0.132*** 0.149***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.038) (0.037)
Region Included Included Included Included
Ownership Included Included Included Included
Selection Model
Clean -0.049** -0.048** -0.025 -0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.02) (0.02)
CommunicationDoctor -0.033* -0.037* -0.04 -0.04
(0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024)
DischargeInfo -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.045* 0.045*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018)
Recommend -0.02*** -0.019*** -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
N 1769 1737 575 570
X 2(df) 61.62(18) 63.25(20) 68.86(20) 81.43(23)
 0.077 0.079 -0.76 -0.76
 0.002 0.002 -0.031 -0.031
y p < 0:1 * p < 0:05 ** p < 0:01 *** p < 0:001
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in Outlier Payment percentage that is 4.4% greater than non-penalized hospitals.
Both dierences are statistically signicant at a 0.05 level. Thus, the results indicate
that penalized hospitals may try to earn extra nancial incentives by admitting
more patients who can bring in such nancial benets. Overall, the results exhibit
empirical evidence that the nancially penalized hospitals use tactics consistent with
symbolic practices, which may be unintended outcomes from the VBP objective.
In terms of moderating eects, the ndings do not support the hypothesized mod-
erating eects of density among the referent group of hospitals. In other words, we
observe no managerial dierence of penalized hospital behaviors pertaining to sym-
bolic practices between an high density area and a low density area. Regarding the
adoption of new government mandated IT systems compliant with Meaningful Use
(i.e., CPOE), new hospital IT investments conforming to Meaningful Use govern-
ment mandates in some cases appear to mitigate the characteristics consistent with
symbolic practice. Specically, in hospitals that are adopting the new IT systems,
the mean CMI percentage change might lessen by 1.2% on average.
Overall, the estimation provides initial empirical evidence regarding our main
research question: nancially penalized hospitals appear more likely to exhibit char-
acteristics consistent with adopting symbolic management practices. However, we
observe no empirical evidence related to the moderating eects of density. Finally,
we also observe that the moderating eects of IT adoptions are mixed depending on
the dependent variables.
4.4.3 Robustness Considerations
We adopt propensity score matching analysis to ensure consistency of our empiri-
cal ndings. A propensity score is a balanced one-dimensional score, which represents
a vector of covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Thus, this method enables one
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to examine an unbiased average treatment eect of the treated group (i.e., nan-
cially penalized hospitals) against the control group (i.e., not penalized hospitals).
To estimate the impact of the penalty, we rst need to obtain the propensity score.
Following the propensity analysis literature (Guo and Fraser, 2010), we obtain the
propensity score (predicted logit) via logistic regression. We used nearest neighbor
matching to identify reasonable pairs of hospitals for comparison. Finally, each pair
within the sample, which includes one treated hospital and one control hospital,
provides the basis for examining the average treatment eect.
Table 4.8 provides estimation results of average treatment eect via propensity
score matching. The signicant average treatment eects for CMI indicate that
penalized hospitals decrease by more than 1.4% CMI change compare to those for
non-penalized hospitals. This nding again suggests that penalized hospitals have a
higher incidence of turning away patients with complex care needs. Similarly, the av-
erage treatment eect for DSH shows an impact of 1.35% increase of DSH, indicating
again that a penalized hospital tends to change operations in a manner that increas-
ingly serves patients who can bring in extra nancial benets, compared to unpe-
nalized hospitals. These two treatment eects are statistically signicant (p<0.05).
However, the average treatment eect of Outlier Payment is not statistically sig-
nicant. Overall, the average treatment eects in this propensity score matching
analysis have the same direction as our main treatment eect model ndings. Thus,
the propensity score results further support the consistency of our estimation.
4.5 Conclusion
This essay highlights hospital practice and process changes in response to the
nancial penalty incentives put in place by the Value Based Purchasing program.
Specically, the empirical estimation within this study provides evidence in sup-
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Table 4.8: Treatment eect of penalty using propensity score matching
Penalized Hospital Not Penalized Hos-
pital
Dierence between
treated and control
group
CMI
Before Matching 0.0078 0.026 -0.0148
After Matching 0.0080 0.023 -0.0145
DSH
Before Matching 0.0082 0.0001 0.0083
After Matching 0.0099 -0.0036 0.0135
Outlier Payment
Before Matching -0.0017 -0.0096 -0.0007
After Matching -0.0022 -0.0001 -0.0023
port of our hypotheses delivered from the related theoretical framework, symbolic
management, which has yet to be quantitatively explored in much detail by OM
researchers in the healthcare domain. In comparison to non-penalized hospitals, the
nancially penalized hospitals changed their process or practices in a manner that
led to symptoms suggestive of symbolic management practices, such as declining pa-
tients who require more complicated care procedures that may lead to undesirable
care outcomes, or accepting more patients who can provide an additional nancial in-
centive. In general, our ndings provide evidence that the VBP program may trigger
penalized hospitals to conduct unintended behaviors, with respect to the underlying
objective of the VBP program. In other words, hospitals are more likely to practice
symbolically to avoid future nancial penalty. Thus, the VBP program may result
in unexpected outcomes.
Beyond the main eects, the study shows that the moderating eects vary de-
pending upon the variables examined. The diusion eect is not associated with any
dependent variables. Our ndings support the moderating eect of IT adoption only
in the CMI change. The result is consistent with the extant IT literature that sym-
bolic practice reduces when a hospital follows the government mandated IT system
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(Devaraj et al., 2013). In summary, our empirical ndings provide implications for
rigorous research on hospitals' behaviors when they face external pressures.
4.5.1 Limitations
While this essay provides potentially meaningful implications for both academic
scholars and practitioners, several limitations of the study are worth mentioning.
First, the essay estimated impacts of the VBP policy across two time periods using
cross sectional analysis. Although the ndings provide empirical evidence to identify
recent managerial tactics consistent with symbolic practices, the ndings cannot ad-
dress what will happen across multiple periods. Thus, research should continue to
analyze the VBP policy. Specically, scholars should seek to propose additional rele-
vant research questions to examine other aspects of symbolic practices. For example,
researchers might study whether all hospitals will eventually conform to VBP objec-
tives, or whether an on-going exchange of outcomes happens across multiple periods
between penalized and non-penalized hospitals. By accommodating multiple peri-
ods, researchers can address whether symbolic practices are transient phenomenon
for hospitals, or a long-term issue. In other words, will government and other TPPs
eventually gure out the practices to identify symbolic management, thus limiting it
to being a short-run phenomenon?
Second, there may exist potential confounding issues related to each hospital's
exogenous population change over time. For example, there might be overlap be-
tween CMI, DSH, and Outlier changes in a hospital. Thus, research should examine
alternate dependent variables. One alternative way to construct a symbolic practice
variable is to put together the three dierent outcomes (i.e., a variable is equal to 1
if a hospital decreases %CMI, increases %DSH, and increases %Outlier), which
may provide a more robust variable. In addition, future work should carefully control
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for other key variables. For instance, there will be dierent ways of controlling for
the referent group. If future work considers such issues using other metrics, research
may be able to identify signicant moderating eects caused by characteristics of
the referent groups. Possible applicable measures could include the average distance
among hospitals, number of hospitals per mile, or whether a hospital is located in a
big metro area. By doing so, we can provide more rigorous and consistent empirical
ndings.
Third, the study adopted the Heckman treatment eect model and the propensity
score matching analysis to analyze the impact of a penalty on hospital behaviors.
Although the proposed econometric approaches can reasonably address sample selec-
tion issues and potential inconsistent estimation results, the underlying phenomenon
can also be addressed using other econometric approaches, such as the dierence-in-
dierence model (DID), or hierarchical linear models (HLM). However, the current
data set cannot be analyzed via the DID model due to the lack of multiple periods,
and cannot employ HLM due to the lack of clear constructs that can dene hierar-
chically nested sets. Thus, this essay can be extended when other testable data are
available. The current essay also did not formally consider possible reverse causality.
Future work should consider this issue to ensure consistent estimation.
Finally, the study used data from more than 500 hospitals for CMI analyses,
250 hospitals for DSH analyses, and 500 hospitals for Outlier analyses. A limitation
pertains to the number of observations lost, relative to the 2984 VBP participating
hospitals. The main reason for the loss of data is related to the available informa-
tion about the CPOE variable from HIMSS Analytics. Thus, future studies should
identify other IT variables that can avoid this loss of data, yet reasonably measure
the same legitimacy eort phenomenon. Doing so should provide more consistent
and reliable quantitative results to practitioners and academic scholars.
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4.5.2 Discussion
The study contributes by developing a useful theoretical framework to delineate
operational responses to the VBP program. This chapter empirically explores hos-
pital and government incentive alignment and coordination problems in the health-
care supply chain context. By empirically quantifying characteristics consistent with
symbolic practices of hospitals, the study transfers the institutional and symbolic
management perspective into healthcare service operations management research.
Next, there is little empirical research in healthcare operations management that ex-
amines the impact of VBP on hospitals' actual behaviors, thus this essay contributes
quantitative ndings pertaining to the VBP implementation. Since the objective of
VBP is to achieve patient-oriented service delivery, which is an important topic in
healthcare OM (Green, 2012), this research is in line with the same direction with
the OM community. Thus, our study contributes by exploring the future research
focus in operations management.
The ndings from this study suggest several implications. First, healthcare OM
scholars can extend the framework and ndings of this study to examine symbolic
management actions across the healthcare industry. For example, scholars inter-
ested in recent operating incentive programs, such as the bundled payment program
(BPCI), could examine the process changes taking place in hospitals after managers
choose to participate in the bundled payment program. As in related organizational
theory literature (Elsbach et al., 1998; Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Rogers et al., 2007;
Westphal and Graebner, 2010), researchers can also explore more rigorous OM re-
lated symbolic practice measures in healthcare organizations. Since there is no clear
measure for examining symbolic practice, future research should make eorts to en-
hance measurement approaches and better identify the degree of symbolic practices
146
in healthcare organizations.
Second, due to the lack of data availability, our study is based on an analysis of
data from two time periods. Thus, future research can examine the VBP program
using panel data with more than three time periods once such data becomes avail-
able. Future studies might benet from adapting our theoretical framework on the
impact of VBP nancial penalties to other government incentives. In addition, fu-
ture research might expand their data sets to include data at the department level or
patient level. By doing so, researchers could gain generalizability and triangulation
of ndings.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the few empirical OM research
studies that relate to healthcare reimbursement processes. Thus, using our study
as a rst stepping-stone, researchers might provide substantial contributions by ex-
panding their research interests into healthcare reimbursement processes, which has
yet to be examined in detail.
For practitioners, our ndings can provide important insights and implications for
policy makers. Unlike other studies, our ndings suggest implications relevant to po-
tential responses to the VBP policy. In providing the empirical ndings, government
policy makers may review the current VBP program with a dierent lens.
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5. CONCLUSION
This dissertation is inspired by managerial problem-motivated research, examin-
ing timely and critical issues for both academic researchers and healthcare practition-
ers. Many healthcare providers (e.g., hospital systems) generously share resources,
such as operational information, through the academic-practice aligned healthcare
research process. This type of research process helped motivate my individual disser-
tation chapters that comprise important but unexplored managerial questions. The
dissertation chapters includes three essays involving (1) conceptual frameworks of
the healthcare system and healthcare reimbursement processes, (2) analytical block
scheduling models of outpatient scheduling processes, and (3) econometric models
for hospital procurement behaviors in response to government nancial penalties.
Therefore, the dissertation covers various perspectives at the strategic level, process
level, and organizational level.
The empirically grounded frameworks developed in Chapter 2 describe the com-
plexity of healthcare reimbursement processes. The essay further explores how reim-
bursement processes create operating challenges, identies research gaps, and pro-
vides suggestions for OM/SCM researchers to tackle these gaps. In Chapter 3, the
Veterans Aairs scandal motivated me to consider improving outpatient scheduling.
My work develops a scheduling algorithm for outpatient scheduling managers who
face patient heterogeneity and patient no-shows, inspired by best practice scheduling
approaches from the Toyota Production System. Chapter 4, inspired by government
policies, concerns how managerial and operational responses of hospitals dier in
response to external pressures imposed upon them by government nancial incen-
tive and quality improvement policies. The gap in both government expectations
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and hospital responses generated the impetus for an interesting empirical study into
healthcare operations management.
Using multiple research methods, including grounded theory development for the
rst essay, deterministic analytical modeling for the second essay, and applied econo-
metric analysis for the third essay, my dissertation provides both data and method-
ological triangulation. As described throughout the dissertation, modern healthcare
operations management continues to increase in complexity. I hope my conceptual
research frameworks, proposed scheduling modeling approaches, and corresponding
theoretical framework and empirical ndings, shed light on better healthcare process
understanding pertaining to nancial issues and impacts aecting healthcare OM
decisions.
Yet admittedly, the ndings described in this dissertation are not exhaustive.
Thus, it is imperative to further discover related issues, such as healthcare reimburse-
ment processes, the adoption of nancial incentive programs, and more sophisticated
scheduling algorithms. For example, in my future research I hope to discover opera-
tional impacts of process improvement initiatives related to nancial ows that take
place within a hospital at a department level, which has not been examined yet. Also,
the adoption of information technologies in healthcare operations has a critical role
in healthcare quality improvements. Thus, another research extension relates to the
interface between information technology and nancial ows in healthcare operations
management. In line with my analytical scheduling essay, future research can be ex-
tended toward outpatient clinic overbooking policy to examine whether the block
scheduling approach can lead to further improvements in outpatient scheduling.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS AND COMMON TERMINOLOGY
Table A.1: Acronyms and common terminology
Acronyms Terminology Denition
AMA American Medical Association A professional group of physicians in the
United States including both doctors of
medicine (MD), doctors of osteopathic
medicine (DO), and medical students.
APCs Ambulatory Payment Classi-
cations
The code classication program for United
States hospital outpatient services. APC is
an example of a prospective payment system
(PPS). APCs are applicable only for hospitals,
not for physicians.
ASCs Ambulatory Surgical Centers Ambulatory surgery centers are health care
providers where surgical procedures do not re-
quire an overnight stay. Such surgery is less
complicated than general hospital surgical pro-
cedures.
CAH Critical Access Hospital Critical Access Hospitals are rural area hos-
pitals that receive cost-based reimbursement.
To be designated a CAH, a rural care provider
should satisfy specic criteria (i.e., the Condi-
tions of Participation (CoP) 42CFR485).
CCO Chief Compliance Ocer The chief compliance ocer of a healthcare
provider manages regulatory compliance issues
within a care provider. Specically, the CCO
oversees reimbursement processes.
Claim Adjudication Claim Adjudication refers to the determina-
tion of a TPPs payment after a care providers
insurance benets are applied to a medical
claim.
CMS Centers for Medicare and Med-
icaid Services
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
is a federal agency that manages the Medicare
program and Medicaid programs in coopera-
tion with state governments.
CORF Comprehensive Outpatient Re-
habilitation Facility
A Comprehensive Outpatient Rehabilitation
Facility is a care provider that oers rehabili-
tation of a patients medical issues via outpa-
tient diagnostic, therapeutic, and restorative
services.
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Acronyms Terminology Denition
CPT Current Procedural Terminol-
ogy
The Current Procedural Terminology code set
is a medical code classication managed by
the AMA. The CPT code set describes eval-
uation, management, and actual surgical pro-
cedures for providing standard service pro-
cedures for coordination among physicians,
coders, and third party payers for reimburse-
ment purposes.
DME Durable Medical Equipment Durable Medical Equipment suppliers provide
medical products that a doctor prescribes for
patients to use in the patients home.
DRGs Diagnosis-Related Groups Diagnosis-Related Groups represent a prospec-
tive payment classication system for inpatient
services for the purposes of payment.
ED Emergency Department A care provider, which provides acute care ser-
vices for patients who admit without a prior
appointment. In general, patients walk in by
themselves or are presented by ambulances.
See also ER for Emergency Room.
EHR Electronic Health Record A software system for collection of electronic
patient health information.
EMTALA Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act
EMTALA is legislation that requires care
providers to provide emergency health care
treatment to anyone needing it regardless of
citizenship, legal status, or ability to pay (EM-
TALA 2014).
FQHC Federally Qualied Health
Center
FQHC provides grants to care providers that
are qualied under CMS and the Public Health
Service Act (PHS).
GSP Global Surgical Package GSP is single payment for a package of ser-
vices, generally surgical services.
HCCI Health Care Cost Institute HCCI is a non-prot organization that sup-
ports healthcare reimbursement processes by
drawing on health care cost and utilization
data for U.S. patients covered by third party
payers.
HCPCS Healthcare Common Proce-
dure Coding System
HCPCS is a set of medical care procedure
codes related to CPT codes. This code set is
promulgated and maintained by CMS.
HHAs Home Health Agencies HHA are care providers that deliver short-
term skilled nursing or rehabilitative services
to homebound patients following a decline in
function or an acute illness.
HHAPPS Home Health PPS Prospective payment systems for HHAs.
HIE Health Information Exchange HIE is a networked software resource that al-
lows care providers and patients to access and
share a patients medical information electron-
ically.
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Acronyms Terminology Denition
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996
HIPAA is a federal law to make it easier for
people to keep health insurance, protect the
condentiality and security of healthcare in-
formation, and help the healthcare industry
control administrative costs.
HIPAA TCS HIPAA Transaction and Code
Standards
In HIPAA regulations, TCS provides standard
transactions for Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI) of health care data.
HOPPS Hospital Outpatient Prospec-
tive Payment System
HOPPS is a reimbursement PPS for hospital
outpatient services.
ICD International Classication of
Diseases
ICD is the standard system adopted by the
United States and other countries to classify
codes for health conditions and related infor-
mation.
LTCH Long-Term Care Hospital LTCHs are certied as acute care hospitals,
but LTCHs focus on patients who, on average,
stay more than 25 days.
Meaningful Use Program that provides nancial incentives for
the meaningful use of EHR technology.
Medicaid Medicaid is a healthcare program for people
with low income. See also CMS.
Medicare Medicare is a federal health insurance program
for elderly people. See also CMS.
MMSEA Medicare, Medicaid and
SCHIP Extension Act of 2007
MMSEA is legislation that, among other fea-
tures, enables CMS to manage reimbursement
processes properly by determining the role of
the primary payer and secondary payer in the
healthcare system.
MSP Medicare Secondary Payer MSP is a program where Medicare does not
have primary payer role in the healthcare re-
imbursement system, but Medicare is involved
in the reimbursement process as a secondary
payer or possible tertiary payer.
MPFS Medicare Physician Fee Sched-
ule
A fee schedule payment system that is used by
Medicare based on RBRVS.
POC Plan Of Care Written physician or authorized care provider
orders for services and treatments based on the
patients condition. The physician establishes
the boundaries of care throughout the duration
of the treatment.
PPS Prospective Payment System PPS is a payment system in which the reim-
bursement process is based on fee for service,
with payments xed in advance, generally for
a year.
PWP Patient Web Portal A website that provides patient personal
health information such as recent doctor vis-
its, discharge summaries, diagnostic tests, and
other information.
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nition
RAC Recovery Audit Contractors RACs audit care providers to identify and cor-
rect improper payments made under Medicare.
RBRVS Resource-Based Relative Value Scale
Through the use of relative values, RBRVS
determines how much money care providers
should be reimbursed under a fee schedule pay-
ment system.
RHC Rural Health Clinic The Rural Health Clinic Services Act of 1977
was enacted to provide primary care services
in approximately 4,000 locations for Medicare
patients in rural areas.
SNF Skilled Nursing Facilities SNFs are care providers certied for delivering
specialized services, such as rehabilitation and
various medical and nursing procedures.
Subrogation One TPP takes over the obligations of pay-
ment from another TPP under an agreement
based on a contract between the two TPPs.
TPP Third Party Payer TPPs reimburse care providers instead of pa-
tients. Examples of TPPs are commercial in-
surance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid.
VBP Value-Based Purchasing Pro-
gram
A CMS incentive program that oers reim-
bursement incentives or penalties based on a
hospitals performance across a set of health-
care outcome metrics.
WHO World Health Organization A specialized agency of the United Nations,
established in 1948 to avoid the international
spread of diseases.
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APPENDIX B
TAXONOMY OF HEALTHCARE INTENSITY
To broaden and rene operations strategy in healthcare, researchers need ap-
propriate frameworks that encompass the overall U.S. healthcare system, including
reimbursement processes. Due to the lack of such a framework, we must provide a
taxonomy of the U.S. healthcare system. The taxonomy can be widely applicable to
healthcare stakeholders. To develop the taxonomy of healthcare intensity, we adapt
Marks et al. (2001)'s taxonomy development protocol, which includes academic liter-
ature reviews and incorporating advices from healthcare professionals. Our research
framework comprises a hierarchical structure. The level of intensity contains two
categories: (1) patient intensity level and (2) care provider intensity level. These
three categories include several subcategories. We argue that operations challenges
and medical errors of all types diagnostic and administrative are more likely to arise
when the intensity levels of patient to healthcare provider are mismatched. Table 2.8
provides our taxonomy with specic denitions. We describe each intensity dimen-
sion below.
Patient Encounter Intensity Patient encounter intensity refers to the level of
patient intensity associated with consuming a healthcare providers resource, such
as workloads of physicians. We use three measures to classify the intensity level of
patients: severity of a medical issue, complexity of procedures, and duration of ill-
ness. Patient classication systems have been widely studied in the nursing industry
because resource allocation problem in nursing care are signicantly associated with
patient groups (Prescott et al., 1991). Typically, several dimensions are associated
with a patient classication. One way to classify and develop patient groups is the
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use of attributions of patients medical issues. Healthcare researchers and government
agencies have provided that the volume or service, and the required skill levels to
treat patients, can separate patient intensity level (Soeken and Prescott, 1991). In
particular, the patient intensity level can be determined by the degree of harm, which
refers to the rigorousness, and period of any harm (WHO, 2009). Thus, depending on
the severity of a medical issues (skill levels), complexity of procedure (skill levels), or
duration of illness (the volume of service), we can label four patient intensity groups:
Minimal-intensity level, Low-intensity level, Mid-intensity level, and High-intensity
level.
Minimal intensity patient This patient group refers to patients, who can conduct
their daily living without any issues, even if they do not present to the healthcare
provider (i.e., clinics or hospitals). Based on WHO (2009)'s degree of harm classi-
cation, we can allocate patients who have little detected symptoms to this group.
This group includes the lowest severity level, so patient dependency needs are not
required. The process and decision making complexity level for treating a patient are
the simplest as compared to other patient groups. This patient group also requires
the least hours of services actually provided. One simple example for no intensity
level of the patient is the Grade 1 nger sprain case, stretching or micro tearing
of nger ligament tissues (NYU Langone Medical Center 2013). Another example
would be a patient encounter for an executive checkup, which entails blood testing,
routine urine examination, or other simple physical examinations. Such examina-
tions allow the patient to perform any daily activities with minimal impairment or
additional treatment. As this is preventive care, the severity level is lower than any
other patient groups (CDC and Prevention, 2013).
Low intensity patient The second type of patient group is the low intensity level
of patients. This low intensity group contains patients who have mild symptoms of
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short duration of illness, but need treatment from healthcare providers to stay healthy
and lead active lives (WHO 2009). Outpatients or home care patients can be located
in this group. First, outpatient refers to the patient, who is served the same day
medical treatment (Cayirli and Veral, 2003). Thus, the total time spent for treating
an outpatient has low intensity level, and the severity and complexity of outpatient
diseases are relatively simpler than in other patient groups except for the minimal
intensity level of patients. A patient with the Grade-2 or 3 nger sprain, which has
partial or severe tearing of ligament tissue (NYU Langone Medical Center 2013), can
be an appropriate example of low intensity level of patients. While the Grade 1 gure
sprain explains a stable joint, the Grade 2, or 3 nger sprain represents instability
of the joint. Thus, without assistance from a professional, the Grade 2, or 3 nger
sprain patient must have diculties to do ordinary activities. A home care patient
group who is treated medical intervention by licensed professionals (Buerhaus et al.,
2000), is another example of low intensity level of patients. Since the complexity of
procedure or severity level is not high enough to treat patients in hospitals, we can
put home care patients at this low level intensity group.
Moderate intensity patient The third type of patient group represents the medium
intensity patient group. In this group, severity of illness, or complexity of procedures
requires higher than the low intensity level. Thus, patients in this group need addi-
tional medical intervention. In general, this type of patient should be hospitalized,
and the length of stay demands more than one day (Hulshof et al., 2012). Thus,
medium intensity level of patient needs longer periods of treatment provided than
lower or minimal intensity level of patient. At the medium intensity level patients
eventually need inpatient services, healthcare providers should prepare appropriate
facilities, such as intensive care units, nursing rooms, or operating rooms (Guerriero
and Guido, 2011). For example, a patient who developed appendicitis can be catego-
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rized into the medium intensity level. This patient may have diculty in performing
ordinary activities without complete care for his condition or disease. Thus, we can
put some part of inpatient at this medium intensity level.
High intensity patient Finally, high intensity level of the patient requires ma-
jor surgical or medical intervention, which relates to a serious or potentially fatal
illness. This type of illness comes from either acute illness and trauma, or active
chronic diseases that associate with mortality. For example, a patient with myocar-
dial infarction can be a high intensity patient. This type of patient should be served
immediately, such as through emergency care services. For these patients, the sever-
ity of illness is highest, surgical procedures are more complex, and durations of illness
are longer than in any other patient groups. With high intensity level, patients are
exposed to shortening life expectancy, or major surgical procedures (WHO 2009).
Thus, health care providers oer both emergency care services, and surgical care
services to address this type of patients (Hans et al., 2012)
Care Provider Intensity For the second taxonomy dimension, we dene the care
provider as an individual or organization that oers healthcare services to patients
(Abbey 2009). This taxonomy dimension is developed by the degree of care providers
capability to treat patients, and the degree of the payment process complexity. Ac-
cording to government agencies, such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) or the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HSS), there
exist hundreds of dierent types of care providers (CMS 855 Enrollment Forms, and
National Provider Identier Standard). These agencies assign formal structures, such
as legitimacies. These legitimacies classify into various health care providers. For
example, an organization that provides inpatient services, such as Hospitals, should
deliver designated services associated with a length of stay or period of care. Thus,
care provider intensity level is determined by the healthcare providers service charac-
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teristics. Previous literature in the operations management eld discusses a dierent
type of healthcare service typologies (Dobrzykowski et al., 2014; Hans et al., 2012;
Hulshof et al., 2012). In particular, Hulshof et al. (2012)s taxonomy suggests six
types of health care services: Ambulatory care services, Emergency care services, Sur-
gical care services, Inpatient care services, Homecare services, and Residential care
services. Adapted by this taxonomy, we develop four dimensions of care provider in-
tensity groups: Minimal intensity level, Low intensity level, Medium intensity level,
and High intensity level of care providers.
Minimal intensity care provider The minimal intensity level of care provider
refers to the organization that provides tangible healthcare items (i.e., wheelchairs,
walkers, canes, or pillows). Thus, this type of provider can be recognized as a
durable medical equipment (DME) supplier named by the Medicare program (Medi-
care, 2014). In this group, care providers sell healthcare items to patients and then
are reimbursed under the Medicare program. Thus, DME supplier do provide ser-
vices such as tting and adjusting DME items. For example, wheelchair training.
Generally DME personnel perform some therapeutic services but not generally di-
agnostic (Bach, 2009). Since DME suppliers deal with tangible items, the typical
payment process is a fee schedule approach, a given piece of DME will be reimbursed
at a given fee schedule amount. The fee schedule amounts may include rental and
used equipment. Thus, no intensity level of care provider needs low level of ability
to treat patients, and relatively simple payment process.
Low intensity care provider Low intensity level of care provider can provide am-
bulatory care services. Typically, clinics belong in this category. This provider group
provides primary care services, community services, and outpatient clinic services.
We can call this service as oce-based medical service, and this area has been widely
explored. Cayirli and Veral (2003) and Gupta and Denton (2008) provide extensive
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literature of clinic services. On the other hand, a healthcare provider, who delivers
home care services, also includes this category. Home care providers deliver medical
treatment using resources of professional nurses, home health aides, medical equip-
ment, and other supporting items (Hulshof et al. 2012). Home health care providers
primarily treat the elderly, disabled, and chronically ill, but not life-threatened ill
(Hans et al., 2012). Since primary care and home health care does not require a
high level of capability to deal with severe patients, low intensity level care needs
low providers treatment capability, and corresponding low payment procedure.
Moderate intensity care provider Medium intensity level of care providers can
provide care to patients whose degree of severity is high enough to be inpatient.
General hospitals are usually located in this category. They provide both surgical
and medical care services, and these surgical services are usually associated with a
length of stay (Guerriero and Guido 2011). Care providers who focus on residential
services can be classied into this group. Residential services usually cover elderly
patients, who need a higher level of treatment than home care service, but do not
strictly have to be in a hospital (Hare et al., 2009). Thus, this type of care provider
requires a higher level of care capability, and their payment process is more complex
than the low or no intensity levels of care provider.
High intensity care provider Finally, the highest intensity level of care can per-
tains to major surgical or medical intervention, which are directly associated with a
fatal illness, such as cancer or myocardial infarction. Some special hospitals, which
have an academic research institute, are categorized in this group. If medium level
of care providers cannot resolve a patients illness, the care provider sends patients
to the high intensity care provider. Since this type of care providers is capable to
deal with the highest severity of illness, they design excellent emergency care ser-
vices, such as rapid response of an ambulance to the health care provider emergency
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center (Green and Kolesar, 2004). In addition, this provider group sometimes will
provide rapid response to tackle a potentially fatal, acute or chronic condition or
illness, they need the highest level of treatment capability, which may involve a wide
range of procedures and associated facilities. In addition, the primary goal of this
provider is to reduce mortality, and may require many possible alternatives to attain
this goal. This problem results in third-party payers to adopt the most complex
payment processes.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREMS AND LEMMAS IN SECTION 3
Proof of Lemma 1:
If Part: When t = 1, we have b1 = 1  L. Thus, we have d1 = (L  b1)+ = 0.
When t = 2, we have b2 = (b1   L)+ + 2 = b1   L + 2 = 1 + 2   L. SinceP2
i=1 i  2L, we have d2 = (L  b2)+ = (2L 
P2
i=1 i)
+ = 0.
Assume the property holds for Period t   1, i.e., bt 1 =
Pt 1
i=1 i   (t   2)L,
dt 1 = (L   bt 1)+ = ((t   1)L  
Pt 1
i=1 i)
+ = 0. Then, in Period t, we have
bt = (bt 1   L)+ + t =
Pt
i=1 i   (t   1)L. Since
Pt
i=1 i  tL, we have dt =
(L  bt)+ = (tL 
Pt
i=1 i)
+ = 0. Thus, D() =
Pr
i=1 di = 0.
Since rL =
Pr
i=1 i, we have O() =
Pr
i=1 i +D()  rL = 0.
Only If Part: Assume there exists Period t, 1  t  r, which is the earliest period
that
Pt
i=1 i < tL. Thus, the physician is idle after serving the rst t patients, which
contradicts the statement that physician's idle time is 0. Thus, if A block schedule
 has zero physician's idle time and overtime, we have
Pt
i=1 i  tL, 81  t  r.
This completes the proof.
The Schedule sub in Set  which Provides the Upper Bound of Patient
Waiting Time:
We dene block schedule ub = (A;A; :::; B;B;B; ::::) as follows: ra Type A
patients are scheduled consecutively followed by rb Type B patients in the block i,
i = 1; 2; : : : ; k. This block ub is repeated k times to cover T time slots to form
sub, where sub = (ub; ub; : : : ; ub). In our example, since ra = 2, rb = 3, we have
185
ub = (A;A;B;B;B),
sub = (A;A;B;B;B;A;A;B;B;B; A;A;B;B;B;A;A;B;B;B;A;A;B;B;B). In
Lemma 1.1, we prove that Schedule sub is in Set . Lemma 1.2 describes the property
regarding patients' waiting time.
Lemma 1.1: Schedule sub is in Set .
Proof of Lemma 1.1: According to Lemma 1, to prove Schedule sub 2 , we need
to show
Pt
i=1 i  tL, 1  t  r.
In ub, the rst ra patients are of Type A. Since a  L, it is easy to see thatPt
i=1 i  tL, 1  t  ra.
In ub, Type B patients are scheduled in Period ra + j, 1  j  rb. Thus, for
t = ra + j, 1  j  rb, we have:
tX
i=1
i   tL = raa + jb   (ra + j)L
= ra(a   L)  j(L  b)
= ra(a   raa + rbb
ra + rb
)  j(raa + rbb
ra + rb
  b)
=
rarb(a   b)
ra + rb
  j ra(a   b)
ra + rb
=
ra(a   b)
ra + rb
(rb   j)  0
The result follows.
Thus, Schedule sub is in Set . Next, in Lemma 1.2, we calculate the patients' waiting
time in Schedule sub, and prove that this value represents the upper bound of the
patients' waiting time of any schedule s 2 .
Lemma 1.2: The patients' waiting time in Schedule sub isW (sub) = k[
ra(ra+2rb 1)
2
(a 
L)  rb(rb 1)
2
(L b)], which represents the upper bound of the patients' waiting time
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W (s) of any schedule s 2 , i.e., W (s)  W (sub).
Proof of Lemma 1.2: The patients' waiting time of ub can be derived as follows:
W (ub) =
raX
j=1
(j   1)(a   L) +
rbX
j=1
[raa + (j   1)b   (ra + j   1)L]
=
raX
j=1
(j   1)(a   L) + rarb(a   L) +
rbX
j=1
(j   1)(b   L)
=
ra(ra   1)
2
(a   L) + rarb(a   L)  rb(rb   1)
2
(L  b)
=
ra(ra + 2rb   1)
2
(a   L)  rb(rb   1)
2
(L  b)
Since in block ub the last patient leaves at (ra + rb)L, the rst patient in the next
block does not wait for service. Similarly, the rst patient in each block does not
wait for service. Thus:
W (sub) = kW (ub) = k[
ra(ra + 2rb   1)
2
(a   L)  rb(rb   1)
2
(L  b)]:
Suppose schedule s 2 , s 6= sub, provides the maximum total patient waiting
time. Note that in sub, all patients of Type B are scheduled at the end of the block
after serving all patients of Type A. Thus, in s, there must exist at least a patient
of Type B who is scheduled before Type A patients. Let k be the rst period in
which a Type B patient is scheduled before Type A patients (see Figure C.1). Since
there are ra Type A patients, and s 6= sub, we have 1  k  ra. We now perform the
following operation on s: move the kth patient (Type B) to the end of schedule s,
i.e., to the rth position in s. We denote the new block schedule as s0 (see Figure C.1).
Thus, we have
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s B A : : : A B : : : B B
k k + 1 r   1 r
s0 A : : : A B B : : : B B
k k + 1 r   1 r
(k   1) patients
(k   1) patients
Figure C.1: Block schedules s and s0 when r = ra + rb.
i = 
0
i = a; 1  i  k   1;k = b;
0k 1+i = k+i; 1  i  r   k;0r = b:
First we show that Schedule s0 is also in Set . Since Schedule s is in Set ,
we have
Pt
i=1 i  tL, 1  t  r. Thus, for t = k + j, 1  j  r   k, we havePk 1
i=1 i + k +
Pj
i=1 k+i   (k + j)L =
Pk
i=1 i + b +
Pj
i=1 k+i   (k + j)L  0.
Thus,
Pk
i=1 i +
Pj
i=1 k+i   (k + j   1)L  L  b > 0.
In Schedule s0, for 1  t  k  1, we havePti=1 0i = ta  tL. For t = k+ j   1,
1  j  r  k, we havePti=1 0i  tL =Pk 1i=1 0i +Pji=1 0k+i 1  (k+ j   1)L. Since
i = 
0
i = a; 1  i  k   1;0k 1+i = k+i; 1  i  r   k, we have
Pk 1
i=1 
0
i +Pj
i=1 
0
k+i 1  (k+ j  1)L =
Pk 1
i=1 i+
Pj
i=1 k+i  (k+ j  1)L  0. For t = r, we
have
Pt
i=1 
0
i = tL. Thus, Schedule s
0 is also in Set .
Since Schedules s and s0 are in Set , the physician's idle time and overtime are
0. Thus, we have
w1 = w
0
1 = 0; wt =
t 1X
i=1
i   (t  1)L; w0t =
t 1X
i=1
0i   (t  1)L; 2  t  r:
LetW (s) (respectively,W (s0)) be the total waiting time of the patients scheduled
in s (respectively, s0). Thus, we have W (s) = k
Pr
t=1wt, W (s
0) = k
Pr
t=1w
0
t. Then,
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rX
t=1
w0t  
rX
t=1
wt =
kX
t=1
(w0t   wt)  wk+1 +
r k 1X
j=1
(w0k+j   wk+j+1) + w0r
= 0  [(k   1)a + b   kL] +
r k 1X
j=1
(L+
k+j 1X
i=1
0i  
k+jX
i=1
i) + (L  b)
= kL  (k   1)a   b + (r   k   1)(L  b) + (L  b)
= rL  (k   1)a   (r   k + 1)b
= (ra + 1  k)(a   b):
Since k  ra, a > b, we have
Pr
t=1w
0
t  
Pr
t=1wt > 0. Thus, W (s
0) > W (s),
which contradicts the statement that schedule s 2 , s 6= sub, provides the maximum
total patient waiting time. Hence the lemma is proved.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The while loop performs at most ra + rb iterations. Thus, the complexity of
Algorithm OptBlock(o) is O(ra + rb).
Proof of Lemma 3:
We rst show that Algorithm OptBlock(o) nds a feasible schedule. Note that
the rst patient scheduled in o is Type A. Since a > L =
raa+rbb
ra+rb
, there is no
idle time between patients scheduled in periods 1 and 2. Similarly, Step 0 assures
that no idle time occurs between patients scheduled in periods j   1 and j, for
j = 3; 4; : : : ; ra + rb. According to Lemma 1, o has zero physician's idle time and
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overtime. Thus, so = (o; o; : : : ; o) is a feasible solution of Problem SP0. Next, we
show that Algorithm OptBlock(o) nds an optimal schedule for Problem SP0.
Suppose schedule su (su 6= s0) provides the minimum patients' waiting time. Let
su = (u; u; : : : ; u). Therefore, there must exist periods j and ` in which dierent
types of patients are scheduled in u and o. Let j < ` and (j; `) be the smallest
indices in which this dierence occurs in u and o. Note that the schedule of the
rst (j   1) patients are identical in both u and o. We now consider two cases:
Case 1: In period j, Type B is scheduled in u and Type A is scheduled in o. In
period `, Type A is scheduled in u and Type B is scheduled in o. According to our
algorithm, a Type A patient can be scheduled in period j only if Fj 1 + b < jL.
Therefore, the physician's idle time is positive in period j of u. This contradicts
our assumption that the schedule u is feasible.
Case 2: In period j, Type A is scheduled in u and Type B is scheduled in o. In
period `, Type B is scheduled in u and Type A is scheduled in o.
We now perform the following operation on u: interchange patients in periods j
and `. Call the new schedule 0u. Note that the schedule of the rst ` patients are
identical in both 0u and o. Therefore, the new schedule 
0
u is feasible.
The proof is by contradiction. Since both u and 
0
u are feasible, there is no idle
time in those schedules. According to our assumption, u provides the minimum
patients' waiting time, i.e., the patients' waiting time Wu  W 0u. The schedule of
the rst (j   1) patients and the last (ra + rb   `) patients are identical in both u
and 0u. Consequently, the start times of the rst j patients and the last (ra+ rb  `)
patients are the same in both u and 
0
u. Thus, the total waiting time of the rst
j patients and the last (ra + rb   `) patients are the same in both u and 0u. Note
that the waiting time of the (j +1)th patient is wj+1 = Fj 1+ a  jL (respectively,
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w0j+1 = Fj 1 + b   jL) in u (respectively, 0u). Therefore, we have wj+1   w0j+1 =
a   b > 0. Similarly, we have wi   w0i = a   b, for i = j + 1; j + 2; : : : ; `. Thus,
Wu W 0u = (`  j)(a b) > 0. This implies Wu > W 0u, which contradicts the claim
that u provides the minimum patients' waiting time.
Proof of Observation 1:
We illustrate this in the following counter example: Assume there are three
types of patients: 1 = 8, 2 = 11, 3 = 13; r1 = 2; r2 = 1; r3 = 1. Thus, L=
(2*8+11*1+13*1)/(2+1+1)=10.
If we use OptBlockm(), then we have = fType 2, Type 3, Type 1, Type 1g.
The patients' waiting time = 0 + 1 + 4 + 2 = 7.
However, the optimal schedule  should be fType 3, Type 1, Type 2, Type 1g
with the patients' waiting time = 0 + 3 + 1 + 2 = 6.
Proof of Lemma 4:
When we implement DPm for each period, at most m possible types of patients
can be assigned. Since there are r periods in one block, at most mr possible schedul-
ing sequences can be considered. Thus, the complexity of DPm is O(m
r).
Proof of Theorem 1:
Consider an arbitrary instance of a known NP-complete problem: Numerical
Matching with Target Sum (NMTS) (Garey and Johnson 1979).
Numerical Matching with Target Sums (NMTS): Given three sets of positive
integers Sx = fx1; : : : ; xng, Sy = fy1; : : : ; yng; Sz = fz1; : : : ; zng, can Sy [ Sz be
partitioned into n disjoint subsets  1; : : : ; n with  k = fyik ; zjkg such that xk =
yik + zjk , for k = 1; : : : ; n?
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Given an instance of NMTS, we construct a specic instance of the decision version
of problem SPm0 as follows: We assume that x = y + z, where x =
Pn
i=1 xi,
y =
Pn
i=1 yi and z =
Pn
i=1 zi. There are m = 3n patient types P`, ` = 1; 2; : : : ;m,
and r` = 1 for all ` = 1; 2; : : : ;m.
Let B = (n + 1)x, M = (n + 2)B. For convenience, the m patient types are
classied into three classes of patients as follows:
i. Class X patients P xi with 
x
i = 3M  B   xi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
ii. Class Y patients P yi with 
y
i = yi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
iii. Class Z patients P zi with 
z
i = B + zi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
Thus, the length of each period, L =
Pn
i=1 
x
i +
Pn
i=1 
y
i+
Pn
i=1 
z
i
3n
=
3nM nB Pni=1 xi+Pni=1 yi+nB+Pni=1 zi
3n
= M . A threshold value D = 3nM   2nB  
2x + y.
Decision Problem (DQ): Does there exist a schedule of patients  such that the
physician idle time is zero, and the total patient waiting time, W satises W 
D = 3nM   2nB   2x + y?
The decision problem is clearly in class NP. Also, it is easy to verify that the
construction of the decision problem can be done in polynomial time. We now show
that there exists a schedule  such that W  3nM   2nB   2x+y if and only if
there exists a solution to the NMTS problem.
If Part: Suppose there exists a NMTS partition. Without loss of generality, we may
assume xi = yi + zi, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. We denote patient schedule  as
((1); (2); : : : ; (m)), where (i) denotes the ith patient scheduled in schedule .
Let si and fi be the start time and nish time of the patient scheduled in the i
th
period. Let wi be the waiting time of the i
th patient. Consider the following schedule
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 = (P x1 ; P
y
1 ; P
z
1 ; P
x
2 ; P
y
2 ; P
z
2 ; : : : ; P
x
n ; P
y
n ; P
z
n) shown in Table C.1:
Table C.1: Patient Schedule  with W = 3nM   2nB   2x +y.
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 : : : 3n  2 3n  1 3n
Type Px1 P
y
1 P
z
1 P
x
2 P
y
2 P
z
2 : : : P
x
n P
y
n P
z
n
(i)
3M   B y1 B + z1 3M   B y2 B + z2 : : : 3M   B yn B + zn
 x1  x2 : : :  xn
si
0 3M   B 3M   B 3M 6M   B 6M   B : : : 3(n  1)M 3nM   B 3nM   B
 x1  x1 + y1  x2  x2 + y2 : : :  xn  xn + yn
fi
3M   B 3M   B 3M 6M   B 6M   B 6M : : : 3nM   B 3nM   B 3nM
 x1  x1 + y1  x2  x2 + y2 : : :  xn  xn + yn
wi
0 2M   B M   B 0 2M   B M   B : : : 0 2M   B M   B
 x1  x1 + y1  x2  x2 + y2 : : :  xn  xn + yn
Now it is easy to see that W =
P3n
i=1wi = 3nM   2nB   2x + y = D.
Only If Part: Suppose there exists a schedule  such that W  D with zero
physician idle time. First we show that  is similar to that shown in Table C.1.
Since M = (n + 2)B, B = (n + 1)x, we have 
x
i > M > 
z
i > B > 
y
i , for
i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
Claim 1: In schedule , the patient assigned to Period 1, (1), must be a Class X
patient.
Proof of Claim 1: To guarantee the physician idle time in Period 1 is 0, we must
have (1)  L = M . Note that xi > M , yi < M , and zi < M , for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
Thus, (1) must be a Class X patient.
Since there are n Class X patients in schedule , we divide  into n blocks
such that (i) there is only one Class X patient in each block, and (ii) each block
begins with a Class X patient. Without loss of generality, we may assume the Class
X patient assigned in Block i is PXi , i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. We denote xmax = max
n
i=1fxig,
zmax = max
n
i=1fzig.
Claim 2: In schedule , if there is exactly one Non-Class-X patient in Block i,
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1  i  n, then the waiting time of this Non-Class-X patient is at least 2M B xmax.
Proof of Claim 2: Assume the Class X patient in Block i (the ith Class X patient)
is in Period t, 1  t < n. Thus, the Non-Class-X patient in Block i is in Period t+1.
The waiting time of this Class X patient is at least 0, i.e., wt  0. The service time
of the ith Class X patient, (t) is at least 3M   B   xmax, i.e., 3M   B   xi 
3M   B   xmax. Since the length of each time slot L = M , then wt+1 = (wt +
(t)   L)+  (2M   B   xmax)+. Since M = (n + 2)B, B = (n + 1)x, we have
(2M   B   xmax)+ = 2M   B   xmax. Thus, the waiting time of the Non-Class-X
patient who is scheduled in Block i is at least 2M  B   xmax.
Claim 3: In , for k  2, if there are exactly k Non-Class-X patients in Block i,
1  i  n, then the average waiting time of these k Non-Class-X patients is at least
k+1
2
(M  B   zmax).
Proof of Claim 3: In Block i, we rst consider the kth Non-Class-X patient. Assume
this patient is in Period t, k  t  n. Since there is no physician's idle time
in Period t, we must have the sum of the waiting time and the service time of this
patient is at leastM , i.e., wt+(t) M . Since the maximum service time of all Non-
Class-X patients is B+zmax, i.e., (t)  B+zmax. Thus, we have wt M B zmax.
Also since wt = wt 1 + (t 1)  M , we have wt 1 = wt +M   (t 1)  2(M  
B   zmax). Similarly, the waiting time of the rst Non-Class-X patient, wt+1 k is at
least k(M  B  zmax). Thus, we have the total waiting time of these k Non-Class-X
patients,
Pk
i=1wt+1 k 
Pk
i=1 i(M  B   zmax) = k(k+1)2 (M  B   zmax). Then, the
average waiting time of these k Non-Class-X patients is at least k+1
2
(M  B  zmax).
Claim 4: In , if there are exactly k Non-Class-X patients in Block i, k = 1 or
k  3, 1  i  n, then the average waiting time of these k Non-Class-X patients is
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at least 2(M  B   zmax).
Proof of Claim 4: If k  3, according to Claim 3, we have the average waiting time
of these k Non-Class-X patients is at least k+1
2
(M B zmax). Since k+12 (M B zmax)
is increasing with an increase in k, we have k+1
2
(M B zmax)  3+12 (M B zmax) =
2(M  B   zmax), for k  3.
If k = 1, according to Claim 2, we have the waiting time of this Non-Class-X
patient is at least 2M   B   xmax. We have 2M   B   xmax   2(M   B   zmax) =
B   xmax + 2zmax. Since B = (n+ 1)x, then B   xmax + 2zmax > 0.
Claim 5: In , there are exactly 2 Non-Class-X patients in each Block i, 1  i  n.
Proof of Claim 5: If not all blocks have exactly 2 Non-Class-X patients, then we
can have at most n   2 blocks with exactly 2 Non-Class-X patients. Assume there
are n1 blocks with exactly 2 Non-Class-X patients, 0  n1  n  2. Thus, according
to Claim 3, these n1 blocks include 2n1 Non-Class-X patients with average waiting
time at least 3
2
(M   B   zmax). The remaining 2(n  n1) Non-Class-X patients are
in blocks with either 1 or at least 3 Non-Class-X patients.
Since the waiting time of Class-X patient is non-negative, then the total waiting
time of all patients should be at least the total waiting time of all Non-Class-X
patients. Thus, we haveW  2n1 32(M B zmax)+2(n n1)2(M B zmax) =
(4n n1)(M  B  zmax). Then (4n n1)(M  B  zmax) D = (n n1)M   (2n 
n1)B+2x y (4n n1)zmax. Since 0  n1  n 2, x > y, x > zmax, we have
(n n1)M  (2n n1)B+2x y  (4n n1)zmax  2M 2nB+(1 4n)x. Since
M = (n + 2)B, B = (n + 1)x, we have 2M   2nB + (1   4n)x = 5x > 0. This
contradicts the assumption that W  D. Thus, all n blocks must have exactly 2
Non-Class-X patients.
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According to Claims 1 and 5, the patient assigned to Period 3i   2 is Class X,
i.e., (3i   2) = P xi , i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Next, we show that in Block k, 1  k  n,
the sequence of 2 Non-Class-X patients is (P yik ; P
z
jk
). We denote ymax = max
n
i=1fyig,
zmin = min
n
i=1fzig.
Claim 6: In Block k (1  k  n) of , if the two Non-Class-X patients are not
in the sequence: (P yik ; P
z
jk
), then the total waiting time of these two Non-Class-X
patients is at least (3M  B   2xk + zmin).
Proof of Claim 6: Since the sequence is not (P yik ; P
z
jk
), there are two possible
scenarios:
1. (P yik ; P
y
jk
)
We rst consider the second Class-Y patient. Since there is no idle time, the
sum of the waiting time and the service time of this patient is at leastM . Since
the maximum service time of all Class-Y patients is ymax. The second Class-Y
patient's waiting time is at least M   ymax. Similarly, the waiting time of the
rst Class-Y patient is at least 2(M   ymax). Thus, the total waiting time of
these two Non-Class-X patients is at least 3(M   ymax). Since B = (n+ 1)x,
we have 3(M   ymax)  (3M  B   2xk + zmin) = B + 2xk   3ymax   zmin > 0.
2. (P zik ; P
y
jk
) or (P zik ; P
z
jk
)
The waiting time of the Class X patient in Block k is at least 0, and the service
time of this Class X patient is 3M  B xk. Since the length of each time slot
L =M , then the waiting time of the rst Class Z patient is at least 2M B xk.
Since the minimum service time of this Class Z patient is B + zmin, then the
waiting time of the patient who follows the rst Class Z patient is at least
M  xk+ zmin. Thus, the total waiting time of these two Non-Class-X patients
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is at least 3M  B   2xk + zmin.
Thus, under both scenarios, we have that the total waiting time of these two
Non-Class-X patients is at least (3M  B   2xk + zmin).
Claim 7: In each block k (1  k  n) of , the two Non-Class-X patients are in
the sequence: (P yik ; P
z
jk
).
Proof of Claim 7: Assume there are n2 blocks which don't follow the sequence:
(P yik ; P
z
jk
), 1  n2  n. Thus, the remaining n  n2 blocks follows the sequence.
If Block k follows the sequence (P yik ; P
z
jk
), then the waiting time of the Class Y
patient is at least 2M B xk. Since the minimum service time of the Class Y patient
is ymin, then the waiting time of the Class Z patient is at least M   B   xk + ymin.
Thus, the total waiting time of the two Non-Class-X patients in Block k is at least
3M   2B   2xk + ymin.
Since the waiting time of Class-X patient is non-negative, then the total waiting
time of all patients should be at least the total waiting time of all Non-Class-X
patients. Thus, we have W   2
Pn
k=1 xk + (n  n2)(3M   2B + ymin) + n2(3M  
B + zmin) =  2x + 3nM + (n2   2n)B + (n  n2)ymin + n2zmin. We have  2x +
3nM +(n2  2n)B+(n n2)ymin+n2zmin D = n2B+(n n2)ymin+n2zmin y.
Since n2  1, B = (n+ 1)x, we have n2B + (n  n2)ymin + n2zmin  y > 0, which
contradicts the assumption that W  D. This completes the proof.
Thus, in each block k (1  k  n) of , the three patients are in the sequence:
(P xk ; P
y
ik
; P zjk). Next we show that given a schedule of patients  such that the physi-
cian idle time is zero, and W  D = 3nM   2nB   2x +y, we nd a solution to
NMTS.
Claim 8: In Block k of , the waiting time of the Class X patient is 0, i.e.,
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w(3k 2) = 0, 1  k  n.
Proof of Claim 8: According to Claim 7, in Block k of , the three patients are
in the sequence: (P xk ; P
y
ik
; P zjk). Thus, the waiting time of these three patients are
w(3k 2), w(3k 2) + 2M  B   xk, and w(3k 2) +M  B   xk + yik . Then the total
waiting time of these three patients is 3w(3k 2) + 3M   2B   2xk + yik . Therefore
W =
Pn
k=1(3w(3k 2) + 3M   2B   2xk + yik) = 3
Pn
k=1w(3k 2) + 3nM   2nB  
2x+y = 3
Pn
k=1w(3k 2)+D. Since W  D, we have
Pn
k=1w(3k 2) = 0. Thus,
w(3k 2) = 0, 1  k  n.
Note that w(4) = w(1) + (1) + (2) + (3)   3L = w(1)   x1 + yi1 + zj1 .
Since w(1) = w(4) = 0, we have  x1 + yi1 + zj1 = 0. Similarly, we can show
that  xk + yik + zjk = 0 for 2  k  n   1. Since x = y + z, we also have
 xn+yin + zjn = 0. Thus, we obtain a solution to NMTS. This completes the proof
of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2:
First, we describe which two scenarios to compare. Given a vector of (z1; z2; : : : ; zr),
we interpret it in the following way: z1 represents the status of the rst Type A
patient, z2 represents the status of the second Type A patient, : : :, zra represents
the status of the rtha Type A patient; zra+1 represents the status of the rst Type B
patient, zra+2 represents the status of the second Type B patient, , : : :, zr represents
the status of the rthb (last) Type B patient. For any possible vector of (z1; z2; : : : ; zr),
zi 2 f0; 1g; 1  i  r, we can nd one and only one corresponding scenario in each
sequence.
Independent of the sequence, for the corresponding scenario, we have xa =Pra
i=1 zi, xb =
Pr
i=ra+1
zi. Among the scheduled ra (respectively, rb) Type A (respec-
tively, Type B) patients, xa (respectively, xb) show up, while (ra   xa) (respectively,
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(rb   xb)) do not show up. Thus, for each scenario, the probability has the same
value: (1  pa)xapra xaa (1  pb)xbprb xbb .
Next, we calculate the physician's idle time in each scenario. If a sequence satises
Lemma 1, then if all scheduled patients show up, the physician works for rL, with 0
idle time. If only xa Type A and xb Type B patients show up, the physician needs
to treat all of these patients. Thus, the physician's working time is xaa + xbb.
Therefore, the physician's idle time is (rL   xaa   xbb). Note that this number
is independent of the specic sequence. To calculate the physician's expected idle
time, for each scenario, we need to multiply the probability of that scenario. The
probability (1 pa)xapra xaa (1 pb)xbprb xbb is also independent of the specic sequence.
Thus, for any one of the 2r possible vectors of (z1; z2; : : : ; zr), zi 2 f0; 1g; 1 
i  r, we can nd one and only one corresponding scenario in each sequence. Each
scenario has the same value in probability and physician's idle time. Therefore, for
any schedule in Set , the expected physician's idle time has the same value.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Assume 1 is an arbitrary sequence satisfying Lemma 1, 2 is an arbitrary se-
quence not satisfying Lemma 1. Given a vector of (z1; z2; : : : ; zr), we interpret it in the
following way: z1 represents the status of the rst Type A patient, z2 represents the
status of the second Type A patient, : : :, zra represents the status of the r
th
a Type A
patient; zra+1 represents the status of the rst Type B patient, zra+2 represents the
status of the second Type B patient, , : : :, zr represents the status of the r
th
b (last)
Type B patient. For any possible vector of (z1; z2; : : : ; zr), zi 2 f0; 1g; 1  i  r, we
can nd one corresponding scenario s1 in sequence 1, one corresponding scenario s2
in sequence 2.
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First, consider z = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1), when all patients showed up. According to
Lemma 1, in Scenario s1, the physician's working time, T1 is rL. Meanwhile, in
Scenario s2, the physician's working time, T2, is more than rL (i.e., T2 > rL) with a
positive amount of overtime.
Then, for an arbitrary z vector, some patients may not show up. To treat xa
Type A patients and xb Type B patients, the physician needs to spend (xaa+xbb)
in both scenarios s1 and s2. In scenario s1, the physician will leave the clinic at
the end of rL. Thus, the physician's idle time is (rL   xaa   xbb). However, in
scenario s2, the physician will leave the clinic either at the end of rL (if the last
patient does not show up) or after the treatment of the last patient, which will be a
number in the range of [rL; T2]. Thus, the physician's idle time in Scenario s2 is at
least (rL  xaa   xbb).
Therefore, in these two scenarios, the physician's idle time in scenario s2 is no less
than the physician's idle time in scenario s1. For the same z vector, s1 and s2 share
the same probability value (1   pa)xapra xaa (1   pb)xbprb xbb . Since the physician's
expected idle time will be the sum of 2r scenario's weighted idle time, the physician's
expected idle time in sequence 2 is always no less than the physician's expected idle
time in Sequence 1. Note that for any schedule in set , the expected physician
overtime is zero. This completes the proof.
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